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Is there

an epistemological and/or practical basis for an ethic
of history

the twentieth century? This dissertation focuses

of Western metaphysics

that

upon

selected

at the close

works within the

of

tradition

have allowed such a question to become both recognizable

and problematic today.

The problematic aspects of such
to the idea

a question

become

of a world-history— of a teleological

unanimously considered

to

readily apparent. For

historical

process— which

it

is all

gives rise

but

be of contemporary relevance only as a reminder of why the

present defines itself as a “postmodern” age.

Furthermore, the concept of an ethic of history evokes the thought of the Kantian

moral law which Georg Lukacs described as early as 1914 as a depleted source of
illumination that no longer serves as “the

map of all

possible paths.”

But along with the philosophy of history as conceived by Herder, Hegel and Marx, the
present has inherited a critique of that tradition

whose

origins lie in the Kantian system.

Chapter

explores

1

how Kant presents an ethic of history that

is

in fact deprived

of the

kind of objective or empirically
verifiable measure capable of
providing something like a
road

map

for

human

unrepresentable law

action.

is

For Kant the task of enforcing an
unwritten and

therefore conferred

Chapter 2 then focuses upon

how

upon the human imagination.

Kant’s critique of reason regulates the
necessary yet

potentially boundless and debilitating

power of the imagination by

theological supplement to the moral
law.

The very phrase

“theological supplement”

indicates that an unorthodox theological
concept has thereby
establish

and valorize a limit

Can such

to the capacities

of the human

a limit be represented “atheologically”?
This

instituting a

been introduced

in order to

will.

is

the question underlying

chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3 Friedrich Schiller’s
program for an “aesthetic education”
interpreted as a supplement to the moral law that
ends

4, in turn,

up by

all

but displacing

it.

is

Chapter

argues that Friedrich Nietzsche’s attempt to displace the moral
law succeeds in

revitalizing

it.
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INTRODUCTION

By using the present
imagination) in
question

is

tense and avoiding the genitive
(for and not o/the historical

its title this

something

that

dissertation attempts to

convey how

for

Kant the law

in

can neither be discovered through a
process of empirical

investigation nor enforced as though

it

were the expression of an already existing
and

legitimated form of political authority.
But what these negative characterizations

thereby accentuate

how

the

history—to a past and

and yet seem

The imagination

when

the need for a binding set of prescriptions
and proscriptions, given

power of the human imagination can be fomented by

relation to a

visible

is

the object

is

to encroach

its

ongoing and dynamic

future that are not immediately present at

upon the subject

as a burden, a threat and a hope.

defined by Kant as the “power of [producing] intuitions
even

not present”—in fact appears to be particularly well suited
for

assuming the impossible task of representing an experience of time
itself upon the subject as

the

name of a

Kant

this

historical

does not mean

an affective absence.'

the

faculties

It

that the stand in for

[Vermogen]

it

is

that

seems

to press

therefore seems that whatever takes

law must bear the imprint of a “subjective”

constitutively arbitrary so long as

powers or

hand or

origin.

an objective or universal law

And

yet for

is

capable of bringing the subject’s cognitive

into a certain

agreement with one another

if not

with

phenomenal world.
However,

if the

cognitive powers ultimately are to cohere then a relation to that

world must be established;

for pure reason

must become

1

practical even

though the

exigencies of historical experience
are not something over which
either the laws of
nature or the rational concepts
[Vemunftsbegriffe] can effectively
legislate.
histoncal subject

fulfilled

And

endowed with

a capacity for

The

freedom which can never be definitively

thus appears to be in need of
a singular measure for action
and reneetion.
the ethic of history Kant presents
as both a “supplement” to the
moral law and

a recuperation of the “nature” of
the subject today seems to meet
several canonized

epistemological criteria:
to

it is

not derived from a teleological
process;

an ethic of conviction, whereby what
counts in the

subjective intention; and

it

last

does not value success above

variable in the evaluation of historical
events, as

was and

instance

is

all else as

is

it

is

not reducible

a particular

the deteimining

the case within certain

strands of nineteenth century historicism and
contemporary neo-pragmatism.^

What

also resonates with ongoing poststructuralist
and neo-Lacanian trends

is

the

presupposition that philosophy, politics, ethics and history
can be brought into an at
least functional relationship

sufficiently transcendental

phenomena

with one another

i.e. if it is

if the position

somehow

held by the philosophical

able to determine

how

is

cultural

are to be represented in terms of their conditions of possibility and
not as

things in themselves.

For what

is

here sought by Kant

is

a standpoint that

would allow human

history to be

interpreted as something other than an aggregation of impressionistic yet ephemeral

events (journalistic historiography) or a realm of appearances whose significance

becomes

legible only with the importation of an extrinsic and atemporal ideal.

of history that

is

neither empirical nor transcendent

2

is

An

then required if the subject

ethic

is to

attain a necessarily
imperfect

shifting relationship

In the

understanding of how to situate itself
within the ever-

between past and present.

second and

third Critiques, the abyssal
foundation for such an ethic is

presented as the moral law, the same
law
putatively

whose

outmoded character now appears

to

unconditional, universal and therefore

be a

liability

when

it

comes

practical-theoretical space capable of
accommodating a proliferating

to creating a

number of

cultural-political identities.

Precedents for such an unfavorable judgment
were in part established by Schiller and
Nietzsche, both of whom represented the
moral law as a debilitating product of Reason
that overly constricts the

human

isolated as a paradigmatic

subject’s form-giving capacity. But

and primordial value

subordinate status within the

is for

economy of the human

Kant consigned

will

unrepresentable ideal and toward a readily accessible idol.

And

“alterity” incapable

It

human being

to a strictly

it

animates

away from an

that is both

moral

opposed

longing for an experience of profane

of being mastered by the self-positing

“Culture should place the

whole concept.

politics; the

thereby

in this sense the

law seems to share an affinity with another contemporary tendency

and appropriated by identity

is

on account of how

a form of practice or production (a re/v;/) that draws
the imagination

to

what

in

freedom and

should thus enable him to assert his

subject.

assist

will,

him

because

in fulfilling his

man

is

the being

[Wesen] that wills.”^
Presented two centuries ago as a response to the Kantian

“summons of and

to

reason” [Aufforderung an die Vemunft], Friedrich Schiller’s prescriptive conception of
the

human being appears today

as an exemplary testament to the hubris of the tradition

3

of Western metaphysics.'' Hubris can
here be ascribed

to an entire tradition insofar as

it

connotes a “transcendental” disposition,
associated not with any particular action
but
with the very concept of the willful
subject as such.

That

human

foundation

is

action has been deprived of a universally
binding rational-moral

not an event that distinguishes the singularity
of the present age; rather,

the latter perhaps

emerges as the time

which even the sense of rupture

in

that

gave

rise

—without, however, being succeeded by anything

to the

legitimation crisis” has passed

like a revolution or restoration.^

It is

as

though modernity has even become alienated

from the concept of alienation, from the “radical world
alienation”

that

Hannah Arendt

described as a “situation where man, wherever he goes,
encounters only himself All
the processes of the earth and the universe have revealed
themselves either as

made

or as potentially man-made.”^

Can

of a calling while in the throes of such a
recognition

is

the sense of being

the

human being

to issue a

identifiable

call

is,

moreover, both unenforceable

which can be neither traced

form of authority claims

as

its

what awaits

seemingly irrefutable yet

groundless verdict against the “being that wills” which

and strangely redundant. The

discern even the semblance

historical situation? Perhaps

summoned

man-

to,

nor received by, an

victim the subject that appears destined to be

without a destiny.

A question pervading recent poststructuralist and neo-Lancanian literature is how to
respond to such an interpretation of world-history without invoking the sense of heroicexistential pathos that

human

accompanied

early twentieth-century attempts to provide the

subject with a binding and enabling ethic.

requires a form

of “tragic” justification, such a

4

By

claiming that

modem expenence

historical ethic allowed the subject to

assert its will in spite, or

Its

because

But when subjected

actions.

of, the

knowledge

to a certain

that there is

no measure on earth

contemporary reading,

secular form of engaged resignation
seems to establish one

this

for

impeccably

more metaphysical measure:

the self-positmg subject as the
last bastion of unassailable
value and meaning.^
Schiller’s conception

insofar as

it

of freedom retroactively forms a precedent

endows the

for such a subject

will with a seemingly inherent
arbitrariness

presumably serves, however, as the indispensable
precondition

which also

for a reinterpretation

of

culture.^

This

IS

the foremost historical problem

which the Dialectic of Enlightenment

diagnosed during the Second World War: the freedom
of the
present itself both as what led

to,

human will seems

and what must lead the way out

of, the

impasse which

the tradition of metaphysics reached at the beginning
of the twentieth century.

capacity for freedom creates an impasse insofar as

human

action in a

way that

it

produces a “measure”

is

The

that

simultaneously enables and entraps the will; that

has been elevated to the status of a de facto law

to

is,

governs

what

the subject’s unfailing ability to posit

and procure arbitrary purposes to the detriment of the human relation toward what

Adorno and Horkheimer

still

named

“nature” and toward what

is

now commonly

referred to as “alterity” or language as such.'®

Poststructuralist philosophy has (explicitly

and implicitly) received the Dialectic of

Enlightenment as something of a living heritage that in part guides
extricate the “experience

'

historical projects.

prototypical, text

'

of freedom” from the debilitating

its

after-effects

Such a rescue operation begins with what one

announces as

its

central presupposition:

5

attempt to

of its

recent,

own

avowedly

any interpretation of the

Western

tradition that lays claim to an
“ethico-political” status

distinguish

ought

to sharply

position from the “discourse of grounds,
morality and good

Its

conscience.”’^

These three cardinal principles contravene the
“protocols” of a
stipulate that “ethics

priority

and

politics... are

evaded when

we

fall

back on the conceptual

of subject, agency or identity as the grounds of
our action.”’^

political

be introduced into a language

is to

become synonyms

for a violence

in

which

historical ethic

which measure and

If the “ethico-

have

self-assertion

stemming from an unreflective need

for “cognitive

certainty” and “security”, then the conceptual and practical
displacements caused

Dialectic of Enlightenment

out of which a

responsibility

new

yield not simply an

historical experience

empty space but

codifies,

first

a fractured tradition

may nevertheless somehow

arise; “the

which adheres

to

make our decisions

to the poststructuralist protocols

for us.”’"’

Thomas Keenan here

Michel Foucault singles out the Kantian philosophy as the “discourse”

disclosed the

[its]... actions

autonomous subject who “must

as a universal subject

The concepts of the

by conforming

constitute

[itself]... in

that

each of

to universal rules.”’^

rule and the ground, together with the corresponding experiences

of certainty and security here
capable of lending worth to

irrational, the

only

worthy of the name comes with the removal of grounds, the withdrawal

of rules or the knowledge on which we might rely
In a text

by the

crystallize into the antithesis

human

experience.

of what

What modem

mythic or the afterglow of the theological

is

is still

scientism

deemed

named

the

thus converted into the

hitherto unrecognized realm of the “ethico-political.”

However,

if the

Enlightenment tradition exerts a singular influence on the present

6

age as an unforgettable monument
marking both the loss of its
largely tmchallenged
authority and the absence

of anything

like

an undisputed

heir,

then the discovery of the

“ethico-political” takes place within
a disquieting historical
interval; for a present

without a determinate identity
continues

to

be affected by a past that can
be represented

as an object of knowledge only
in terms of loss. Such a
situation poses difficulties for

Keenan and Foucault

to the degree that their
respective projects unduly subject
the

enduring sense of the past to a present’s
unilateral reinterpretation.'’

For instance, when Keenan and Foucault
are read together,

of the institutionalized legitimation

crisis are traceable to

it

appears that the origins

Kant, the principal

philosophical source from which Schiller
derives his conception of culture.

But what

if

the Kantian discourse of “grounds and
morality” exerts both a centrifugal and

centnpetal force upon the contemporary critique
of the universal, moral subject? Then
the

summons of reason” would seem

to

emanate from a past

that

ought

to

be

represented not only as the origin of the current impasse
afflicting the Western tradition

but also as a living heritage capable of renaming the
central task which faces a
prospective ethic of history: “the only responsibility worthy
of the

removal of [the] grounds. .on which
.

name comes with

we might rely to make our decisions

7

for us.”

the

CHAPTER

THE VOCATION OF REASON AND

Excavating the “treasure” which Kant

left for

systematic order, of all the possessions
that

what

at first

secret.'*

may appear more closely

impressions.

“posterity”_“the inventory, put

to resemble a relic than

of reason takes on

in

is

opened

any kind of much needed

to the beginning of the 86"'

the aura of a heritage emitting both
of these

What then becomes apparent

[Vemunftbestimmung] continues

THE LOGIC OF HISTORY

we have through pure rcusou”-unearths

But when the Critique of Judgment

section, the vocation

I

is

how

the imposing “destination of reason”

to furnish the basis for a teleological

judgment

rendered by an array of “post-Kantian” subjects.'^

There

is a judgment that even the commonest
understanding [gemeinste
Verstand] cannot escape when it meditates about the
existence of the
things in the world and of the world itself. .It is the

judgment

.

that all

these diverse creatures [Geschdpfe] [of the world] would
exist for
nothing [zu nichts da sein wurden] if they did not include human
beings... no matter

how

diversely, coherently

artfully devised these creatures

and purposively

the judgment that without

man

all

may

be, and

how

words it is
of creation would be a mere wasteland
interrelated... In other

[eine bloBe Wiiste], gratuitous and without a final purpose [Endzweck].

The judgments of the “commonest understanding” hold a

human
ill

central place in the trial of

reason which Kant stages in the three Critiques. For they testify to a vocation

served as long as the realm of human experience

empirically verifiable. That

is,

is

confined to that which

is

they indicate a fundamental need to raise questions

which a knowledge of Newtonian “physics” cannot answer.

8

But while the need

for a system of meta-physics

imagination depnved of empirical cognition

is to

otherwise potentially boundless speculations,

seemingly incapable of ever being
attests to

how

it is

The

if the

its

also eminently dangerous and

history of modem philosophy, in fact,

which emerged

in order to

endow

a teleological and ethical form has instead
produced a “combat

of endless conflict” which threatens

to

expand beyond the tragic-comic

disputations of academe and into the world which the
Its

inescapably necessary

retain a certain lawfulness for

the tradition of Western metaphysics

human expenence with
arena

fulfilled.

is

home.^’ If anything like a peace

is to

common understanding claims

be attained, then such a locus must be

recognized as the source of both the conflicts and their possible
resolution. That

with the

common understanding that the receptivity to

propensity for lawless speculation that “plunges
contradictions”

is

to

purview of reason, which

“moral feeling” and the

human reason

into darkness and

is

empirical perception must

both of these forms of experience before

—“On Ethicotheology”—

commonest understanding
science.

As

is

its

tribunal

itself,

and the very

title

judgment

the

however, brings

of its

86‘^

indicates that the inescapable judgment of the

not merely directed toward a world conceived as an object

a result, two indissociable aspects of the essentially limited yet

enabling power [Vermogen] of human judgment are here brought
First, the

become

thus positioned in close proximity to what tradition has

reserved for theology and aesthetics. The Critique of Judgment

of physical

is, it is

be found.

The realm of the imagination not guided by

section

as

in question that

“reflective” judgment, defined

seems

by Kant

forth.

to press itself upon the

human

subject

is

as the ability to prescribe a universal principle

9

a

for a particular

But

phenomenon

this capacity to posit a

in the absence of an existing

law which

in turn serves as a

law bearing objective

guide for the subject’s

interpretation of its relationship to the world
does not thereby enable

want of empincal knowledge
reflective judgment toward

set in

for an arbitrarily

imposed

constrained

to

view the phenomenal world

principles that structure

human

as if it

So although

is

not

were an objective

constitutive

,

is

of

ineluctably

the subjectivity of the subject

.

.it

then

it

Copemican

turn,

however, even

is

is

critical

holds just as necessarily for our

principle.

human judgment

in its interpretation

cannot subsume the phenomena of nature under

concepts determined in accordance with mechanical-mathematical laws. As a
the

drawn

the self-prescribed law that stands in for a

If the subjective principle that is necessary for

of nature

exchange a

accordance with a priori spatio-temporal

regulative, not constitutive.

is

human judgment

in

is,

to

experience and are capable of being submitted to

reflection, to “self-cognition.”

given universal

That

it

rule. Rather, the act

which the commonest understanding

motion by the Copemican revolution.

validity.

this determinate

judgment of nature

is

result

of

governed by

a priori principles valid only for understanding nature as a phenomenon, not as a thing
in itself.

But as an indeterminate object of sense, nature also

affects the subject in

that cannot be accounted for in terms of mechanical laws alone.

interpretation of nature is guided

nevertheless bears

its

By presenting the

by a merely “subjective” or

ways

When this happens,

the

reflective principle that

own form of necessity.
task of critical philosophy to be the delimitation of the conditions

for the possibility of human representation (rather than of objects, of things in

themselves), Kant sets a precedent for an interpretation of the sensible world in which

10

the concept of nature

is

severed from anything

like

a corresponding, preformed object

of intuition. And yet the concept of nature
as phenomenon also demarcates a
realm of
necessity that

chasm”
also

is

separated from the “domain” [Gebiet]
of freedom

[eine unubersehbare Kluft].“ Nature
thus signifies that

what must be represented

The

two

centuries, the borders

Kant established

in order to

of necessity impinging upon the subject as a being
redrawn.

And yet the

philosophy

to

common

understanding

in the

human

not from the

subject.

Over the

circumscribe an experience

world have been continually

disparate attempts which arose out of the tradition of Western

action have to a great extent upheld the underlying structure erected by

the “critical enterprise”

whose completion Kant announced

in the preface to the third

For the foundation in question endures so long as the search continues

Critique.

is

not given, but

determine the conditions of possibility that enable and limit human

knowledge and

measure or

is

upon a concept of non-natural necessity derived

external world as such but from the specific
constitution of the

past

which

in strict opposition to freedom.

inescapable judgment that awaits the recognition
of the

thus turns out to be based

by an “immense

limit that

would allow a

subject for

for a

whom objective knowledge of the world

barred to fashion laws for itself which are capable of organizing and giving value to

human

experience.

But there

are countervailing signs that such evidence

simply suggest
Kantianism. In

that there is a

fact,

need

the degree to

to greatly

which

of historical continuity does not

expand the traditional concept of neo-

the transmission of tradition has

spawned

seemingly dramatic theoretical and practical reversals or inversions becomes

11

—
particularly evident

when Kant’s

description of how the world

becomes a wasteland

is

reread at the close of the twentieth century.
If an inescapable judgment for the present age

wasteland precisely because of the supposition

purpose of nature, then

how

is

is that

that the

the world has

become

a

human being represents

the final

the exposition of the “ethical-political” to be
understood?

For there would then be no immediately recognizable theoretical
or
within which such an ethic could begin to get

its

practical space

bearings and gather the remains of

humanity’s “powers” or forces in the wake of the ravages caused by
the triumph of the
will.

A. The “Precarious and Dangerous Standpoint”

Returning to Kant therefore seems necessary

between the subject and the concept of the
Critiques.

By

doing so

human beings does
this

it

becomes evident

in order to clarify the relationship

“final purpose” presented in the three

first

of all that for Kant the mere existence of

not suffice to ensure that the world does not exist for no thing, for

bare fact then begs the question of why they

exist.

On the basis of a peculiar experience that cannot be

secured as an object of

knowledge, Kant specifies that only a certain type of human being preempts the
devaluing of the world: namely, the type capable of positing
a “final purpose”.

For something to be

first

—and

relating to itself as

of all considered a purpose,

it

must be

thought of as the cause of a particular object, the “real basis of its possibility.”

12

28

A

purpose

final

is

then a “purpose that requires no other
purpose as a condition of its

possibility.”'" In the

Prolegomen a To Any Future Metaphysics, such
a form of “special

causality

is

isolated as the fundamental

“problem of metaphysics” whose origin

lies in

the “indomitable desire” [die nicht zu dampfende
Begierde] of human reason to “create
for Itself the idea of a spontaneity that can,

on

its

be preceded by another cause by means of which

own,

it

is

start to

act-without needing

determined to action

to

in turn,

according to the law of causal connection.”

What

accentuates the “indomitable” character of such a desire

object in question seems to be immanent

on the

reflecting

natural laws

it

it

is that

nevertheless “fails” to appear; for

prescribes for the phenomenal world,

impelled to follow the chain of cause and effect

until

it

secures the

unconditioned cause as an object of knowledge. And while
also “inevitable” [unvermeidlich]

creating an antinomy, that which

although the

this not

human

first,

when
reason

or

only indomitable but

demand of theoretical reason cannot be met
is

is

(without

seemingly contradictory), the practical effects of

just such a cause are evinced through a form of human action that appears in nature

even though

it

simultaneously seems to belie the very possibility that

it

arose out of

nature.^*

Now
freedom

for a spontaneous

—

to

be ascribed

will, the latter

legislating.

for

its

to the finite, contingent

is

What makes

the

cause, that

it

is,

the idea of

and pathologically affected human

must be endowed with a form of agency

existence in such a

purpose

—an unconditioned

power

that can, or should,

be

self-

possible for a consequently “autonomous” subject to answer

way

that its acts appear to animate the

world with a

“power of desire” [Begehrungsvermogen]-the “power [of the
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final

subject]. ..to

be the cause, through

its

representations, of the reality of the objects of

these representations.”

While reason cannot determine the existence of a
of theoretical knowledge,

And

action.

it is

it

practical

of reason’s “practical” power as a potentially

historical force that averts the disaster that

The only

purpose in nature as an object

can introduce such a purpose into nature through

the recognition

which could only be

final

would otherwise expose

ethical-

the world to a future

a repetition of the past.

which can give man’s existence an absolute value
[absoluten Wert], and by reference to which the existence of the
world
can have a final purpose, is the power of desire.. .But.. .not.. .that [lower]
power of desire which makes man dependent on nature (through
[thing]

impulses of sense) [durch sinnliche Antriebe], i.e. not the one according
to which the value of man’s existence depends on what he receives
and
enjoys.

An

“absolute value”

is

established only

himself, and that consists in what he does,

by means of what the subject can “give

how and on what principles he

link in nature [nichts als Naturglied] but in the freedom of his

good

acts, not as a

power of desire... in

a

will [guter Wille].

Because

it is

the result of a reflective judgment, the concept of the

final

purpose does not

That

is,

for

Kant amount

to a

human being

as a

“dogmatic” presentation of teleology.

the “inner moral destination of human existence for a purpose [die innere

moralische Zweckbestimmung seines Daseins] that makes up for the deficiency

knowledge of nature” does not
knowledge.^^ Nor does

it

in its

in turn establish a determinate object of historical

even succeed in dispelling the suspicion

that the

human being

is

incapable of attaining the regulative ideal toward which

is

forever exposed to the danger that once the ideal of establishing a “kingdom of
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it

strives.

In fact, the subject

purposes”
will give

its

is

acknowledged,

nse

ajudgment

to

its

inevitable juxtaposition with humanity’s
profane history

that “regard[s) that striving [Bestrebung]
as

wholly

futile in

effects.”

The common understanding seems

to

be confronted with another inescapable

judgment: recognition of the higher power of desire

overwhelming sense of futility unless human
revolution”.

(the will

will also bring with

it

an

history undergoes a fundamental

But the possibility of transforming the natural history of the

of a phenomenal being of nature whose empirical existence

time) into an ethical history

is

mocked by

that continues to uphold Augustine’s

is

finite will

determined

in

the ever expanding chronicle of human evil

judgment of world-history during the age of the

Enlightenment.^^

Regardless of how authentic the documentation of a particular historical event may
be, however,

used

it

does not offer admissible evidence

to either disprove or

to the tribunal

of reason that can be

confirm humanity’s moral destination. Natural history would

then seem to furnish the space and time within which the striving toward a
is

to occur without, in turn, providing a

“In fact,

it is

by

all

means impossible

GewiBheit auszumachen] as a

result

measure

final

purpose

that sanctions its practical possibility.

to determine with

complete certainty [mit vdlliger

of experience a single case

in

which the maxim

[the

subjective principle guiding action] of a seemingly obligatory action was based solely

upon moral grounds and on the

representation of duty.”

Furthermore, any attempt to approximate certainty here would be of absolutely no
value in any case, for a historical event that serves as a testament

model

for, ethical action

would not allow

the will to maintain
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its

to,

and idolatrous

autonomy. For

following wha.

is

singled ou, as an example
of morality i„ an

logical impossibility that

about morality than

to

claim

be allowed with regard

Unable

to dismiss

cames over to
it

to the

can be derived from
examples...Imitation can

in

human

subject

is

that the

“good will”

to the testimony

is

a “mere chimera

of nature, history or theology,

destined for a final punrose
must be defended

from an avowedly “precarious and
dangerous standpoint which should
be firm
it is

no way

moral.”

of the human imagination” by
appealing

the fact that

a

is

experience: ‘Vorse counsel
could not be given
ei

summarily the accusation

the supposition that the

autonomous manner

based or dependent upon [gehangt]
something that

is

neither

despite

on heaven

nor earth.”

The human being

is

summoned

by “reason”, which thereby serves
guarantor.

The need

to a task

of neither sacred nor simply profane
origin

less as a mediating

power than as something

like a

for the latter arises lest the
subject find itself abandoned to
an

inheritance in which the withdrawal of
the grounds, of the moral foundation,
established

by

that

either

which

is either closest

(nature) or

wholly incomprehensible or

most

distant (the divine) renders experience

solipsistic.

The only responsibility worthy of the name comes with

the removal of grounds.”'*^

This contemporary declaration seems to be
corroborated by the very “discourse of

grounds and morality” against which
discourse

it

of reason

that

it

was

once claimed

to

presented. But what kind of language

is

speak for the self-legislating subject? While

allows the subject to express a dissatisfaction with certain
inadequacies endemic to

empirical existence,

which

is

it

the

also allows the imagination to take

on a boundless character

thus prone to the rise of “fanaticism [Schwarmerei], which
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its

is

the delusion of

wanting to see something beyond
principles,

all limits

of sensibility,

i.e.

of dreaming according to

of raving with reason [nach Grundsatzen
traumen...mit Vemunft

Although the

limits

of sensibility ought

rasen]."'^

be recognized by theoretical reason as an

to

impenetrable barrier rather than as a threshold,
the subject

is

not thereby consigned to

an existence responsive only to the mechanism
of nature and the vagaries of
“unprincipled” dreams. For the subject’s “plunge
into darkness”
rediscovery of solid ground but by an ungraspable
force that
its

is arrested

not by the

somehow justifies

itself in

very incomprehensibility:
reason restlessly searches for the unconditionally
necessary and sees
itself compelled to accept it without any
means at all of making
it

comprehensible

to itself.

.

.And so even though we do not grasp

practically unconditioned necessity of the moral
imperative,

nevertheless grasp
fairness

be demanded

toward the

The

its

irresistible force

reason."*^

capable of puncturing an insulating delusion

the onset of a meta-psychological

presupposes an

we do

incomprehensibility, which is all that can in
of a philosophy which strives in its principles

of human

limits

ability to

the

mood. For

to

be destined

to a

is attested to

moral purpose

be receptive to a certain experience whose effects are no

immediate than the feelings of pain and pleasure. And although the summons
reason

s

moral vocation

is

only graspable through the language of reason,

movement of the human understanding does

by

less

to

this peculiar

not trace a vicious circle. Rather,

its

“hermeneutic” character stems from the interpretation of a singular experience which
indicates that because reason can

build concepts

(i.e.

know

only that which

it

posits,

it is

able not only to

the categories) into the phenomenal world but also to initiate events

therein through acts of freedom. This

means
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that the possibility

of history becoming

ethical is “guaranteed”

which

IS

by a form of non-natural necessity specific
to the human being

traceable to the strangest of all facts, the
“fact of reason.”

However, in order to avoid misinterpretation in regarding
this. .[fact] as
it must be noted carefully
that it is not an empirical fact but the
sole fact of pure reason which, by it, announces
itself... [I]t forces itself
upon us of itself [es sich fur sich selbst uns aufdringt] and...
is not based
on any intuition, either pure [i.e. intellectual] or empirical.
.

given,

Perhaps the poverty of the empirical
with the

significance

But Kant seems

fact

becomes most evident when confronted

of a death that provokes irreconcilable and inimitable
responses,

to suggest that the “practical reality”

(i.e.

exceptional fact that gives rise to an incommensurable
subject imagines

that the

action?

its

imminent
Or,

relation to its

threat

how may

own

the possible efficacy) of an

mood

is

confirmed when the

death in a singular way; that

is,

how

is it

possible

of death does not become the determining motive for a given

an act of willful sacrifice be understood?

Ask [someone].

.whether he thinks

it would be possible for him to
of life, however great it may be, if his sovereign
threatened him with... an immediate penalty of death [unverzdgerten
Todesstrafe] unless he made a false disposition against a honorable man

overcome

.

his love

whom the sovereign wished to destroy.

.Whether he would do so or not
he perhaps will not dare to affirm; but that it would be possible for him,
he must concede without hesitation. He judges, therefore, that he can do
something because he is conscious he should, and recognizes freedom in
himself, which otherwise

.

would have remained unknown

to

him without

the [fact of reason or the consciousness of the] moral law.

If the consciousness of the moral

law—the

fact

—did yield an object of

of reason

empirical knowledge then the assumption that humanity has a final purpose would be

challenged by something

still

of reason offers a measure

for

more threatening than a judgment of futility. For
what amounts

to a typology
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the fact

of possible historical moods

which are then evaluated

in terms

of the kind of relationship

to the

moral law they

presuppose.

For instance,

if reason is

allowed to dream with concepts and thereby
imagine the

objective reality of the law to be as readily
apparent to the

human understanding

as the

appearances of nature, then the power of judgment
would have no need to posit a
limiting and yet enabling reflective

judgment

for itself (i.e. that

and the power of desire would not be “subject”
that

word: “the will

that

it

is... not

must be regarded

a final purpose),

it is

to the law in the only proper sense

merely subjected [unterworfen]

to the

of

law but so subjected

as legislating for itself [selbstgesetzgebend].”

Only an autonomous,

self-legislating subject

can also be subjected to the moral law.

A critique of reason, an exposition and delimitation of its limits and capacities, is
therefore necessary above

because the concept of morality has traditionally been

all

represented either as an “attractive allure” [Reiz] or “coercive force” [Zwang]

,

thereby

preempting the development of a form of consciousness which recognizes the
“indelible” [unausldschliche] yet invisible character of the

The

limits to

human knowledge harmonize with

long as such recognition takes place. But

law."^^

the will’s practical capacities so

if the conditions for the possibility

action are not understood, and the measure for an ethic of history

is

assumed

of lawful
to

be of

empirical origin, then a premature reconciliation between sensibility and duty arises.

For because the “spur
subject

is

[Stachel] to action is here immediately at

“no longer required

resist the inclinations

to

work

its

way up toward

hand and

gathering

its

external”, the

powers

in order to

through the living representation [lebendige Vorstellung] of the

dignity of the law.”
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Lawful actions would then ostensibly take
conditioned the world would

still

be performed out of fear; such

is

place, but insofar as they

were empirically

resemble a mere wasteland because they
would
the experience of a subject

whose

at best

habitual behavior

betrays a will that appears to be determined in
the last instance by regulative principles

which preserve and

further natural inclinations.

And natural history can

only become

ethical if the finite subject understands itself
as a pathologically affected, but not

pathologically determined being:
the dependence of a will which

not absolutely good on the principle of
moral necessitation [Ndtigung]) is obligation
[Verbindlichkeit]. This [condition] can thus not be ascribed
to a holy

autonomy

is

(i.e.

being The objective necessity of an action [done] out of obligation

is

duty.

The idea of the holy

“regulates” the self-representation of a

identity is constituted as a lack and

reason must hope

whose

not purposeless.

is

corresponds to such a pure incentive

will is

And the
is

human

endowed with

a certain capacity that

representation of the law

“living” insofar as

it is,

whose

subject

which

like all concepts

of

reason [Vemunftsbegriffe], unrepresentable. Only in

this

unholy will which

singular capacity to confer an

is

nevertheless distinguished

by

its

way can

it

innervate an

absolute value on actions undertaken without undue regard for their pragmatic or
technical utility. For if the proper jurisdiction of the law
value, then the

human

is

calculated in terms of use

experience of time would be devoid of any intimation that the

“spontaneity” required for introducing the qualitatively

the conduct of human beings, so long as

new

its [finite,

into history could arise:

pathological] nature

remained as it now is, would be transformed into a mere mechanism,
where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no
would be found in the figures.
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life

The mechanical movements

associated with the puppet theater are
particularly

unsuitable for representing the kind of
“moving force or emotion” animating the good

And

will.

moods

sustaining this productive tension

as hubris, irreverence, fanaticism and
complacency are

and nurtured once the subject

though

necessary because such historical

is

It

were

If what

in

some way

is

too easily cultivated

all

faced with the task of approaching the
impossible as

imperfectly and imperceptibly realizable.

appear to be the conditions for the impossibility of a
historical experience are

understandably thought of as inhibiting rather than enabling
the

of the moral law

s

commands may be

the Lutheran Reformation. For

the “lower”

power of desire

will,

then the severity

lessened in a manner that evokes the origins of

what adds

to the

drama of the

Kant stages

will

is that

also forces itself upon the subject, thereby creating the

conditions of possibility for misrepresenting the law as “indulgent and
thus suitable for

our comfort [nachsichtlich (indulgent) und so unserer Behaglichkeit angemessen].”^^

The

relation to the moral law

would thus be transformed

rationalization and legitimization of the real

—whether

be “after Kant”, as the constitution of an existing
sanctions

its

into an occasion for the

the latter

state or as

is

construed, as

it

will

an extra-legal norm that

overthrow. In such cases an ethical-historical law

is

posited as a

determinate object which can be possessed and mastered “merely through the use of the
[subject’s] natural powers.”

But “duty and indebtedness [Schuldigkeit] are the only names
our relation to the moral law.”

This

is

the only

way

in

that

we must

give to

which a non-quanti Liable

—

correspondence between rational concept (the idea of freedom) and experience
historical

mood

—

is to

i.e.

be maintained. The intimation of such imperfect symmetry
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a

answers yet again

And because being in

experience.

interaction

to the insuperable

demand of reason

world means being subjected

the

between the understanding and

sense impressions),

work before any

human consciousness

particular

for a coherent

sensibility (this is

is for

how

and unified

to the

ongoing

the subject processes

Kant affected by a process which

moment of theoretical

cognition arises.

is at

Once such an

intentional act does occur, the question that
immediately imposes itself upon reason

“what sort of use can

we make of our understanding.

.

.as regards experience, if

is:

we do

not set purposes for ourselves?”^^

The

setting

of purposes ultimately requires

which culminates

in the establishment

experience must be conceived
verified

or

first

by a

in

of the

aporetic character

“final purpose”.

way

Now because human

terms of a necessary unity that nevertheless cannot be

theoretical cognition (that

cause), the subject

that they cohere in a systematic

s relation

would

require an intuition of the unconditioned,

of indebtedness

to the

moral law takes on an

which may present reason with something more than a seeming

contradiction. For once reason posits the subject as a final purpose in accordance with

an unfailing logic,
(be

it

it is

confronted with the existentially compelling absence of anything

a sign of nature, history or divinity) that would suggest the fulfillment of such a

purpose

is historically

would appear

to

be

its

possible.

outermost

And

at this

limits, for

point Kant pushes the use of logic to what

it

would not be

violate logic’s touchstone, the law of non-contradiction

to

—

logical

—

if the fact

it

would

in fact

of reason turned out

be “useless” for not only pragmatic and technical but also moral ends.
In the third Critique, the principle

how

of “purposiveness without a purpose” indicates

the subject’s sense of being in a relation as such (of being in a relation with
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its

own

powers of representation: the understanding and
the imagination)
disinterested experience specific to the
judgment of beauty.

forms the

subjective” basis for moral feeling

subject to represent a

finite subject

The only proper

Such a principle

by demonstrating

that

it

is

in fact

possible for a

phenomenal object of nature independently of technical
or

pragmatic considerations; but

of the

induced by the

is

bound

this principle also

to a

appears to offer

law whose commands

it is

itself as

a description

unable fully to carry out.

relation to the law thus appears ultimately to lead
to the recognition

that the subject is destined for ^ final purpose to

no purpose. And

something

this is

that

poses the greatest threat to the lawfulness of the vocation of reason:

pure reason contains... principles of the possibility
of experience, i.e. of
the experience of such actions as could be met with in accordance
with
moral prescriptions in the history of the human being [solche

Handlungen, die den

sittlichen Vorschriften gemali in der Geschichte des
anzutreffen sein kdnnten]. For since pure reason commands
that such actions ought to occur, they must also be able to occur [Kant’s

Menschen

emphasis].

It is

the “peculiar fate” of the

human

powers of reason. This summons places
“must” and seemingly cannot be carried
possibility

of any use of reason as such

subject to be called by reason to

it

its

own

before a law whose injunctions “could”,

But

out.

[is].

.

“that

which

is

.that its principles

required for the

and affirmations must

not contradict one another.”

The

logic of reason

seems

to

have given to the commonest understanding an

inescapable judgment

whose

innocence

For what kind of sentence

is at stake.

as a final purpose to

seems both

to

verdict indicates that something

no purpose,

as the subject

is it

that determines the

guilt or

human being

of the moral law whose historicization

be demanded and precluded by the a
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more than

priori principles

of pure reason?

And

yet the Kantian subject appears in
fact to be poised to assume

its

destiny in

defiance of the logic of history. For the
will stands before an indelible yet
invisible law

whose “categorical imperative”

prescribes

no

particular action save for the act of

law as such:

prescribing

since. .[the will]

is deprived of every impulse
that might arise for it from
obeying any particular law, there is nothing left
to serve the will as
pnnciple except the universal conformity of its
.

actions to law as such;

should never act except

i.e. I

maxim

in

such a

[a subjective rule for action]

way

I can also will that my
should become a universal law.

that

Like the power of reflective judgment, prescribing
lawful maxims supplies the will
with a universal principle that no cognition of
phenomenal nature

is

disclosing.

The

however,

also represented on analogy with the latter’s laws; that

is

idea of the moral world that

and the concept of freedom

it

is

capable of

thus posited as the antithesis of nature,

presupposes present themselves

is,

the fact of reason

to the subject as the

conditions for the possibility of an experience of history which, although
not actual,
nevertheless

if a

somehow

law

is to

is

necessary:

be morally

ground of obligation, then it must
absolute necessity... [For] merely the dignity of humanity as
rational nature without any further purpose or advantage to be thereby
gained... should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the will...[T]his
very independence of the maxims from all. .[natural] incentives should
carry with

valid... as a

it

.

constitute the sublimity of maxims and the worthiness of every rational

subject to be a legislative

Zweeke]

for otherwise

the natural law of his

The

critique

of reason

is

member

in the

kingdom of purposes [Reich der

he would have to be regarded as subject only

own

a form of immanent critique in the sense that

proper constitution of the “transcendental” subject for
principles

of logic and reason’s a

to

needs.

whom

it

delimits the

sensible experience, the

priori representations are integrated into a totality

within which antinomies and insoluble contradictions are rigorously distinguished from
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one another.

On which

side, then,

does the looming judgment

that the

human being

is

destined to a final purpose for no purpose
fall?

B. The Final Purpose Without

If the subject appears to

realized as

human history,

be destined

its

purpose which

is

incapable of being

then the logic of non-contradiction presents the
“inflexible

precept” of the autonomous will with
recognition of both

to a final

A Purpose

own capacity

greatest challenge; and yet the subject’s

its

for

freedom (through the

fact

of reason) and the

apparent futility of its striving for the historicization of the law
can produce one
particular

mood

or feeling that reinforces rather than weakens the principle of

autonomy: longing.
This

mood

arises if the operative principle guiding pragmatic and technical

“whoever wills the purpose

comes across something

wills also the sole

like

means

for

it

which

an interdiction that exposes the willful subject

appears to remain apart from the objects

it is

potential barrier to amoral action can be

removed by judging an

subject’s

power of appropriation

maybe dangerous and

in

to

we

be of no use

by a productive

is

to

what

object that defies the

to anything but an evidently idle,

fanciful desires

are at once conscious of the insufficiency (or even

of our representations

because cognition

power”

capable of positing.^^ But perhaps this

any case purposeless imagination: “in

[phantastischen Begehrungen]

unsuitability)

are in his

action—

to

be the cause of their objects.”

^ And yet

here without a discernible object and the will seems to be animated

tension, these fanciful desires

higher power of desire.

There appears

may have

in fact to
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a particular bearing upon the

be a particular use of the imagination

which

attests to

causality.”

another

way of understanding the

For “fanciful desires”

thought of... [such] causality

when

the wish is an affect,

One

is

attest to

idea of freedom as a form of “special

a non-mechanical causal relation, and
the

contained in every wish and

namely

is particularly

noticeable

longing..

particular affect disturbs both habitual and
exceptional applications of the

concept of causality to experience.^^ That

is,

a certain affect seems to allow a practical

incapacity and a theoretical determination of a
condition of possibility to coexist.

Longing thus appears

to

be the mood most suitable

which the moral law demands. And while
quantifiable experience of time,

it

it

to the

maintenance of the disposition

exposes the subject

also does not

seem

to offer a

to the thought

of a non-

way of demarcating

anything like the proper boundaries of the historical imagination.

Was Wilhelm

Dilthey

then perhaps right in claiming that the Kantian system remained incomplete
without a
fourth critique, a “Critique of Historical Reason”?^^

One never longs

for

what

Longing appears

own.

in

is

foreign to

one and never

Georg Lukacs’ formulation

for

as a

what

is

mood

already one’s

that

seems

to

be

capable of both enervating and innervating the will, of both contracting and expanding
the realm of human experience.

To what kind of relation

to history

does the experience of longing then give rise?

appears that the object of longing does not solicit a
possessiveness, or undifferentiated lassitude.

seem

to

And

mood of ready

expectancy,

the historical imagination

be activated by either compiling an inventory of what already

confronted with hieroglyphs whose incomprehensibility

be receptive to an event whose profane origin
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is

It

would not

exists or being

thoroughly “understood.” To

lies in the “special causality”

ascribed to

the practical will, the subject must be
attuned to
testifies against

it

is

affected

by the law which

both the inviolability of what already
exists and the merely chimerical

character of the unrepresentable or “foreign”.

emergence of a

how

state

of longing

Such attunement

is

conducive

that incites as well as inhibits
desire.

judgment of insufficiency can be somehow converted

That

into an impetus for

is,

to the

if a

moral action,

then the onset of either resignation (which
deprives the will of practical incentives) or
a

sense of premature worldly reconciliation (which
remains blind to desire’s irreducible

sense of lack)

This

is

may be

forestalled in the

ongoing drama of the subject’s acculturation.

possible because the causal relation specific to longing

such

is

that:

even the awareness of its insufficiency for [producing] the
effect cannot
prevent [the will]... from striving [Bestrebung] for the effect...
[But] why
our nature was given a propensity for what we are aware
are

empty

desires [leeren Begehrungen]

is

an anthropological-teleological

It seems that if we had to assure ourselves
about the sufficiency
of our powers to bring forth an object before we could be determined
to
apply our forces [zur Kraftanwendung bestimmt werden], then these

question.

forces

would remain

largely unused.^^

A longing for what the subject recognizes to be an impossible desire can
reinforce rather than

undermine the

self-positing character

of the

will:

“even the

awareness of its insufficiency for [producing] the effect cannot prevent

may then become

[the

will]. .from striving for the effect.”

Longing

subject’s relation to the moral

based upon a feeling of respect [Achtung]

.

law

is

that is attuned to the fact that its natural inclinations can

of the

sacrifice

such independence

is

is

when

the

be thwarted. In the case

demonstrated by the fact that the “law” of

self-preservation is not capable of binding the subject in

infringement of this natural law

ethical

all

cases.

The

possible thanks to the subject’s relation to the
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moral law. One form of necessity thus gives

way

to another; “respect

[is]

consciousness of the direct necessitation [Notigung] of the
will by the law.”^®

While the forms of natural and moral necessity are represented

in antithetical terms,

they are also analogous to one another insofar as they both
bind the subject to the
principles of non-contradiction and universality.

moral law

to

be understood?

precarious and

because

own

this

It

ought

to take

How then is the historicization of the

place in a realm that appears to contain a

ambiguous admixture of sensible and supersensible

realm (neither wholly “natural” nor wholly “moral”)

principles.

is

And

not insulated

by

its

singular laws the “feeling” of respect and the “fact” of reason cannot be secured
or

grounded

in a theoretical determination or

“schematic hypotyposis.”^' The

“representation” of the experience of human freedom

therefore forced to borrow

is

concepts that are otherwise reserved for classifying the phenomena of nature. As a
result,

what furnishes a non-natural

(i.e.,

moral) incentive for the ethical subject

immediately recognizable as something that
as

it

lies

beyond

is

not

the pleasure principle insofar

appears to set the will in motion by an “inward effect” that acts as an “impulse to

activity.”

to the

way

or compels

But for the subject
in

it

which
to

it

to feel a sense

of respect

it

must have become receptive

can be affected by an “invisible” yet “indelible” law which allows

view the space and time of the phenomenal world

as something

more

than a realm within which pragmatic and technical actions are performed in the service

of “pathological” purposes. The subject of the law

is

therefore attuned to something

recognizable and yet unfamiliar, to something other than sensible impulses that
nevertheless both resembles and infringes upon those impulses.

And

out of a sense of

“respect” for what discloses the capacities and limitations of its higher power of desire.
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a productive tension
into a

is

produced within the

will that elevates

an experience oflonging

form of striving.

Why the human will must assume what appears to be such a contorted
also to be considered a

“good will” remains

teleological question.”

Two

given a propensity for what
reinterpretations

for

[it is].

.

to

is

it

centuries later the suspicion that the subject’s “nature

of this tendency

human being

if

Kant an unanswerable “anthropological-

was

.aware are empty desires” led to two

that alternatively located its origin in a repetition

compulsion stemming from a primordial trauma and in a tragic-comic
destines the

form

be a “useless passion.”^^

fate

which

By providing human desire with

an ontological content, Psychoanalysis and Existentialism attempted to renew and
redefine the anthropological-teleological question at a time

when

the vocation of reason

appeared appropriate only for the subject of a distant age. But because Kant interpreted
the

demands of this

the moral law (that

calling in a

somehow

way

that deprived the subject

exists both apart

of a

direct presentation

from and within the

of

subject), the

“discourse of grounds, morality and good conscience” does not seem to offer the

sovereignty of self-consciousness a measure for securing
Instead

for a

it

has

left it

with an “empty desire”

that

its

historical experience.^"^

must nevertheless serve

form of action that has no codified body of “rules or knowledge”

as an incentive

to guide

Such a representation of the human will may appear unexpectedly recognizable
contemporary subject whose desire or longing
(that is as yet

unknowable)

is

to

respond

neither assuaged nor incited

Freudian unconscious or of the absurd.^^
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to

it.^^

to a

something apart from

by the discovery of the

itself

in the introduction to the
“Transcendental

It IS

groundwork for determining how

lays the

judgment and reason)
access”.

As

a

first

Logic”

the cognitive

relate to the objects to

in the first Critique that

Kant

powers (understanding,

which they

in

one way or another have

pnnciple, Kant specifies that an act of
empirical cognition

is

possible for a subject only if a given concept
corresponds with a particular intuition or

perception (Anschauung). “Thoughts without content
are empty; intuitions without

concepts are blind.”

Now the experience of longing clearly does not give rise to
of an empirical object present

empty or

fanciful

’

at

a cognition [Erkenntnis]

hand. Nevertheless, the particular significance of the

desire that animates this

mood is

presented

at a critical

juncture in

the introduction to the Critique of Judgment in order to reaffirm
the central thesis of the

second Critique

that

had since come under

definition of the (practical)

one

s representations,

power of desire

of the

attack.

What provoked

as the

“power of being

actuality of the objects

formulation appears “idealistic” insofar as

it

censure was Kant’s
the cause, through

of these representations.”^^ This

suggests that a “mere wish”, which

a form of desire, should be credited with a practical power that

it

is

also

palpably does not

possess.

But what
fact

first

presents itself to self-consciousness as an impossible desire

be an occasion for the subject

to

become aware of its

“unconscious” or “natural” teleological process
principle of autonomy, allows

we had
before

to assure ourselves

we

it

to

may

in

participation in an

that, rather

than posing a threat to the

be discovered and then exercised:

“it

seems

that if

about the sufficiency of our powers to bring forth an object

could be determined to apply our forces, then these forces would remain
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largely unused. For usually

we do

not

come to know what

forces

we have in

the first

place except by trying them out. Hence the
deception contained in vain wishes

is

only

the result of a beneficent arrangement in
our nature.”

While an impossible desire could

indicate that reason is “directed to.
..fantastic

and. .empty imaginary purposes” [phantastisch
und. .leere eingebildete Zwecke] and
.

.

thus amounts to nothing

more than

sensuous matenal content

is

a “vain wish”, a representation that

not necessarily merely chimerical, especially

corroborated by certain “feelings” or

be put

emptied of

is

moods

to a singular, exceptional test.^®

For

that

if it is

allow the subject’s latent “forces” to

if the subject

were preoccupied

solely with

carrying out readily attainable pragmatic and technical purposes,
then any successful
practical

accomplishment would

attest

only to the fact that a certain

mastered which demonstrates “competence

“actual” or immanent and

its

historical imagination

empirical concepts presented to

it

by

for an object that could

—

obligatory

ideal.

be either an

For the subject’s

would be

the understanding;

what the summons of reason introduces
idle

it

to

what

it

would remain unresponsive

as an impossible or seemingly

wish

or, in fact,

relation to the

respect

”

it is

beyond our ability

moral law

(onginal emphasis).
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to attain to

empty desire

— and

a regulative

is

therefore

such that the

is

empirical cognition must be suspended; cognitive certainty thus gives

“the feeling that

judges to be

directed only toward

connection between lawful necessity and phenomenal actuality that

mood:

has been

use of suitable means toward optional

Such a subject would therefore be responsive only

ends.”

to

in the

skill

required for

way to

an idea that

is

a peculiar

a law for us

is

While empty concepts have no place

empty
Its

in the classification

of natural phenomena,

desires can serve the pivotal role of
exposing the subject to something other
than

pathologically affected nature.

The

special causality (capacity for freedom)
that

is

“particularly noticeable” in the experience
of longing therefore establishes a

fundamental sense of lack as the proper identity
of the autonomous

What

thus

is

established”, however,

is

will.^^

anything but an underlying sense of

“cognitive certainty” or “security” that would allow
the subject to prescribe actions for
itself on the basis

of existing “rules and knowledge.”'^ There

concept of “subject, agency, or identity”
of.

.

For while Kant

.action.”^'

a natural-historical teleology

is

somehow

be explanation ultimately offers
series

itself

not even a determinate

that could serve here as the

cites the “nature”

be endowed with a “propensity for what

is

of the subject

“ground

in a

way

responsible for the fact that the will appears to

[it]... is

aware are empty desires”,

theoretical reason nothing

more than an

this

would-

interrelated

of unanswerable anthropological-teleological questions. “For how a law can be
of
and immediately a determining ground of the will [wie ein Gesetz

unmittelbar Bestimmungsgrund des Willens sein kdnne] (though this
in all morality) is for

a free will

At

that suggests

is

human

by both

the

is

essential

possible.”

—a moment described by Theodor W. Adorno one
where ought
—
appears
as

falls silent

world whose

what

und

reason an insoluble problem and identical with that of how

this point

speculation

is

fur sich

it

to start”

will is constituted in such a

phenomenal

facts

way

the subject

that

it

is

which “Kant’s

as a being in the

susceptible to being determined

of nature and the peculiar
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in

fact

of reason.

—
But

not only the origin of the latter
experience that lies beyond the
pui^iew of

it is

theoretical cognition.

conceiving

its

but

in himself’

relation to death in terms that abrogate
the natural law

preservation, what

fall silent;

For once the subject “recognizes freedom

it

is

to

become of this freedom? “ Here Kant’s

by

of self-

speculation does not

does seem to lead reason toward a recognition
of what

may

be an

insoluble contradiction: the co-existence of the
vocation of reason and the logic of

human

history.

C.

The Form of the Law and

the Content of History

All duties depend as regards the kind of obligation
(not the object of their action)

upon. .one principle
.

universal law; this

is

[:]

.

.

.

We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a

the canon for morally estimating any of our actions.”^’
Because

places such a typically transcendental emphasis upon the

upon the

particular action in itself, Kantian morality has

for instance

by Georg Lukacs

Echoing Adorno
of the

fact

s critique

mode of obligation

been commonly

of Kant’s evasion
latter

in the face

—derived from

all in his

Schiller’s concept

‘created.’”^*

—

of play

to “cognitive certainty”

latter

by

something

And

human

it

is

the

Lukacs

will.

Kant

failing to provide the subject with

and “security”:
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into

that interests

reinterpretation of the self-positing character of the

here faulted for improperly inhibiting the

what amounts

interpreted

of the question of the origin

was “thereby transformed

merely there and could not be conceived of as having been

above

rather than

as something “purely formal and lacking in content.”

of reason, Lukacs claims the

principle of creation

it

is

the hiatus between appearance and
essence... is itself introiluced into
subject hven llic subject is split into

tlie

phenomenon and noumenon, and

the

unresolved, insoluble and henceforth
permanent conllict between freedom
and necessity now invades its innermost
structure... [ And in
this, the resulting ethic

consequence of

|

becomes purely formal and lacking

content The
attempts to make itself concrete, i.c.
to test its slrcnuth on
concrete problems, it is forced to borrow
the elements of content... from
the

moment

this ethic

world

phenomena.

ol

For l.ukacs the
that

subsume

limit to the

particular

moral only

if

Kantian system becomes evident when
the natural laws

phenomena under

free action insofar as the

in

maxims— the

universal concepts

subjective rules

-

become

the “model” for

of the subject arc held

to a proper ethic

1

his analogical use

of history, which has

knowledge which

is,

furthermore

not qualified, as

for

it

is

of logic and natural law thus acts as an obstacle

at its disposal

access to a specifically historical

however, also “objective” and therefore also modeled upon

scientific principles,

this connection

historical materialism

between the natural and

was

his ethic from the kind

of excesses

fated to encounter (once objective historical

possible, then there must be a proper form of authority that has the

historical is

that

laced with a particular kind of content: that

logic and causality that arc presented in the

yet the basis of Kantian ethics

first

seems

substantial than peculiar and precarious

is,

Lukacs’

knowledge

power

basis of that knowledge); and on the other hand Lukacs’ critique indicates
is in fact

natural

Kant, by being a merely analogical relation. So on the one

hand Kant’s “formalism” preserves

And

he

they are capable of being universalized
without violating the principle of

non-contradiction.

formalism

to

is

to act

on the

how

Kant’s

the principles of

Critique.

to lie, in a fantastic

moods and

way, on nothing more

feelings that “ought” to act against

certain other feelings. But as the presentation of the willful sacrifice attests, these

counter- feelings, or moral feelings, arise most prominently in a situation of
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life

and

death.

And

since

it

is

only an ethical history

that forestalls

both the symbolic death

that

reduces the sphere of human action to a
wasteland and the violent death which
awaits
nation states if they continue to
treat

wage war

each and every human subject as a

of morality must carry with

it

in violation

of the categorical imperative

purpose (as an end in

final

a form of non-natural necessity.

itself),

This

is

the principle

why

the

ethical subject

must be a self-positing subject capable of introducing
an “absolute

value

phenomenal world. For

into the

world, or indeed even beyond

it,

“it is

that could

to

impossible to think of anything

at all in

the

be considered good without limitation [ohne

Einschrankung] except a good will.”

Because the incentives
sources of motivation,

it

that serve the

good

will

must not contain any pathological

must be formed and maintained

in

such a

way

that

it

is

subjected to a law that can only appear as a “law as such”. “For here
mere conformity to

law as such [GesetzmaBigkeit] (without having as
certain actions)

to

is

what serves the will as

its

its

ground some law determined

principle,

and must so serve

be everywhere an empty delusion and chimerical concept

[leerer

it,

for

if duty is

not

Wahn und

chimarischer Begriff].

Between

the experiences of “empty delusion” and

similar yet fundamentally distinct feelings and

typology which

is

neither

moods

formed nor evaluated on

“empty desire”
that

lie

an array of

must be arranged

the basis

of empirical

into a

“formalism” of Kantian ethics therefore emerges as a way of compensating, as
for the fact that the subject has an experience of being affected

having a determinate representation of it.

35

by

The

criteria.

it

were,

the law without

Out of such a

theoretical

and

practical gap emerges the
possibility that the law’s

formal character can serve as a principle
of critical negativity that exposes a
characterized by both scientism and
aestheticism to what

demand

for an ethic

of history. But what happens when

object of contemporary interpretation?
For Giorgio

was once

represented as a

that imperative

Agamben

it

modem age

becomes an

invites eomparison

with Kafka’s parable “Before the Law’’:
“Kafka’s legend presenfs the pure form

which law affirms

itself with the greatest force
precisely at the point in

which

in

no

it

longer prescribes anything.”

But while Kafka

s text is

read by

Agamben

as a critique, Kant’s formalism

diagnosed as a symptom of the world-historical
That

IS,

is

situation that the former allegorizes.

rather than acting as a guarantor of morality in
times of duress, the moral law

discloses the last “secularized” remnants of an
ethical-theological tradition deprived of
its

original sources of legitimation and is therefore no
longer capable of appearing

however “negatively”— as an object of either

respect or longing.

to a sense

no longer reinforces the

of longing,

it

does so in a

character of the autonomous will.
for

way

that

The vocation of reason would

having “preserved” an ossified Judeo-Christian

experience as a festering

wound

“spiritual” manipulation.

It

that

Or, if it does give rise

therefore be

tradition that lives

remains exposed

to various

self-positing

on

in

impugned

human

forms of political and

should not be surprising, therefore, that the text Kant

devotes to renewing and redefining this tradition bears what

now

appropriately oxymoronic

Of Mere Reason.-

In an age dominated

is

title:

Religion Within the Bounds

appears to be an

by the influence of post-structuralism, however,

a term which hardly designates a form of censure
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—

the oxymoronic

even, or especially,

when

it

is

used to refer

to concepts that attest to philosophy's
irreducibly “literary” character.

to the possible detriment or benefit

no

extra-linguistic referent that

of a contemporary

But

It

historical ethic, there is reputedly

would allow something

a trans-individual power that discloses
to the

human

For

called reason to present itself as

subject

proper destiny.

its

has not escaped the attention of such
poststructuralist

critics as J. Hillis Miller

that Kant’s entire “discourse” is saturated
with the very tropological figures (in the
form

of symbolic representations” and
myriad attempts

to present

in the use

a postructuralist

of narrative)

that

have been enlisted

historical ethic within the

in the

ever shifting

boundaries of language alone.^^
Miller therefore reads the “as if’ statements that
Kant repeatedly uses in order to
present the subject’s relation to the unrepresentable moral
law

maxim of your action were

to

become through your will

(e.g.,

“Act as

if the

a universal law of nature”) in

the light of a world-historical interpretation of the relationship
between aesthetics and
ethics,

narrative, like analogy, is inserted into that blank place

purely conceptual language of philosophy

Of course Miller ultimately
it

fails

or

is

where the presumed

missing.”

finds Kant’s meta-narrative to be unable to deliver what

promises: namely, the ability to isolate the “fact” of reason in a form of experience

which thereby demonstrates
imagination
to the

is its

moral

undue

is

(practically, if not theoretically) that the

not abyssal but “grounded” on something outside of itself, on

law.'^*

reliance

What

maxims

its

relation

leads Kant’s narrative of ethical action astray. Miller argues,

upon what every oxymoron

logic’s principle of non-contradiction. That

posit

human

that appear as

is,

or instance of catachresis violates:

the moral law

though they could conform
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commands

to a universal

that the subject

law of nature. As

a result, a

maxim

is

valid only if its application
to the world does not
produce a

contradiction.- These are the “formal”

of “content” a

Where

historicization

criteria that

Kant employs

to indicate

what

sort

of the law would be capable of
producing.

then does the rule of logic begin to
falter? For Miller,

it

fails to settle the

question of whether or not the testing of
maxims for their universal applicability

is

based upon something external to the
“performance” of the as-if experiment.
Instead,

merely postpones an answer by inserting a
narrative into the “space” which

it

remains impenetrable

more than

restate

knowledge. But does

this

What needs

to

that is necessitated

by

be emphasized

is

how

and

duty the subject
all

But

other

to

human

commanded

is

the law’s unrepresentability

Is

it

used to reinforce the

itself cannot

this universal

itself

capacity to be a final

be presented in conceptual terms, does

(or inhibiting) restriction also apply to the object

the absence of a determinate origin

animate the will of the

human

it is

conditioned by the

namely, the injunction to recognize

what purpose does the subject recognize

same productive

striving?

to uphold:

is

subjects as a final purpose.

purpose? While the moral law in
the

much

the time of indefinite

rule of logic. For the latter appears to remain intact
so long as
first

assessment do

what Kant identified as the “dangerous and
precarious standpoint” of

a historical ethic?

postponement

for empirical

history ought to

ethical subject? If so a link

become

ethical

and end

that is

of longing and

somehow

expected to

between Kant’s narration of how

and the identification of a “need” for a

rebirth

tragedy in modernity would seem to have been forged.
After

all,

the central

moment of the second

Critique (the disclosure of the fact of

reason) presents a subject that recognizes “freedom in
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itself’, that

recognizes the

of

possibility

of becoming

But should such an

ethical

attestation

by

willfully appropriating

of singularity

that sets

its

relation to

its

humanity apart from the

beings of nature be made into the
touchstone of an ethic of history?
What
here

is

the degree to which such singularity

of gift. And Kant’s
singularity in a

way

Logic dictates

historical ethic

is

viewed as

may offer an

own

of the

rest

decisive

is

either a curse or as

death.'“

some

sort

intimation of how to interpret such

that displaces this dualism.

that theoretical

reason attempt to unify the phenomena
the

understanding represents by isolating the
unconditioned cause of causality as such.

This
is

IS

a project toward which reason

not a task that

is

undertaken

is

impelled by a seemingly “pre-thetic”
desire.

at the subject’s discretion;

contingent, intentional choice.

At

this point the higher

the pnnciples of logic reinforce one another
in a

antagonism (or antinomy)
constitutively practical

that is resolved only

that the

it is

when

power of desire

not merely the result of a

power of desire

way that,

(reason) and

as if by design, produces an

reason discovers that

it

is

itself introduces the principle

of the

unconditioned into the phenomenal world through the potentially
spontaneous and

self-

legislating character of the will.

The time and space of nature
which can be

is

thus poised to “receive” but not to produce effects

attributable only to actions

An immense chasm

of the “good

will”:

[eine uniibersehbare Kluft]

domain of the concept of nature,

is

between the
domain of the

fixed

the sensible, and the

concept of freedom, the supersensible, so

no transition from the
by means of the theoretical use
of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first
of which cannot have any influence on the second: and yet the second is
to have an influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to
actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its laws.’®^
sensible to the supersensible (and hence
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that

It

But such an

actualization

freedom and nature

be precluded by the

to

intersect, or rather collide

a transition through the

It

seems

“mere use of [its]

when

fact that the

realms of

the subject attempts to initiate
such

natural powers.”'®^

turns out that reason’s “indomitable”
desire to reach the “utmost bounds
of

cognition”

is

by no means quelled by

the discovery of the fact of reason; nor

rechanneled or “sublated” into an inexorable striving

For the sense of unity

that appears to

for the historicization

is it

simply

of the law.

be established through the discovery of the

spontaneity and autonomy of the higher power of
desire suffers from the same

experience that befalls the satisfaction of “lower” desires:
the “feeling” of satisfaction

does not prove

to

be

lasting.'®^

And

in fact time itself obtrudes here as the
fundamental

obstacle that prevents reason from unifying

reason

s

need for order

is to

its

be secured, then

allows the ethical subject to represent

its

it

theoretical

and practical principles.

If

seems a concept must be introduced

that

relation to the future in terms of a viable

historical possibility.

In the “Postulates of Empirical Thought

As Such” presented

Kant draws out the implications of the Copemican Revolution

in the first Critique,

in

metaphysics by

determining not the constitution of objects in themselves but the ways in which they are
represented by the

human understanding through

possibility, actuality

The

first

the “categories of modality”:

and necessity.

of these categories designates

that

which “agrees

concept) with the formal conditions of experience”— above

time and space. So long as the concept of possibility

phenomenal

(in

all

terms of intuition and

with the conditions of

is restricted

to the realm

of

nature, the rule of logic does not prove decisive in the last instance in
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'

determining a particular object’s relation to the
representing subject:

must contain no contradiction

indeed a necessary logical condition, but

is

sufficient for [establishing that] the concept
has objective reality,

possibility of. .such an object
.

But when Kant attempts

“that... a

thought through the concept.”*

is

to isolate those effects

produced

i.e.,

concept

is far front

it

that the [real]

'

in the natural

world whose

origin cannot be determined by the mechanical laws
that otherwise guide the

understanding’s interpretation of nature, the concept of
possibility and the function of
logic both change significantly.

Since the concept of freedom—the keystone [SchluBstein] of the
whole structure of
a system of pure reason”

—corresponds with no given

empirical

phenomenon,

subject does not have access to a theoretical cognition that could
establish
reality. It is for this reason that the

be indispensable

reason

itself to the

—and thus perhaps no

The

of legitimacy and coherence upon what would

imagination as an unmistakable yet unidentifiable fact of
fact at all,

no matter how unique and

singular.

disclosure of the fact of reason therefore allows the power of desire and the

principles of logic to cohere in a

way that delimits the

autonomous

will.

threatens

autonomy: an experience of history

its

ethical.

subject as

becomes entangled

it

somehow

relation

formal character of the

Such a will remains exposed, however,

imminently

nature

objective

concept’s logical condition of possibility proves to

for conferring a sense

otherwise present

its

the

There

converge:

between an

is

is

to

something that necessarily

that is neither

merely natural nor

a question, therefore, that presses itself upon the moral
in the time

and space wherein the laws of freedom and

there a “category of modality” capable of determining the

ethical-historical possibility (understood as
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an object) and the

power of desire (understood

as a subject)?

Of all

the unanswerable anthropological-

teleological questions that inescapably arise for
reason, this

is

breadth of its peculiar fate with an unrivalled starkness and

one that illuminates the
For the

clarity.**^

finite

subject appears to be confronted with a question that must
be both rigorously suspended

and vigorously pursued.

By

attempting to respond, the Kantian subject effectively places itself
beyond the

reach of the “constitution” that was established for

For the type of perspectival realignment

it

by

the

Copemican Revolution.

that replaces the determination

of an object’s

condition of possibility with a determination of the conditions of possibility for
representing that object does not rectify matters
future of an

autonomous

of placing ourselves

will.

in. .[a
.

“This

is

when

the “object” in question

precisely the misfortune, that

Copemican-like] position when

it

is

we

is

the

are not capable

a question of the

prediction of free actions.”

Because the

way

free

—though “unholy”—

that is accentuated

by

its

will remains mired in a natural history in a

obligation to change that world, the consequences of its

actions can be derived neither from the formal principle of autonomy nor from the law

of causality that the understanding prescribes

how this

situation could not be otherwise,

to

phenomenal

nature.'

To dramatize

Kant indicates how the putative

ability to

represent a future action must have recourse to a concept of either logical, objective or
rational-regulative possibility that presupposes a capacity for either prediction,

divination or prophecy.

As

delineated in the lectures on Anthropology

first ability

properly belongs

among

From

A Pragmatic Point of View

the postulates of empirical thought since
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it

is

,

the

possible for the

human

understanding to predict occurrences
in phenomenal nature (and

thereby secure their logical and objective
possibility) by adhering to the laws
of

mechanical causality.

no

way

furthest

prophecy, which

human being

is

appears in

act

has no sense that could receive

itself,

of an event

autonomous

the

removed from an

of empirical cognition

is

the art of

practiced as though “a secret were about to
he revealed, though the

power of intellectual

reality

in

lay claim to being predictive.

At the point

it

Representing an ethical-historical possibility
can therefore

‘

it.”

Because

'

intuition (a theoretical cognition

it

invokes the specious

of an object of the imagination as

apart from empirical perception) in order to
determine the objective

come,

to

will.

this art is also disqualified

For while the

impulses, being affected by the

from being of practical service

latter is receptive to

commands of the law

is

to

something other than sensible
not something that the subject

experiences passively.

Kant’s most acerbic criticisms are often directed toward those
prophecies in the language of philosophy. What
less

threatened by such claims

is

nothing

than the very constitution of transcendental subjectivity that preserves and animates

the capacities of the

autonomous

the prophetic act itself and the

it

is

who announce

will.

image

it

It is

therefore not surprising that Kant views both

produces as a “monstrosity” [Unding]'

violates the principle of non-contradiction at the very

between logic and desire needs

to

moment when

That

the relation

be defined with the greatest possible precision

in

order to determine the conditions for the possibility of the historicization of the moral
law. For a “true secret”

is

disclosed in a prophecy only if the subject in question has

access to a form of “supersensible experience” whereby “the transcendent
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[is]

is,

represented as immanent.”

philosophy” and

it

title

thus seems that the attempt to determine

to represent its relation to

of modality

Prophecy thus earns the

'

its

future

that is not derived

(i.e.,

of the “exact opposite of

how

the

to represent an “ohjeet” in

autonomous

is

temis of a category

from natural laws) must rely upon the

For in comparison with prophecy,

will

art

of divination.

this art puts forth the relatively cautious
yet

ambiguous claim of having “foresight contrary

to

accepted laws of experienee (contrary

to nature).”

Given
is

to

this formulation,

it

appears that a form of divination

have any “hope” of correlating the idea of an

temporal concept that thereby distinguishes

it

ethic

is

necessary

if the subject

of history with some

sort

of

from an ungrounded and arbitrary

projection of the imagination; otherwise a sense of human “foresight”
would have to
yield to a “predictive”

power

phenomena. Does the

subject’s duty to alter

that

would be applicable only within

the realm of

relation to the laws

its

of natural causality

then require that the task of historicizing the moral law be undertaken without a
representation of non-mechanical time?

The

art

of divination

as an article

of faith:

that is neither

in

it

that

it is

seems

to allow for

somehow

what the experience of longing takes

possible to (symbolically) represent something

merely chimerical nor simply present

need of some

striving;

in fact

sort

of practical reinforcement

if

it

at

hand. But a sense of longing

is to

is

be converted into an act of

needs, in short, some sort of sign that indicates that the “immense chasm”

separating the natural from the ethical not only ought but can be crossed.’^’

But

how

is

it

even possible

for the subject to

be thinking

terms about the relation between the power of desire and
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its

in

purportedly Kantian

ethical-historical object?

For respect for the moral law requires that

all

the possibility of historical success or failure)

thought of possibility as such

must not

determining ground of the free power of choice [Willkiir]is

alone

interfere with the practical-

rational incentives determining the will: “morality
needs absolutely

order to recognize what duty

(let

or to impel [anzutreiben]

that is

its

no material

no purpose-either

performance. .[W]hen
.

it

in

is

a question of duty, morality can perfectly well abstract from
purposes altogether and

ought to do so.”
In order to carry out

from the requirement

its

duty out of a sense of duty, the moral subject

that a relationship

an actual, possible or necessary object.

be established between

But as a being

exempted

cognitive

power and

in the world, the subject is also

exposed to an experience of time which prevents the

strict

conceived as a self-contained and self-sustaining

of will. In

act

its

is

adherence to duty from being
fact

it

seems

that the

imperative to “abstract from purposes altogether” applies not only to the negation of
pathological and pragmatic inclinations but also to the very compliance with duty itself

For experience seems to withhold anything
rigorously follows the

like a sense

commands of the moral

law begins to resemble something
incentives of the will are

law; in

of purpose from the subject

fact,

who

being subject to the moral

like a “spiritual trial” insofar as the rational

by no means assured of being able

to give rise to

correspondingly rational actions; on the contrary.

But a

spiritual trial

emergence Kant aims

of this

sort

evokes precisely the sort of historical

to preclude; for

it

mood whose

bears a disquieting resemblance to a particular

tradition within the history

of metaphysics which the publication of “On the Miscarriage

of All Philosophical Trials

in

Theodicy” (1791) attempted
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to bring to a close.

For

Kant such a juridical proceeding would be capable
of reaching a verdict only
possible for reason to interpret
will.

The impious accusation

counterpurposive

no

less

its

the

all

phenomena of natural

that reason brings

it

were

history relate to a divine

forward against everything that

is

[Zweckwidrige] in the world here provokes an ostensibly
pious but

misguided and perhaps even

then not

for

how

if

fanatical defense.

But

is

a “secularized”

trial

but inevitable so long as respect for the moral law
translates into a striving

seemingly impossible historicization?

But Kant does not attempt
type of mood that the
require, that

is,

to preserve or restore respect for the

demand

to “abstract

from

all

law by valorizing the

purposes altogether” seems to

the respect for the moral law threatened

by

the fact that the subject

appears destined to be a final purpose to no purpose “ought” not give rise to something
like a tragic ethos. In fact,

it is

precisely at this point that the rule of logic

perhaps unexpected resurgence: “if human nature
it

must also be assumed

relation to

one another,

Although
articulated

somehow
highest

it

this

is

that the

is

is

makes

a

called to strive for the highest good,

measure of its cognitive powers, especially

their

suitable to this end.”’^^

assumption

in fact

does

little

more than

restate the

problem, as

careful to separate the judgment that the subject’s cognitive powers are

“suitable” for a form of ethical striving from the question of whether the

good

is

actually attainable.

But something new

is

also introduced here: the

concept of the “highest good”. What does this signify? What are
possibility? Is

it

its

conditions of

capable of resolving what Kant acknowledges to be the appearance of

a “contradiction between an inner final purpose that

46

is set [for

the subject]. .as a duty.
.

and an external nature in which that

no

final

final

purpose

be actualized but which

is to

itself has

purpose whatever”?'

Among the

innumerable attempts

to define the highest

metaphysics, Kant identifies an underlying,
subjective

need of the human being
whether

principle,

recognition of the

it

for a

common

good

in the history

of

concern: the attempt to elevate the

form of sensible

satisfaction into

an ethical

be called the pursuit of happiness, the maintenance
of virtue or the

good

life.

This need

is

admissible for Kant only

if

translates into

it

the following proposition: “happiness distributed
in exact proportion to

morality. .constitutes the highest good of a possible world.”

And of a “secular”

.

world,

it

must be added.

giving anything

Not

surprisingly,

however, the

more than an anomalous or

such a theologically inspired demand.

latter

proves incapable of

“accidental assent” [zufalligen Beitritt] to

The maxims of the Kantian

subject therefore

appear incapable of introducing a form of non-natural necessity into the world that
furnishes “permanent rules” [bestandigen Regeln] for

The form of the law and

human

action.'^''

the content of natural history ought to converge in

the actualization of freedom; but at this critical juncture the

“immense chasm”

separating the ethical and the natural seems if anything to be widened

vocation of reason

summons

still

further.

The

the subject to strive for the unconditioned and for a sense

of totality; when translated into “historical” terms, these two principles produce the
concept of the highest good. Such a telos then confronts the subject as an impossibility
that

must nevertheless somehow be represented

done
and

if,

if,

on the one hand, Kant represents the

on the other hand, the

as a possibility. But

tragic

principle of morality
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and the

“on

its

how can

this

be

ethical in antithetical terms,

own

behalf. .in
.

no way needs

religion,

whether objectively, as regards willing or
subjectively,

capability... since

its

as regards

laws bind through the mere form of universal
lawfulness.”
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CHAPTER II
THE THEOLOGICAL SUPPLEMENT

“On

own behalf’,

its

the Kantian principle

of morality “in no way needs

religion,

whether objectively, as regards willing or
subjectively, as regards capability.”'^
“Objectively, as regards willing”; this
external support in order to

as regards capability”; this

means

comply with

means

the

commands

Morality thus “in no

it

most. This

nothing but what

way needs

may explain why

“need” for theology does not

is

The

we can

Kant

law. “Subjectively,

of autonomy

and vice-

moment when

represented in specifically historical terms.

And

seems

by saying

arise so long as morality is considered

be inadequate when the

it

“on

its

own

behalf.”

moral

of history on

its

own
it

is

but inevitable that the experience of being in the world will be defined in terms of a

fundamental lack.

mere reason”

What
its

need

that the

relation to the

if thinking

to

behalf is not something for which the vocation of reason prepares the subject, then
all

is

do.”

in fact qualifies this statement

to

of no empirical-

practical, in short, is logical

religion” at the very

But perhaps such a perspective proves
law

commands of the moral

that the possibility for the experience

objectively practical, and not merely logical.
versa: “duty

that the subject is in need

is

It is at this

point that a theology emerges from “within the bounds of

in order to '^supplement this lack” [erganzt

expressed in

this yet to

nun diesen

Mangel].'^"*

be determined need for a theological supplement has

roots in an anthropological-teleological question that, for Walter Benjamin, must

continually be renewed: “in remembrance [Eingedenken]
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we have

an experience that

forbids us .0 conceive

of history

granted us to try to write
It ts

it

as fundamentally
atheological,

little

as

may be

it

with immediately theological
concepts.”*^^

m response to Max Horkheimer's statement

that historical events

ought to

fall

under the purview of empirical
science that Benjamin
invokes the subjective and
precarious experience of “remembrance”
or bearing in

Horkheimer's secularism attempts

human

Benjamin attempts

history,

experience that

is

to extinrate all

to

mind (Erngedenkenj.

If

remnants of myth and theology
from

preserve a distinction between
these two realms of

also integral to Kant’s historical
ethic.

For both Benjamin and Kant, the
representation of time as a

rectilinear, quantifiable

continuum conditions the “fundamentally
atheological” conception of history.
The
inadequacy of such a representation emerges
is

when

able to act, or to imagine acting, on
the basis

the Kantian subject discovers that

of a “law” that

violates the

mechanical causation. But the insufficiency
of the non-natural law
Itself when the

would-be autonomous

in turn

it

mies of
manifests

will is confronted with the finite
experience

of

being in a world that seems to be devoid of the
kind of duration without repetition that

would allow the implementation of “permanent” moral
“mles”
This

is

i.e.,

and developed over

a culture based

that threatens the “progress”

on theology or m3dh which would appear

autonomy.

a collectivity to be

an

several generations emerges; but such continuity,

seems to require the very form of culture

legislative

be established.'"

the point at which the need for the institution
of something like a tradition

that IS sustained

in turn,

to

bound

But
to a

for

Kant only a relation

law

to the

that is “represented” as

idol.
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of reason:

to divest the subject

former makes

it

of its

possible for

an (ethical) ideal and not as

What an

ethic

distinction to

IS,

of history needs above

be made. For Kant an

an insubstantial idea

amounts

some son of measure

emerges due

On

were a

that

allows this

an error orsubrept.on”;

mistakenly identified with a
phenomenal form.'»

own cognitive powers and

the other hand, an “ideal”

is

solicited projection,

It

only to the subject’s

also a projection, but one
that

is

prompted by the subject's

itself-to the moral law, to that which
indicates that

somehow

is

existence

not arbitrary;

is

of an

reflexive, that

relation to something

its

that

therefore

their purported representation

aware of the insufficiency of a
representation that

IS,

to

to a projection not recognized
as such, responsive

misapprehension of its
object.

is

idol

all is

it is

as

it

beyond

defined in terms of

a constitutive lack situated in relation
to an “other.”

The form and content of historical experience
basis of whether

for

it

is

takes on the form of idol or ideal.

Kant forbids the subject

to conceive

It is

What

then

is

the experience that

it

in “immediately theological”

an act of self-cognition whereby the subject
recognizes

the moral law

which

in turn

by Kant on the

of history as fundamentally atheological,
even

though he does not, on the other hand, then
present
terms?

therefore evaluated

demands (when coupled with

the

how

it

is

affected

power of desire and

by

the

ineradicable natural need for positing purposes) a
non-sensible representation that

“proceeds from the concepts of reason, [which] set up an
Ideal... which

from the most sacred duties
It is

itself arises

that are themselves independent of theology.”’

therefore appropriate that for Kant the subject of the moral law

theological revelation or form of mediation that

would allow

to the “supersensible” into a sensible experience.
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it

is

to convert

deprived of a

its

For the “fact” of freedom

exposure

that is

disclosed in the experience of being
toward dealh must not be
derived from a
theological (or, allcmalivcly, empirical)
source:
|lhc

prmeiple of morality

is| formal and directs
categorically, without
regard to the objects of the power
of desire., .and hence without
regar.l to
any purpose whatever. I his lomial
character of my acts
in which
alone their intrinsic moral value
consists, is wholly in my
power- and
can certainly abstract from whether
the purposes that this law
obligates
me to further arc possible or unachievable
(because they constitute only
I

he extrinsic value of my acts) since
only to what can do. ^

to look

And
to

that is

never

in

my power,

yet the Kantian subject

is

is

order

inexorably led toward an “experience
that forbids us

conceive of history as fundamentally athcological”
since what

power”

in

1

incapable of producing effects that can be
represented

logical or objective possibility.

subject s actions

is

is

in

“wholly

terms of either a

Furthermore, the “extrinsic value” [auBcrc
Wert] of the

not to be judged from a disinterested
standpoint that would thereby

consign them to the sphere of the aesthetic. The
furtherance of duty seems
will

in its

beyond the realm delimited

natural history encroaches

for the

upholding of duty.

upon the autonomous

will,

it

And

to take the

as the experience of

creates the need for a

representation of non-mechanical time capable of giving rise to
something like a sense

of hope and a conception of non-natural, inter-generational continuity;
logic of history

and the vocation of reason produce

particular sense

of an

Is

for the subject

is

in short,

what the

the need for a

“after-life”.

a “negative” theological principle presented within the limits of reason therefore

alone capable of giving a “meaning” to death that confers a sense of purpose upon

human
limits

history? But then

of reason as though

how,
it

in turn,

were both

can a tradition emerge from within those same
a singular product of culture and an unassailable

value which exists apart from the act of institution? The concept of tradition would
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therefore

seem

,o signify that

which has already been

posited as an impossible ideal

only

if

It

lost as

well as what

is

then to be

could emerge as a
histoncal-practical possibility

a tradition could be represented
as an object created

by a

subject

whose

willful

intentionahty effectively exerts a
retroactive force. Considered
in meta-historical terms,
Christianity appears to reason as
a tradition that arose in just
such a manner. For being

able to formulate the principles
that constitute Christian
doctrine
“resided

m the human power of reason [menschlichen

before that power

first

began

to germinate; affer that

it

is

something

that

Vemunftsvermogens] even
only developed more and more

with the advancement of the eulture of
reason [wird mit der fortgehenden
Kultur
desselben nur immer

mehr

entwickelt].”

But thought of in terms of the particular
rather than transcendental subject
of the
moral law
time

IS

[i.e.,

the

precisely

“human power of reason”],

what prevents

it

seems

the self-positing will

appears to withdraw from the realm of practice
the
as an object of longing. But perhaps there

is

that a certain representation

from giving form

moment

it

of

to a tradition that

becomes conceptualized

another experience of history that would

allow the empirical and transcendental dimensions
of subjectivity to coalesce.

For instance,

if a tradition

cannot be formed ex-nihilo, then

it

seems unlikely

it

could

be similarly ruptured. Furthermore, the “source” of tradition—
no matter how
discredited or

outmoded

may

exist for a “reason” that is neither arbitrary nor the

product of an objective historical necessity. The very form of the tradition
indicative of a certain content that can be understood only

transcendental reflection on

its

may be

by undertaking a

conditions of possibility. Kant’s attempt to appropriate

religious experience for the vocation of reason accentuates the importance of such a
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renection for ,he development
of a historical ethic that
intcntrets a certain form
of
culture (Christianity) as a

symptom of an

For Kant the ••experience”

a priori anthropological-teleological
“need

that indicates that the
historical

not therefore simply be represented

in antithetical

terms

tmd the theological sho.dd
the limit experience lhal
has

is

already emerged as the touchstone
for the vocation of
reason: the

human

relation

toward

death.

The prominent position

this relation holds in the

through the paradigmatic act of
self-sacrifice

Kantian system

how

that attests to

first

the rational idea (or

concept) of freedom can take on a
practical reality for the subject.
What

about the Kantian subject’s sacrifice

noumenal law
incites the

action).

that

good

is

that in

assumption of death

it

is

distinctive

upholds a

only becomes “manifest” through
a particular sense of guilt

will to act (or to consider

As presented

subject issues against

preempt the need

its

became evident

its

what

is at

that then

stake in laying claim to an ethical

m the second Critique, the judgment of guilt is something the
sensible nature while simultaneously
retaining the power to

for expiation. Consequently,

phenomenal form of power

that

no sacrifice

would thereby be

is

rendered to an instituted,

re-legitimated.

The

sacrifice is rather

offered to “law as such”, to a law that must
be followed without regard for “any purpose

whatsoever.”

But the vocation of reason ultimately both prepares

from the demand

that the subject

perform a sacrifice

principle of “purposiveness without a purpose.”
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in the

for

and shirks

name of upholding

a

A. Pardonable Guilt

The autonomous will
world of phenomena;

when

necessary

its

is

ascribed to the subject that

this

means

that

it

is able,

is

no longer wholly immersed

or strives to

become

in the

able, to negate

desire to possess objects or to pursue
pragmatic purposes that gratify

sensible inclinations: “a purpose is always
the object of an inclination...
of an

immediate desire

commands

to

possess a thing by means of one’s action,
just as a law (which

practically) is the object

of respect.”

The power of desire

into a feeling

of respect on the “condition”

understood

terms of exchange and/or coercion.

The

in

subject of the moral law

purpose which

is

is

the indomitable

totality (vis-a-vis

relate to itself,

transformed

law not be

however, as a

purpose

a

“assigned to us as such by reason alone” and therefore
cannot be

derived from experience.
desire

must

that this relation to the

is

What

demand

is

sent to reason

by reason through

to posit both the unconditioned

both objects of cognition and acts of the

demand can only be met by negating
purpose. But then in what sense

is

will).

the

power of

and the concept of

And

it

seems

that this

the concept of the contingent, pathological

the

Endzweck a purpose

at all,

other than perhaps as

a singular manifestation of the concept of purposiveness without a purpose?
If transposed from the context in

which

it

is

presented in the third Critique (as the

experience of aesthetic judgment) to the historical task facing the subject of the law,

such a principle seems to impart a tragic ethos

to

Kantian morality. But could a “law” of

tragedy provide the historical imagination with a measure that prevents
gravitating toward

what Kant represents

as the polar extremities
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it

from

of human experience:

immersion

in the

pathological and absorption in the
fanatical

(i.e.,

the illusory

experience of possessing or being possessed
by the supersensible as though

an exceptional though nevertheless
phenomenal substance)?

it

were but

If the limits established

by

the constitution of transcendental
subjectivity are to be maintained,
the unrepresentable

character of the law must be brought into
a relation with the
latter’s pathological

nature serves as the “condition” of
possibility for

consciousness to be affected by the law
pathological

is not,

What emerges

way can

finite subject.

therefore, the final

in the first place.

moment of the

For the

human

The “negation” of the

subject’s ethical conversion.

here seems to be best described as a process
of sublation; only

in

such a

the natural need for purposes and the upholding
of ethical duty co-exist within

the over-determined structure of the

will.''"'

For while “morality does not need the

representation of a purpose which would have to precede
the determination of the will

may

well be that

it

has a necessary relation [Beziehung] to such a purpose.”

The autonomous

will is

autonomous only

if

it

has negated

its

natural propensity to

posit and procure pathological purposes.

Once

never be certain

the subject discovers the limits of autonomy

that

and the conditions
negation.

It

such

is

the case)

this is

for a “necessary relation” that only

accomplished (and we can

emerges with the

then turns out that a certain relation of exchange

between the law and the subject

(i.e.

is

prior act of

possible after

final

all

purpose

to

of

no

confronted with the seemingly unbridgeable chasm separating the realms

of freedom and nature) appears incapable of meeting the demands
the higher

in fact

that is purified of, or rather redefines, the concept

“use value.” For the autonomous will confronted with being a

purpose

it

power of desire. The

failure that only
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for unity

becomes apparent by

first

imposed by
abstracting

from pragmatic purposes stands
preserves that which

preempts a

is

exists insofar as

in the

that supplements

What

and

then both

law and recuperates a form of purposiveness

for the

an unexpected sense of reciprocity. The principle
of morality—

to evince an unexpected

For

need of a form of justification

established (practically) by the fact of reason.

tragic relation to the

subject as Endzweck

which only

is

in

it

serves as an incentive for the

form of “respect”

absence of all reference

will can take place in

for the

to a

human beings

human

phenomenal

will

—

in fact

seems

subject.

purpose no determination of the
no such determination

at all, since

can occur without an effect, and its representation, thought not as the
determining ground of the power of choice [nicht als Bestimmungsgrund
der Willkiir] nor as a purpose that comes first in intention, must
nonetheless be admissible as the consequence of that power’s
determination to a purpose through the law; without this purpose a power
of choice which does not add to a contemplated action the thought of
either an objectively or subjectively determined object (which it has or

should have). .can itself obtain no
.

When
the law,

is

the

something

its

like a “natural”

pathological origin

is

human need

“it is.

.

for purposiveness is brought before

not merely negated but preserved and elevated. This

outcome of the narrative whose

the second Critique:

satisfaction.'^'

central task is

announced

in the introduction to

.incumbent upon the Critique of Practical Reason as such

prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that

it

to

alone and exclusively,

furnishes the determining ground of the will.”

The attempt

to

expose pragmatic or instrumental subjectivity

itself (or to another part

subject

becomes aware

realm of nature

something beyond

of itself) begins with the disclosure of the “fact of reason”. The
that

it is

capable of initiating actions in accordance with a

principle of “special” (non-natural) causality

world because the

to

free will

whose

effects should then appear in the

can only establish a practical relation

that appears to the subject through the categories
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to itself within the

of the understanding.

But since the

effects

of freedom cannot be accounted

terms, the special causality
IS,

of the

will

for (i.e. represented) in
such

seems capable of creating only an
impasse;

that

the natural need for purposiveness,
the “indomitable desire” to
determine both the

first

cause and the unity of the world within
which purposes are to be posited, and
the

duty to adhere to the moral law do not
seem capable of foiming the interrelated
that IS necessary for reason to fulfill

morality becomes manifest

when

its

proper vocation.

The

pathological limit to

the rational concept of the final
purpose

by the obtrusive laws of phenomenal nature which

totality

is

undermined

refuse to “cooperate” with the

intentions of the good will.*^^
In

Its

attempt

at initiating

a historicization of the law the subject

is

exposed

incompatible forms of experience or two forms of
causality, neither of which

of negating the
is

other.

As

fully accounted for (in

to

is

two

capable

a result, the subject becomes ensnared in a dual
existence that

keeping with the

of establishing the sense of order

limits

that the higher

of theoretical reason) and yet incapable

power of desire

requires:

matters of fact pertain either to the [a priori] concept of nature,
which
proves its reality in the objects of sense. .or to the concept of freedom,
all

.

which sufficiently establishes its reality through the causality that reason
has by being able to [produce] certain effects in the world of sense and
that

It is

it

irrefutably postulates in the

moral law.

not the experience of natural necessity that entraps the ethical subject but the

experience of suffering under the weight of an unrealizable capacity for freedom. The
subject of the law ought to relate to itself as an end in

reason appears to convert the

freedom of the

will with a

itself,

as an absolute value. But

latter into a surplus value insofar as

law of history

nature (over either external nature or

its

that allows

own

it

to legislate

internal nature).
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For

it

does not provide the

over phenomenal
if the

autonomous

Win ca^^o. .d.ss

.he d.sparity bePveen
vidue

a„a happiness (nature)

world, .hen .he concep. of
freedom either negates
itself-sinee

in the

.us. he conceived hy
reason as a spontaneous power
.ha. exerts a force
independently of natural
causes- or
subsists as an irreducible
rentainder.

be a huntan capacity

What

that is jus. strong

is

disclosed

by the

i.

fact

and determinate enough

to

insufficiency or powerlessness;
the task of a historical
ethic then

with such an experience

that is also cut off
from the

of reason would then

measure

its

ultimate

becomes how

immediacy ascribed

to

cope

to the self-

enclosed realm of phenomenal
nature.

The veo.

identification

of a disjunction between moral
demand and moral

however, preserve the possibility
of forging an

ethic in that

it

of metaphysics. For what Kan.
represents

may,

infioduces a negative

principle that reveals the existence
of a hitherto unrecognized gap
or
tradition

act

wound

in the

as the antinomic rela.ton
between

freedom and nature illuminates what
the pre-Christian doctrines
of Epicureanism and
Stoicism had covered over: “the Stoic
system made consciousness of strength
the sole
pivot on which

all

moral dispositions were

to turn.

.
.

virtue required

As

by

its

pure law as fully attainable

[TJhey represented the degree of

in this life.”

potentially determining causes of action,
neither the sensible nor the

supersensible constitute a form of necessary
immediacy for the subject that

seemingly deprived of a source of mediation

that

its

autonomy does not

translate into a

“kingdom of purposes” or the highest good
to

what might

is

befall the will in another life are
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then

left

with the

form of autarky that

“in. .this life”.
.

also

would enable the “immense chasm”

separating freedom and nature to be crossed.
The subject
realization that

is

And while

institutes the

speculations as

of course incapable of securing a form

of knowledge, they can provide some

sort

of measure

any such “measure” does not have objective
subject

is

“compelled”

for action if it is recognized
that

validity in itself but is

something the

to introduce into its experience
if it is to retain an underlying

sense of coherence or lawfulness.
If the logic of the Kantian

system dictates

that the concept

of freedom be represented

m historical terms as a surplus value, three responses to such a
to a subject neither

wholly determined by, nor independent

determine that the capacity of freedom and/or the
law

can equate the moral with the

law can be understood

in

first

seem

to

two are prepared

emerges as the only possible way

The seeming

inability

it

of, tradition;

it

can

itself is essentially “diabolical”;

can become attuned to

how

its

relation to the

be sanctioned by Kant’s “formal” principle of

for,

while the third

is

not.

And

yet

it

is

the latter that

for the subject to lay claim to an ethic of history.

of the Kantian subject

to unite the

higher power of desire, the

natural need for purposiveness, and the concept of unconditional
moral duty into an

integrated experience of being in the world confronts the historical
imagination as an

irremediable affliction:
morality really has no need of a purpose for right conduct. .[as] the law
that contains the formal condition of the use of freedom in general
suffices to it. Yet. .it cannot possibly be a matter of indifference to
.

.

how to answer the question, what is then the result of this right
conduct of ours? Nor to what are we to direct our actions and abstentions
reason

[Tun und Lassen], even granted

It

it

terms of a beneficent reciprocity. While
none of these

possible experiences would
morality, the

tragic; or

fate present themselves

this is not frilly in

our control.

cannot be a matter of indifference simply because reason has no choice but to be

concerned with such unsolicited and a posteriori questions
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that cannot

be definitively

answered. Since

i,

is

unthinkable that the constitution
of reason has been incorrectly

delimited, the natural need for
putposes must be

the higher

think for

power of desire

all

for “otherwise

accommodated and synchronized
with

would be

it

a hindrance to moral
resolve, to

our actions and abstentions
taken as a whole some sort
of ultimate purpose

which reason can justify.”'

What
spirit

m fact seems to hinder the resolute will that

otherwise follows the

of law as such by “abstracting from
purposes altogether”

the “ultimate” purpose of nature:
the emergence of the

purpose.

The time and space of an

ethic

human

is

letter

and

the regulative idea of

subject as a final

of history thus appears to be
reserved

exclusively for a self-positing will
unable to conjoin the principle of
autonomy with the

expenence of being
then

it

in the

would demand an

world. If anything like such a
reconciliation could occur,

interpretation beholden to

what

is

presented in Religion

W rthm The Bounds of Mere Reason as the constitutively contradictory
“dtabohcal
to the fact

evil.”'^’

What such a concept designates

of reason not by conflating

its

for

Kant

is

concept of

a subject that responds

pathological motivations for moral ones but
by

willfully choosing to contravene the law.'^''

Evil

is

diabolical

rather than “radical” if its transgression

of a subreption (mistaking the moral

of duty

not the result

for the pathological) or an inability to

dependency on pathological sources of motivation. The would-be
acts in accordance with the principle

is

overcome

diabolical subject

of autonomy and negates the sensible

determinations of the will for no apparent reason or end; the capacity
for freedom

thereby emerges as something that can produce a principle of purposeless
autonomy.
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a

Such a

variation on the concept

of freedom

as a fomt of “special
causality” brings

the relationship between
cause and law underlying
the Kantian system
to the fore. That
is,

the moral law emerges out
of the gap in

human

experience that opens with
the

suspension (in the imagination) of
the laws of natural causality.
However, the moral

law cannot be thought of as a
cause that necessarily produces
moral effects
it

can neither abrogate the laws of
natural causality nor reproduce
them

p actical terms. This

freedom have

to

is

why

is

in moral-

described as a “special causality”;
the effects of

be understood as though they
emanated from a cause, but the

spontaneous act of freedom
table

it

in the world:

is

not something that can be
understood on the basis of the

of categories (foremost of which

and law are thus not

identical,

law of causality).

is the

The concepts of cause

and yet they are mutually dependent
upon each

other; as

a result, the principles of special and
natural causality determining the
ethical and

pathological acts that constitute the totality
of human experience must each in turn
be

secured by a form of lawfulness.

imagination

is

And what

the diabolical being offers to the

a representation that undermines the entire
architectonic of pure reason:

of oneself as a freely acting being, yet as
exempted from the one
law commensurate to such a being (the moral
law) would amount to the
thought of a cause operating without any law at
all (for the determination
according to natural law is abolished on account of
freedom) and this is a
to think

contradiction.

The
subject

contradictory concept of a “cause operating without any
law at all” leads the

by

yet another route toward the

“immense chasm” separating

the natural and the

moral. For the experience of being affected by the moral law proved
to be bereft of a

second order lawfulness capable of providing the subject with the means

for

embodying

the principle of autonomy in completed and lasting ethical actions; the
subject therefore
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remains entangled
because,

it

in the

no longer

laws of the phenomenal world
even though, or espeeially

identifies itself merely as a
“link” in the order

of nature. The

corollary to this absence of a second
order or supplementary historical
law emerges in
the thought

of diabolical

evil; for

human

experience

is

again bereft of a law, although

rather than being confronted with a
moral law seemingly incapable of
producing

worldly effects reason faces the prospect
of a worldly cause unregulated by a
law.

But the vocation of reason refuses

to sanction the possibility

subject or what amounts to a diabolical moral
law. The former

of either a diabolical

is

dismissed from the

tnbunal of reason on the grounds that the subject,
as both a cause and effect of the
sensible and supersensible, must always be
determined in

the other.

What emerges

phenomenology
terms,

it

is

here

is

its

actions

by

either the

one or

a dimension of subjectivity that reappears in

as the ‘pre-thetic”

and

in

psychoanalysis as the unconscious; in Kantian

represented as an underlying condition whose effect on
the will can be

inferred (but not fully determined) from both intentional
and unintentional actions since

human

experience

is

supersensible origin

always formed in accordance with a
regardless of how the subject

sources of motivation or reflection.
law; the question

autonomous

is

The

may

law—of either sensible or
interpret or understand its

subject always already acts

only whether this will be done in a

way that

is

own

on the basis of a

befitting for an

self-positing subject: “the law... imposes itself on [the subject] irresistibly,

because of his moral predisposition and
the irreducible natural inclinations] he
as a sufficient determination of his

if no other incentive

would

also incorporate

power of choice.”'^^
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were
it

at

work

into his

against

it [i.e.

supreme maxim

The experience of freedom,
not abyssal;

when

like the play

of the imagination

the “determination according
to natural law

of freedom” the moral law presses

itself upon the subject in
a

experience will not be without a (non-sens,
ble) measure. For
impossible.

.

.[that]

That would require

and there

is

no law

pathological

is

in general, ultimately
is

is

abolished on account

way
it

is

that ensures that

its

“absolutely

reason could extirpate within
itself the dignity of the law
itself”
that reason elevate resistance
to the
in the

law

to the status

Kantian system that could explain
such a maneuver. If the

displaced as an incentive, and the
subject acts as though

“exonerated from the moral law” then reason
would be

such a lawless experience

of an incentive,

that apparently wills for the

at

it

how

a loss as to

were
to account for

mere sake of willing and

effectively abstracts from purposes altogether.

But

IS this

not exactly what

of upholding a duty

world? For

it

is

is

required of the ethical subject confronted
with the task

that is necessarily

undermined by

the experience

of being

in the

the lack of another law that seems to prevent
the striving for the

“highest good” from being correlated with a practical
possibility; as a result the

autonomous subject appears

after all to

be a cause bereft of another law

that

would

allow the power of desire, the irreducible needs of the natural subject
and moral duty
co-exist. Either another ‘law”

of history or time would then have

to

be devised (and/or

discovered) or the concept of lawfulness and the antinomic relation between

contingency and morality would have
fact receive

something of a hearing

to

be reevaluated. And both

in the third Critique

possibilities

when Kant

do

in

directly confronts

the possibility that the lack of a second order law could emerge as something like a
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to

“law” of Its own capable of being assumed
alternative available to the

good

will:

B,

in defiance of the only other
apparent

having recourse

The Spinozan

Converting a certain lawlessness into a law

to a theological

supplement.

Subject

that acts as a subjective

maxim, or

subjecting oneself to a law that appears incapable
of producing worldly effects evokes a
tragic ethos that can be

educed from Kant’s representation of the moral
disposition:

need neither of the idea of another being above. .[the
subject] in
order that he recognize his duty, nor that he observe
it
of an incentive
other than the law itself. At least, it is the human being’s
it is

in

.

—

—

own

[Schuld] if such a need

For Kant

this is not a

becomes so only
atonement

is

if

it

is

is

fault

found in him.

condemnable form of guilt requiring expiation;

in fact

it

treated as such. This displacement of guilt or preemptive

an act that Kant ascribes to a “righteous man,. .Spinoza for example.”
.

This

is

the

name Kant

gives to precisely the type of subject

of historical mood--that the law as such seems
imperative to abstract from

does not “find
stake.

it

all

purposes

to

— and

demand: a subject unphased by the

when upholding

the law

necessary to look around for some purpose”

The Spinozan

command

and who therefore

when

its

sense of duty

subject recognizes that the imperatives of the moral law:

whatever

their consequences; indeed they even
such consequences entirely whenever a
concerned, and thereby they make of duty an object

absolutely,

require that

to precisely the type

we abstract from

particular action

is

of the highest respect, without proposing to us, or assigning, a purpose
(and an ultimate purpose) such as would constitute some sort of
inducement for it and an incentive to the fulfillment of our duty. All
human beings could sufficiently partake of this incentive too if they just
adhered (as they should) to the rule of pure reason in the law. What need
have they to know of the outcome of their moral actions and abstentions
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is at

that the world s course

be determined or
suffices for them

™

"

the course of natural history
which can not
legislated by practical reason]
will bring about? It
that they do their duty, even
if everything were to
end

7

[i.e.

™

’

worthiness

H c'" n perhaps never
[Wurdigkeit]
converge.

The
is

will animating such a subject, unlike
the fantastic image

lawful; in fact

Moreover,

it

presents the paradigmatic case

it

does not shirk from duty when, as

is

of a

subject

of the diabolical being,

bound

law as such.

to

inevitably the case for a

representation of human experience in accordance
with Kantian principles,

confronted by the fact that though
natural time, this alterity

is

its

duty exposes

it

to

it

is

something other than non-

not capable of being appropriated in a

way

would

that

effectively displace the laws of natural causality.
Practical reason’s apparent inability to harmonize
virtue and happiness

is

accentuated by one law of nature in particular: the inevitability
of the death that brings

an “end... [to]

life in this

compliance with duty
and the

fact

is

world”.

And

undermined when

of death. For the subject

“need” that

arises

pardonable

guilt

from

is

it

its

is

the subject’s

it

“fault” [Schuld] if its

confronted with both the fact of reason

culpable for the supplementary

exposure to these

which must give

is

own

rise to

facts.

But

it

is this

(i.e.

theological)

peculiar sense of

an ethic of history since the vocation of reason

would otherwise have no ready response

to the untimely death that appears as the

most

obtrusive of the laws of nature.

It

the

was

the subject’s relation to

human

own

death that

first

disclosed the fact of reason and

capacity for freedom. In that case the subject willfully assumed

death and sacrificed

now

its

its

its

own

“natural” life in order to uphold law as such. But the subject

confronted with a death scene in which

its
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own

finitude

is

not capable of being

is

7

appropriated by practical reason. In fact the

latter's

very vocation

irrevocably undermined by the very nature
against which

it

now seems

to

be

ought and must establish

independence and autonomy.

What
Homeric

name

defenses against natural death are then
available
striving for great deeds that

into a

monument

that

would serve

for

Kantian subject? Not a

the purpose of externalizing a
proper

would then outlive the heroic

presumably worthy of such veneration cannot

to the

subject.

Kant even be

For a moral action

verified,

much

less

immortalized.*^^

But the subject may have recourse
foundation in
feeling

human

to

The a

nature.”

of the sublime which

is

else,

something in fact that “has

priori principle in question

emerges

its

in the

aroused “merely in apprehension and without any

reasoning on our part when the subject

judges in a particular way.'^*

something

is

confronted by a phenomenon of nature that

By converting

it

an overwhelming threat to the subject’s

sensible existence into an attestation of its proper vocation, a judgment
of the

dynamically sublime discloses the

judge nature without fear and
nature.”

threat to

phenomena of nature;

its

with which

we have been endowed,

the subject’s ability to withstand and

fmitude posed by the counter-purposive force exerted by the

not by denying that the threat exists, but by displacing the power

can exert in determining the subject’s actions: “we can. .consider an object
.

without being afraid of it,

if

we judge

it

in such a

way

where

we might possibly want to put up resistance

would

in that case

1

be

to

of our vocation as being sublimely above

Such a judgment demonstrates

overcome the

it

to think

ability,

"^

utterly futile.”
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that

against

we merely
it,

fearful

think of the case

and that any resistance

If an object

reason
the

is

of fear

is

converted into an aesthetic judgment then
what emerges for

an intimation of “the basis of a self-preservation

quite different in kind

one that can be assailed and endangered by nature
outside

of the subject’s dignity as a

purpose outweighs the need

final

The

us.”

to preserve

justifies the

noble sacrifice that

preservation

mere

should the two dimensions of experience conflict with
one another. This

is

from

life

what

prepared for by an aesthetic judgment which
allows

is

us to consider what can be “assailed and endangered
by nature outside us” as but a

subordinated part of the
displaced

totality

by a sense of awe

of human experience. For

for the chaotic force exerted

and hurricanes are among the examples Kant

cites) that

if the feeling

of fear can be

by nature (volcanic eruptions

seems

to defy the

understanding’s laws of order and regularity then being in the world
takes on a partly
non-pathological character; that

is,

ought to produce perhaps appear
posited in

which both

purposive

when measured by

the worldly effects the special causality of freedom

an impossibility

less like

subject and object

seem capable of acting

the standard

to

be put

to its ultimate test.

And

in a

way

of mathematical-mechanical

With the experience of untimely death
seem

if a relation to

nature can be

that is counter-

causality.

the subject’s “superiority over nature”

would

here a distinction emerges between two

representations of death, both of which lend themselves to an aesthetic judgment of the

sublime.

The

first is

the sacrificial act, the predisposition toward which

is facilitated

cultivating the feeling of the sublime that “regards nature’s might. .as yet not having
.

such dominance over us, as persons, that
principles

were

at stake

and

we

should have to

we had to choose between
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bow

to

it

if our highest

upholding or abandoning

by

But

if a sacrifice

can be perfomted

subject considered as a final
purpose

judgment.
still

.

in the

is

.[that] considerfs] nature
as

name of the

sacrificed to sensible nature?
Is an “aesthetic

a might that has no
dominance over” the subject

possible? Only if a certain relation
to the moral law

imagines

its

it

possibly mean”, Paul de

sublime, “ that the imagination
sacrifices

of reason?

—

is

maintained and the subject

relation to death in yet another
way.

What could

Ju dgment

moral law, what happens
if the

For de

Man

this

like the writing

Man

asks in his intentretation of
the Kantian

itself, like

can only indicate

Antigone or Iphigenia...for the
sake

how

the writing of the Critique
of

of any philosophical text- was
“determined by linguistic

Structures that are not within the
author’s control.”

A mystenous cause acting without any recognizable law
here, a

“movement”

that

by

definition

would have

to

would appear

to

be

at

work

be consigned along with the

abortive concepts of diabolical evil and
“blind chance” to the realm inhabited
by the

products of the imagination incapable of
being either represented by the understanding
or thought by reason without contradiction.'^®

autonomous

subject,

de

Man

By

isolating such a threat to the

invites reconsideration

of something intimated

in Kant’s

oft-repeated claim that the origin of the subject’s
decision to freely adopt this or that

maxim remains

inscrutable to speculative reason.'^' For the process
of linguistic

determinism de

Man

invokes shares an apparent affinity with both

and a concept that emerged most clearly with Freud
“stages” in the

work of Schopenhauer,

of the unconscious which

is

through disparate

Nietzsche, and Eduard von Hartmann: the “law”

situated outside

Freudian unconscious connotes too

after passing

modem structuralism

much

of time. But because

in the
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for

de

Man the

way of autonomous agency

or

mtegrated

if fractured subjectivity
the

ethics with the “pathos

of sacrif.ce”

is

unacknowledged cause

that

imbues Kantian

said to function in
accordance with the “laws of

figurative language.”’

If a

law of language somehow conditions
the transmission of continuity
and

discontinuity within tradition, then

on what de

Man calls

how should Kanfs

an “economy of sacrifice and
recuperation” be understood
apart

from the incidental and dismissive
reference
further specified) as an art form
containing

_1.

On

relationship to a tradition
based

in the Critique

no

of Judgment to tragedy (not

intrinsic ethical

value?‘“

A “Stirring and Shining Example”

the one hand, the sacrificial scenes
Kant stages in order to present the fact of

reason and the feeling of the sublime tend
to displace the type of romantic-heroic

pathos cited by de Man. For the sacrifice of
the imagination—of its power to
the

phenomena of nature— allows

the subject to receive everything in return:

recognition of its proper supersensible identity.

intuit

i.e.,

the

Furthermore, the subject ought

not be confronted, in principle, with competing
ethical values in seemingly
irreconcilable opposition to one another, for such
moral ambiguity

maxims of their necessary
this

“determination and stability”.

In fact

would deprive
it

is

precisely in

context that Kant valorizes a certain “peculiarity of Christian morality”:

The

figurative representation of heaven and hell. ..serves to prevent us
from thinking of good and evil, the realm of light and the realm of
darkness, as bordering on each other and losing themselves into one
another by gradual steps; [it]... rather represents good and evil as though
separated by an immeasurable chasm. The total dissimilarity of the basic
principles by which one can be subject to either one or the other of these
two realms, and also the danger associated with the illusion of a close
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be^een the characteristics that qualify
somebody for one or
the other, justify this form
of representation which, though
containing
^ an
element of horror, is nonetheless
sublime.
relationship

'

On

the other hand, something
analogous to

historical conditions

that there is

of possibility

for Attic tragedy

reemerges

in

Kant’s supposition

a need for a Copemican Revolution
in the tradition of Western

metaphysics. For just as Greek tragedy
tradition

what have been represented as the
world-

is

said to

have illumined the decline of a

“under the impulse of a new moral
world

that

was being bom” the

eritique

of

reason lays the groundwork for a
metaphysics of morals amidst the ruins
of doctrinal
theology.

a destiny

Such a foundation, however, appears
which

is

to deliver the Kantian subject
over to

both inescapable and incapable of being
successfully appropriated

insofar as the origin of the law and the
capacity for freedom that
inscrutable,

it

presupposes remain

and the telos or purpose of such freedom
eludes the grasp of human

knowledge.

But

is

such a peculiar fate”

tragic as well? This is

what de

Man

suggests

by

associating the pathos of sacrifice in the judgment
of the sublime with two archetypal
figures

of Greek tragedy. What lends

itself to

such an assessment

determination of how the feeling of sublimity attests to the

way

in

is

Kant’s

which the subject

capable of making a distinction between natural death and
symbolic death.
its

is

By basing

proper identity upon a form of self-preservation “different in kind” from
the type of

life that is

maintained in a merely natural or biological sense the subject becomes

receptive to the possible need for an ethically sanctioned act of self-sacrifice.’^^
there are certain limits as to

how the relationship between

and reason ought and can be understood. For the former
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But

the singular “facts” of death

is

both elevated and devalued

by the

latter.

The

tension that emerges in this
relation stems from
Kant's conversion of

the Aristotelian-Christian
principle
the

autonomous

of the

first

cause into the unrepresentable
power of

subject; however, the inscrutable
basis of this

subject can neither simply appropriate
nor ethically negate.

power

The

is

something the

subject therefore

appears destined by the vocation of
reason to assume the role of
agent and guardian.

For

if

freedom can be "deduced” as a

of respect, then

it

appears to be

rational

somehow

The inverted commas introduce

and

practical concept through the
feeling

“situated.”

the unanswerable
anthropological-teleological

question that emerges at this critical
juncture for reason:

how

capacity or “pre-determinism can
co-exist with freedom,

when

predeterminism freely chosen actions, as
occurrences, have

is it that

an underlying

according to

their determining

grounds

in

antecedent time [Kant’s emphasis]... whereas
according to freedom the action... must be
in the control

It is

of the subject

at the

moment of its happening.”

the traditional dualism of freedom/necessity
(of temporal contingency/moral

permanence) that creates the following aporia: there must
and cannot be some “basis”
for

human freedom

movement from

that simultaneously requires and suspends the

potentiality to actuality. This supposition

contradiction so long as time

continuum conceived

is

phenomenal

must appear

as a

represented in terms of a quantitative, rectilinear

in diametric opposition to the special causality

of freedom. Not

only then does the absence of a concept of non-mechanical time suspend the
question of

freedom’s origin;

it

also

seems

to prevent the finite subject

whose consequences correspond with

from positing purposes

the underlying intention to give form to the idea

of moral necessity. Thrown into a seemingly paradoxical
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state

of situated freedom

that

brings with

it

both an absence of theoretical
knowledge and an evidently
necessary

sense of failure vis-a-vis practical
action, the subject thus
appears poised to accept

its

“peculiar fate” as a tragic fate.

Or does

the subject’s identity as both
agent and guardian but not
author of the moral

law preclude the devolution of the
peculiar into the tragic?
Kant’s censure of an act of suicide
that seeks “death

in

An

indication arises in

order to promote a worthy

purpose through a stirring and shining
example [durch ein Aufsehen erregendes
glanzendes Beispiel],
life,

. .

for

one may indeed dare something

or even endure death at the hand of
another,

at the risk

when one cannot

of losing one’s

avoid

it

without

betrayrng an rrccmissible duty. But one
cannot dispose of oneself and one’s

life

as a

means, whatever the purpose, and thus be the
author of one’s death.”

While the
as an

fact

of natural death appears

Endzweck, the

within the

act

of suicide

power of the human

the antinomic relation

between

natural death

these

guilt,

between the

act.

and the Endzweck
guilt,

upon

is

ethical

and

fate

to

the subject; and the

there ought not to be any ambiguity

makes

it

seem

to prevent the subject

as though the delimitation of

from converting respect

assume an Oedipal form of guilty innocence.
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is

negated and resolved

moral law into a recognition of an unconditional necessity requiring

—

it

In both cases the ultimate absenee of contradietion in
the

two concepts was designed

tragic destiny

example of how

uphold the eategorical imperative. For

of innocent

on suicide demonstrates how

surrounding a sacrificial
relationship

offers a singular counterintuitive

will to strictly

through a granting of pardonable
prohibition

to limit the subject’s ability to relate
to itself

it

to

for the

assume a

The immoral character of suicide
stems

for

Kan, from the way

in which it makes
a
decision about life and death
on the basis of criteria
extrinsic to the subject’s
autonomy;

that

is,

the act substitutes a
contingent, pathological
puntose (such as the attempt
to

avoid pain to oneself and/or
to cause pain

purpose of relating to

its

"Person

” as

in others) for the
subject’s properly final

an end in itself”
Because the vocation of

reason ’’calls” for a particular
self relation of the will
which gives to the subject

moral identity of custodian and
agent, what Lukacs and
Benjamin
hfe” can be sacrificed in the

such that

is

violated

by the

name of duty

suicide; in fact

is

unduly privileged

dual

will later call ’’mere

but never vice-versa.'”
For
it

its

in

a

i,

is

way

no,

life as

that reverses

the proper hierarchical relationship
Kant establishes between the
ethical and the
aesthetic.

This relation becomes evident

induced by a judgment of the sublime

to tbe subject

through a peculiar feeling

that forcibly transforms
the imagination

from an

auxiliary of the understanding
into an “instrument of reason.”

Such a subordination of the

aesthetic to the ethical

becomes evident

in

Kant’s concept

of the “aesthetic idea” which conveys a
symbolic representation of an otherwise
indemonstrable rational concept

that

acculturation of the moral subject.

imagination which prompts

whatsoever,
express

it

i.e.

much

can thereby serve as a heuristic device

“And by

aesthetic idea

I

mean

a presentation of the

thought but to which no determinant thought

no determinant concept, can be adequate, so

completely and allow us

in the

to grasp

it.”''”'

that

no language can

The descriptive

been sacnficed to the newfound power of the aesthetic
idea which

force

will

of language has

become

transformed into the basis for a historical ethic in the work
of Schiller and Nietzsche.
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But

i.

i.

the comparatively
restrictive delimitation
of the

that is transgressed

depicts

how moral

power of the aesthetic

by the advent of the “stimng
and shining example”
which
action can appear

in the

form of a suicidal act earned
out

idea

ostensibly

in

order to

hasten the realization of a
particular purpose. Rather
than attesting to an invisible
yet
indelible moral law. the
spectacle
setting

of heroism

up an idol to be revered and

imitated.

fetishizes a subjective intention,
i
thereby

And

a cause whose galvanizing
power

dependent upon such a graspable,
detenninate phenomenalization
preempts what

presumably attempting to

further: the historicization

of the moral

it

is

was

law. For even if a

heroic subject endures death
without betraying an “irremissible
duty”, such an act

is

ultimately devoid of ethical-historical
value precisely because of its
misplaced

attachment to aesthetic form:
to teach

only admiration for virtuous actions,
however great a sacrifice
may have cost, falls short of the right spirit
that ought to support
he apprentice s disposition for the
moral good. For, however virtuous
someone IS, all the good that he can ever
perform still is merely duty; to
do one s duty, however, is no more
than to do what lies in the common
moral order and is not, therefore deserving
of wonder.
these

This admiration

on the contrary a dulling of our feeling for
duty, as if to give obedience
to It were something extraordinary
and meritorious.’^^
IS

The

threat to

duty properly understood therefore seems
to arise both from a certain

impoverishment and overstimulation of the imagination.
Once again the subject’s
relationship to the moral law appears to be
sustained
for although a “being without affects” earns
a title

by a precarious balance offerees;

of nobility from pure reason, the

subject s sensible nature, in turn, receives a form
of compensation that removes the

need

for the unconditional ethic

of renunciation which the task of upholding duty as

such seems to require.
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The

subject

of the moral law thus appears

incurring guilt once

it

is

exposed

to the

nature and freedom, only one of
which

evoked

for

to

be confronted with two ways
of

“immense chasm" separating
is

the realms

of

pardonable. For the form of heroism
which

Kant by the Stoa, “Spinoza" and the
“stimng”

act

of suicide

is

guilty

is

of

prematurely demarcating the limits of
the historically (imjpossible.'”

The

how

suicide

heroic

it

Kant censures exemplifies the distinction

may

undermined by

its

appear,

it

attests to

how

in

question

no matter

in that

the principle of autonomy can
be

very condition of possibility: the freedom
of the will which becomes

most markedly pronounced

in the subject’s ability to anticipate

its

pathological manner. Properly conceived as
neither a curse nor a

own

death in a non-

gift, this is

the

capacity that leads to a recognition of finitude
which can then be conducive either to the

upholding or betraying of an “irremissible duty” toward
law as such. There

is

yet

another death scene, however, that threatens to overturn
the finely wrought stracture of
the

autonomous

will that mediates the Kantian subject’s relationship
to both the

vocation of reason and the logic of history.

2.

The

fact

of natural death

The Monstrous Limit

may be

seen as the quintessence of the sort of “natural”

might which, thanks to the feeling of the sublime, can be displaced

to the point

where

“has no dominance over us.”*^^ But could there be an instance in which the force of
nature appears insuperable even to a mind attuned to the sublime?’^^

whose “purposiveness”

is

conceived by reason on analogy with
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rejv//,

What

if nature,

could be

it

—
represented as a form of agency that
demands reason sacrifice nothing
less that

proper vocation?- In that case the
subject would die twice:
“naturally” and

manner
Kant

would

that

in fact

its

in a

precipitate the collapse of the
Kantian symbolic order.

addresses this very possibility, and
in a

way that

not as peremptorily

is

dismissive as his treatment of such
concepts as diabolical evil and
the Epicurean-like
rule

of “blind chance”

in nature.^«>

For because neither

is

subsumable under

either the

categories of the understanding or the
ideas of reason, they can only
take on the

impossible or self-negating (or self-contradictory)
form of a “cause acting without any

law

But elevating the mere

at all.”

subject

unaffected

IS

would seem

fact

of death into a natural law whose
relation to the

by a judgment of the sublime

to resonate

is

an act of the imagination which

with the same “commonest understanding”
Kant invoked in

order to accentuate the inescapability of the
thought that “without

would be

a

mere wasteland, gratuitous and without a

Once more,
law and

its

man

all

of creation

final purpose.”^®^

the fact of reason (which attests to the subject’s
receptivity to the moral

consequent recognition of its duty

to relate to itself as a final

the fact of natural death (the foremost obstacle that stands
in the

purpose) and

way of successfully

executing such a duty) appear to exist in a necessarily antinomic
relation to one another

once the question of the historicization of the law

problem
only

that

if the

is raised.^®^

reemerges when Kant introduces a form of guilt

need for a pardon remains unrecognized or

The operative concept of justice

at

work here

is

is

This

that

is

the fundamental

demands expiation

directly challenged.

evinced with the help of a certain

relationship that can best be described as a strange sort of affinity.

To borrow

language of symbolic analogy; just as in a judgment of beauty the subject
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is

the

allowed

m the absence of a determinate concept-to regard
acculturation

there

is

is

furthered

when

it

its

of its manifold shapes,

to discern a fortunate

and by no means

between the vocation of reason
and Christian doctrine.™

mtimation of a concept of non-mechanical
time thereby becomes
discernible

the atemporal character of the
moral law

of the Christian tradition

rise

as a “favor of nature”
that

disinterested contemplation

a teleological judgment which
enables

arbitrary parallelism

An

by the

it

to

which

it

ought

presented as necessarily prior to
the

is

in fact

give thanks for putting

at its

disposal a language rich enough to
retroactively disclose the concepts
of reason in a

form comprehensible

to the

human

The expenence which suggests

imagination.

that

an ethic of history cannot be
conceived of in

fundamentally atheological terms emerges

how

the validity of the moral law

is in

at the

very

moment when Kant reiterates

no way derived from or dependent upon

theological doctrine. For the indispensable
yet derivative theological supplement

preserves the principle of morality only
spontaneity” of the

power of freedom,

if

it

is

presupposed that the “absolute

the equating of justice with the ideal of a
strictly

proportional relationship between virtue and happiness,
and the experience of a will

whose

capacity for choice

is

always already corrupted and yet capable of reform are not

“seculanzations” but rather rational concepts which are then

made

intelligible

through

the sublimity of such ideas as God, the afterlife and
redemption.^®^

Such ideas of reason introduce a new category of modality by
toward the future as an “object” capable of giving
traditionally defined as “hope”.

As might be
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directing the subject

rise to a historical

mood

that has

been

expected, a Kantian hope does not emerge

m direct opposition to a law of tragedy.

Not Kafka's “hope for the
hopeless’’ but rather

the need for hope, but not too
much, would be an appropriate
aphorism.

The

theoretical

and practical

bearing “absolute value’’
affected

in

is

possibility of relating to
oneself as

an end

in itself

corroborated by the subject’s
consciousness of being

by the moral law.“‘ But because

this

being destined to reason

also situated

is

a history whose phenomena
appear to be governed by the
laws of mechanical

regularity and “natural” contingency,
the possibility of positing
something of absolute

value devolves in the face of actuality
into an ineffectual capacity.
However, the
vocation of reason

is

able to displace the so-called
logic of natural history by
enforcing

the law of non-contradiction. For

bound

to

what seems

to

it

would be

a contradiction for the subject
to be

be a palpably contradictory ethic of
history and only an

experience of time animated by a principle
of hope allows the

latter to

be redefined as

an antinomy of reason.

By ngorously
toward the need
regulates

its

adhering to the

commands of the moral

for a faith that preserves

its

law, the subject

drawn

capacity for upholding a law which

rational projections in the absence

of determinate knowledge (of either the

sensible or supersensible). For once the influence
exerted

upon

is

by pathological

incentives

the will has been weakened, the relation to the moral
law can be sustained by a

sense of reciprocity that sublates the ineradicable natural desire
for possession, for a
sense of purposiveness:
faith is a

confidence in the promise [VerheiBung] of the moral law; but

the moral law does not contain this promise:

it is I who put it there, and
For no law of reason can command [us to
pursue] a final purpose unless reason also promises [versprechen], even
if not with certainty, that this final purpose is achievable, and hence also

on a morally

sufficient basis.
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justifies us in assenting to
the conditions

can conceive of that achievability.^^^

Such

are the conditions

which ensure

creating an absolute value
through the
into a surplus value.

And

under which alone our
reason

that the limitations
preventing the subject

power of desire do not

also transfonn the latter

since speculative reason
cannot conceive of the
possibility of

hannonizing duty with happiness on
the basis of natural causes
the subject’s

“own physical

(i.e.

in terms either

of

ability” or an implausible
“cooperation of nature”), the

principle of hope arises only with
the assumption that there
causality (attributed

from

by analogy

to the rational concept

that allows reason to distinguish
a regulative ideal

is

one form of special

of God)

that furnishes a

measure

from a “baseless and idle^ven

if

well-meant expectation.”^®*

As

to the question

of how the law of non-contradiction
ultimately preserves the

autonomy of morality by

enlisting the services of a theological
supplement, Kant

responds by introducing something like
a singular historical event
vocation of reason what

it

would otherwise have

relation to a certain tradition that

is

that

seems

to give the

to accept as a constitutive lack:
a

neither arbitrary nor simply handed

down through

an ongoing process of seamless continuity. For
Kant the “affinity” between Christian
doctrine and the vocation of reason serves as but
a preparatory stage for the possible

development of a “universal religion” capable of innervating
the

subject’s striving

toward the realization of the highest good.^®^ By orienting the
subject toward a
regulative ideal rather than an idol, the representation of
human history takes on a
certain structure of expectation that endures only if the
“promise” of the moral law

binds the subject not to a self-sustaining projection but rather to an imposition
as

it

were, by a particular form of alterity.
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solicited,

The name Kant

gives to such alterity

ensuing act of identif.cation
speaking, and

it

is

is historically

conditioned, although the

not historically determined;

it

is

not necessary, strictly

does not yield an object of
empirical knowledge.

enable the subject to appropriate

its

relation to a past in a

way

It

does however

that allows the present
to

be opened to a future which can
be imagined as something
other than a mere extensron
of itself. The Kantian system thus
becomes exposed

to

two intimations of non-

mechanical time. And while the time
of faith may well be represented
as but
obverse of rectilinear, mathematical
time, the “space” created for
Revolution suggests there

may be another experience of history

it

by the Copemican

whose conditions of

possibility are not, however, further
developed or perhaps even recognized.

addressed by Kant

is

the

What

is

the likely objection to be raised
against reason's “appropriation”

of theology:

must seem dubious how this term [Fides]
and
have made their way into moral philosophy.
it

this special idea

For they were

[Godl

first

introduced with Christianity, and it might
seem as if their acceptance [by
moral philosophy] is perhaps only a fawning
imitation [schmeichlerische
Nachahmung] of the language of Christianity. But
this is not the only
case where this wondrous religion has in
the greatest simplicity

of its

expression [Vortrages] enriched [bereichert]
philosophy with far more
determinate and pure concepts of morality than
philosophy had until then
been able to furnish [liefem], but which, once they
are there, reason
sanctions freely [frei gebilligt] and accepts as
concepts that it surely
could and should have come upon and introduced.^'®

This

is

an excusable omission directly related

to the

sense of pardonable guilt

conferred upon the subject. In the former case, reason receives
a
latter

it

bestows one. Either way, the language of Christianity

shore up a

new moral

the tradition

it is

foundation for

human

action that

must

is

gift as

it

were; in the

retrieved in order to

retain the central tenets of

nonetheless displacing; furthermore, such a retention could not
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effectively take place if the
language in question

was simply preserved or
thought of in

symbolic rather than allegorical terms.^”

Now the representation of this peculiar
clumsy

if elaborate

It

movement may appear

as but a

device employed to preserve
and secularize the remnants
of

doctrinal theology in the “age of
critique”
that

historical

-

And

as ,f in anticipation

of the objection

rather succeeds only in
deconstructing the Enlightenment
concepts of the

theological undthe secular, Kant
attempts to convert this source
of theoretical-practical
instability into a productive
tension

response to the

crisis

of metaphysics

like a secular theodicy

favors

It

which must be sustained as the only
viable
in modernity.

which defends

What

is

then put forth

commands

something

the moral law against the
accusation that the

extends to the finite subject (granting
a pardon and permitting

unconditional

is

ethical

it

to

add to

its

the promise of a promise) betray
an underlying weakness or

imperfection of reason which in turn calls
for both a more unequivocal
redefinition of
the relationship between history and theology
and a renaming of the subject’s destiny;
as

no longer a

The

peculiar, but rather a tragic fate.

theological “supplement” to a concept of morality
based above

all

upon the

principles of autonomy and unconditional necessity
begs the question that Kant directly

confronts in the concluding sections of the third Critique.
In the

necessary to assume that
so that anyone

God

exists, as

it

is to

acknowledge

who cannot convince himself that God

from the obligations

that the

to

that the

moral law

is

it

as

valid,

may judge himself released

moral law imposes?”^

The importance of this question
by those susceptible

exists

last instance “is

lies for

Kant not

in the likely

conclusion to be drawn

radical evil” but in the kind of challenge or counter-move
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it

provokes

in ,he -case

interest in the

respects:

it

of .he righteous ntan...
Spinoza,

Spinozan subject, as

it

were,

is in

tun,

for

example.- And

of interest here

dramatizes in a concise and
striking fashion

how

the

in

two

Kant’s

interne, a.ed

commands of the moral

law direct the w.„ inexorably
toward, and then suddenly
away from, the time and space
of tragedy; and it precipitates the
staging of the one death
scene presided over by reason

which

threatens to dismantle Kant’s
entire “critical enterprise.”^'^

How does Kant construct the Spinozan
pardonable

guilt

which gives

rise to the

response to the “fact” of the
subject’s

need for a theological supplement

clarifies its originary destination
to reason? Priorto the
introduction

that in turn

of Spinoza, the

Kantian subject appeared to be confronted
with one of two ways of incurring
pardonable
punishable

is

is

the need for a

the

to

for being situated in natural
history:

confounding of the pathological and the
moral when determining the

basis of subjective maxims.

shown

form of compensation

guilt:

be directed

at

(And

the form of guilt that

would

befall diabolical evil

was

a purely imaginary object which
could not act a practical-

historical cause).

So how
airtight

IS

the

emergence of Spinozan righteousness accounted

moral system? The Spinozist subject

for the moral law

for a pardon.

by declining the favor the

for in this seemingly

in effect attempts to intensify

latter extends,

respect

its

thereby preempting the need

Such a maneuver would presumably be construed as an

act

of

transgression only if theology had sunk “into the depths
of a demonology”, only

if the

idea of law as such had been transmogrified into a
Homeric god offended by a show of
ingratitude.

For the Spinozan subject “actively reveres the moral law

firmly persuaded that there

is

no God

and... also
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no future

life: [so]

[but]

how will

.

.

.remains

he judge

his

own

inner destination to a purpose
[imposed] by the moral law
[innere

Zweckbestimmung durch das moralische
This

is

Gesetz]?”^’^

a somewhat disingenuous question

in that

it

presupposes that the proper

acculturation of the subject necessarily
passes through the following
four stages:

humiliation of the pathological through
a feeling of respect for the
moral law; the
recognition that the law’s

commands

not only ought to be executed
but must, logically,

be executable: “duty commands nothing
but what we can do”; the
awareness,
nevertheless, of a profound disparity
between theoretical and practical
possibility at

precisely this critical juncture; the
deteimination that adopting the theological

supplement

is

the only

consistency that
existence.

is

The

way

for the subject to “think consistently
in

morality”-a

only maintained by conspicuously
suspending the question of God’s

narrative thus culminates in the “step to
religion” [Schritt zur

Religion] that simultaneously takes the subject
out of what amounts to pre-history:

The moral argument

not meant to prove to the skeptic that there is
a
that he must adopt the assumption of this
proposition as one of
the maxims of his practical reason if he wants to
think consistently in
is

God, but

Nor is the argument meant to say that it is necessary for
morality [Sittlichkeit] to assume that the happiness of all
rational beings
in the world is [to be] proportionate [gemafi] to their
morality
morality.

[Moralitat], but rather that morality
this

The

assumption

logical

[es ist

outcome

durch

sie

to the collision

makes

is it

necessary for us to

make

between the “logic” of history and the vocation

of reason’s fundamental law of non-contradiction
of logic insofar

it

notwendig].

is that

there

is

a logic to the collapse

thereby creates a practical-historical space for faith which allows

the subject’s fate to be represented as “peculiar” rather than tragic. But the Spinozan
figure appears poised to

assume the

latter as its

proper destiny in that

singular relationship Kant establishes between theology and morality.
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it

severs the

Or

rather he

is

pointed in that direction by dutifully
following the imperatives
prescribed by law as
.uch: -‘he does not require that
complying with the law should
bring him an advantage,
either in this world or another;
rather he

good

to

which

The law
the feeling

who

is

that sacred [heilige]

this

unselfish and wants only
to bring about the

law directs

sacred or holy insofar as

of respect. At

is

it

is

all his

forces.”^^®

unrepresentable and yet capable
of inducing

point law as such relates to
the ethical subject as
such,

has no more need to inquire as to

how

it

is

he

is

bound by the law than

to

know

the

origin of geometo..^' Yet just as
the latter’s figures are
nowhere perfectly duplicated

among the phenomena of nature,
direct

its

will to “those other things [of the
world] regarded either as purposes
or as

objects for which [the subject]

It is at

its

is

the final purpose.”

this point that the finite subject is
confronted with the inescapable

that as a being

purpose

the moral law affects a being
in the world enjoined to

is

forces

of nature bearing a form of inner lawfulness

a seemingly purposeless one; for

is

rational destination to a

its

impossible for

is

And of course

also impossible that this

to successfully “apply

it

is

the only causality “that can be connected
with

is

atonement has the deck stacked against him. His

selfless

historicizing the law incapable of being historicized

[that]

encounters

to the

law but foregoes

limits.

historical

For

it

is

human freedom.”

is

preempt the need

commitment

presented

to the task

by Kant

not as though he reluctantly accepts

striving for the highest good.^^^ Rather

character of the atemporal moral law
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if the

impossible in the last instance.

clear, therefore, that the Spinozist subject attempting
to

irreducibly

it

toward the realization of the highest good prescribed
by the moral law

causality of nature

It IS

it

judgment

for

of

as an “effort

its

subjection

he recognizes the

(i.e.,

the

demand

for the

law’s historicization).^^^ Thus
“he wants only
sacred law directs
limitations

all

his

forces.”- The

of the Kantian

On

the

limits

about the good to which
that

he then encounters in

of history which only seems

ethic

pronounced, however, when the attempt

move beyond

to bring

is

made

(e.g.

to

fact isolate the

become more

by Schiller and Nietzsche)

to

them.

one hand, the phenomena of
nature cannot be

legislation; nor

is

directly subjected to
moral

the alterity of nature
something that can be appropriated
as but an

unrecognized property of the subject.
The relationship between the free
rather requires a form of “mediation”
that postpones indefinitely
the

will

and nature

moment of

synthesis.

On

the other hand, as a regulative ideal,
such a synthesis leaves a certain
subject-

object relationship fundamentally intact
insofar as phenomenal nature
alternatively as a

series

mechanism constmcted by

of effects whose cause

is

is

represented

the laws of the understanding and
as a

thought of on analogy with a particular form
of agency:

TExvrj.

This dual representation of nature

is

then coupled with a theologically inspired

conception of the special causality of human freedom

autonomous and unconditional power. The
moral

is

that acts as a spontaneous,

stark opposition

between the natural and

the

designed to prevent any intermediate, contingent and
therefore inadequate

historical ethic

from

such a failed attempt

of possibility

arising; yet

it

also creates a dualism that preempts anything but

at historicizing the

for the assumption

law from occurring. These are the conditions

of a rational

faith that allows for the idea

harmonization of nature and morality, “foreign
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to

of a

each of them of itself to be thought
’

without contradiction

-

the Spinozist subject are

A„

the interrelated

now almost

lintits

ready to arrest the heroic
striving of

in place.

"ow and

flnrnr"^
a igen
[

Beitntt] with the purpose

of his

then assent fortuitouslv

he feels so obligated and
mpelled to achieve, he can never
expect nature to harmonize
with it in a
way governed by laws and permanent
rules [bestandigen
Regelnl (such
a shis inner maxims
and must be). Deceit, violence
and envy wdl
'’™’
^
that

llrbenelolfnh-

These are the same ineradicable

limits to the being that wills
that failed to impress

themselves upon the similarly constituted
Stoic consciousness which held
the “mere use

of its powers”

to

be the sole “pivot on which

Like the Spinozist,
life

it

supposedly succeeds

all

moral dispositions were

in “exposing.. .[itself]

to

tum.”«»

indeed to the

ills

of

without subjecting...(itself| to them.”"'
But does not such a conception ofvirtue

represented by Kant as a “certain heroism
of the sage” bear a striking resemblance
to
the expenence of the sublime which “is
in fact difficult to think of.. .without
connecting

With

It

The

a mental attunement similar to that for
moral feeling”?^^^
difference between the experience of the
sublime and Spinozist-Stoic heroism in

this context lies in

how Kant

cases; in the former

is

it is

elevated and limited by an exposure to “alterity”;
in the

devalued and limited by

“territory” traversed

presents the imagination’s relationship to reason
in both

its

failure to recognize

latter

what remains apart from the

by the power of desire— albeit

as something that emanates from an

unrepresentable source.^^^

The

sacrifice

of the imagination

in the

judgment of the sublime

deprivation... that serves our inner freedom” insofar as
will

(i.e.

that

it

is

a

sustains the condition of the

of striving or “incessant laboring”) necessary
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it

for a

morally autonomous

but ultintately not autarkic
subject; for

without end”

[ins

its

task

of endless progress-or
‘-progressing

Unendliche gehenden
Progressus]-ntust not be
arrested by a

prentature Judgment of either
completeness or failure since
the value of the
subject's
actions ought to be measured
against a “nonsensible
standard that has...infinity
itself

under

as a unit.”^«

it

The judgment of the sublime

leads to the discovery
of the

nonsensible standard” which must
then co-exist, however,
with a temporal measure.

That

the subject’s sense of
“superiority over nature” ought

is,

somehow

to cohere with

an awareness of its constitutive
inability to master inner
and external nature

manner prescribed
vacillate

to the so-called

End^eck. And while

between a sense of hubris and resignation,

autonomy of the Kantian

subject

is

to.

.

.[its]

This

wanted

is

within.. .[its]

power, then what

aid from another source, whether
or not.

IS

to

the either/or presented to the Spinozist

assume neither position. But what

brings with

it

the Stoic consciousness

is

is

.

enables

latter

not within

.[it]

who

[its]

in

imagine

that if it

power will come

Kant’s narrative originally

then introduced as the deciding factor

an experience of time that poses the greatest
threat yet to the vocation of

how

the self-positing subject

remains mired in an inhospitable and seemingly
unalterable natural
is

to

it

itself

know[s] in what way.”^^^

reason. For not only does the Spinozist’s failure
indicate

imagination

may

the essentially conditional

confronted with the “choice” of
orienting

toward a law of tragedy or a principle
of hope. The
“acts as well as

in the

history.

The

further impelled to represent this time as something
other than an

infinitely repeatable extension

of the present;

that

is,

there

is still

one singular event

will momentarily irrupt in the midst of such disarming
continuity: “as concerns the

other righteous people he meets: no matter

how worthy of happiness
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they

may be.

that

nature,

which pays no

attention to that, will

still

subject

deprivation, disease, and untimely
death. Jus. like
If .he

need for an

ethic

of tragedy seems

to all the evils

the other animals

of

of the earth.’""

to thereby increase,
then perhaps

can be found in the act of
self-sacrif.ee-the

possibility for

incomparable quahty upon the human
subject
animals of the earth.” Or rather
the

all

them

that sets

it

which seems
from

apart

sacrificial act itself stands
in

the relation to death that
emerges in this context

is still less

a measure

to confer an

“all the other

need of a measure,

capable than the act of

suicide from giving rise to a
universal law for ethical
action. Furthermore,
nature

longer represented as something
that
sacrifice to reason;

certain that, in

it

is in fact

marked

offered-^r as something

not clear to what such an
act

contrast to

“violence that the imagination

is

what can

inflicts

is

is

no

that offers i.self_as a

rendered, although

transpire in the judgment

on the subject

for

[will not]...still

it

is

of the sublime, the
be judged

purposive/or the whole vocation of the
It is

with this judgment of purposiveness
that the success or failure of
a historical

ethic based

upon

the principle that “fulfillment of
duty consists in the form of the

earnest will, not in the intermediate causes
[responsible] for success” rests.^^^

What

leads up to Kant’s presentation of a sublated
or second order form of success in the
third

Critique

is

the representation of nature

phenomena produced,

as

it

TExvrj; as a result, the

were, by the former are no longer subsumable
under the

categories of the understanding.

human being

on analogy with human

The appearances of nature

—including

the pathological

thus take on a non-mechanical, “purposive” quality
that becomes the

foremost object of reflective judgment.
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As a

finite

and pathological being, the
subject

ts

exposed both

to the necessarily

obligator, character of the law
and to the imposs.bility
of its historicization.
Included

among

the

ways

in

which Kant presents

this

duahsm

as but an

antinomy

is

the

provisional suggestion in the third
Critique that a degree
of complicity exists
between
the realms of the natural and
the moral.
in the sublation

of natural inclination

An intimation

of such complicity also
appeared

that led to the “promise”

of the moral law. And

another Aujhebung occurs when
the subject’s sensible
nature-rift as

it is

by

“deceit,

violence and envy”_is recuperated
for reason by being
converted through a reftective
teleological

judgment

into the pre-condition
for the establishment

Z^ecke. The very time of natural
history
is

do

somehow;,„rpo«ve;
in

order to be a

final

for

it

prepares, as

it

then represented as a form
of repetition that

were, the subject “for what he
himself must

punrose” by allowing his pathological
inclinations

rather accumulate, until a state
of critical
like

is

of the Reiche der

mass

is

to

grow, or

reached. Having produced something

a Hobbesian state of nature that
Kant represents as a condition of “shining
misery”

[glanzende Blend], the “lower” desire for
sustaining mere
for the vocation

institution

of reason insofar as

it

becomes possible

life

proves to be serviceable

to preserve

it

only through the

of a form of civil society which makes the
process of moral acculturation

at

least thinkable.^^^

Nature
IS

is

thereby represented as “achiev[ing]...its

own purpose, even

not ours.”^^® Moreover, this singular purpose,
the “ultimate purpose”

of nature, manifests

moment

itself in yet

in the repetitive

if that

[letzte

purpose

Zweck]

another act of sacrifice which becomes the culminating

“development” of the pathological

inclinations.^'^'

That

is,

the

subject s subjection to inner and outer nature produces the very
conditions necessary for
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to establish itself as
“independent

it

The

telos

of nature

is

self-sufficient,

attained with the abdication

natural-historical process that

is

of nature;

and a

final punrose.’’"^

this is the

outcome of a

neither merely mechanical
nor necessarily progressive.

While neither “prescnbing a law
the concept

of nature,

to nature, nor learning
one from

of a natural puiposiveness

by observation”

it

in this context nevertheless
allows the subject to

bring a sense of coherence to
“historical” experience by
projecting a fonn of lawfulness

upon phenomena incapable of being
wholly subsumed under the
mathematical
categories of the understanding.^'^^

As

a result of the “character and
limits of our cognitive powers”,

(reflectively) nature to be not

beckon the subject

to

cannot accomplish on

to

merely a mechanism but something
“other” which seems

perform the act-the positing of the

its

to prepare the

nevertheless be an unconditional act of
freedom,

upon

final

purpose-which

the histoncization of the law

it

way

for

what must

also continues to exert a negative

by furnishing

a set of incentives that

threaten the will with an ever imminent
relapse into dependency or heteronomy.
“relation” to nature in question

Nature receives nothing

it

own.^^^

While phenomenal nature therefore seems

influence

we judge

was introduced primarily

in return for the sacrifice

it

in order for

it

to

performs in order to

The

be ruptured.

fulfill its

“ultimate purpose”.

Now certain appearances of nature seem neither mechanical nor susceptible to
judged by a principle of purposiveness, namely, scenes of chaos,
“its

in

which

wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation.”^"*^ This threat

appropriated, as

it

were, in the judgment of the sublime which
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it

is in

being

manifests

turn
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seems

as Ihoiij-h everything

is in

place lor Ihe endless task of

Ininslorming natural history into an ethical history, the
anonymous agency which reason
projects n|>on Ihe rormer reemerges as a foree lhal

seems

lo

demand

a saeridee that

reverses Ihe hierarchical relationships Kant establishes
hetween the sensible and
supersensible, hor something more that natural death |)iesses itself
upon the S|)ino/.an
snbjeel’s inulnly rigorous devotion lo Ihe letter and spirit of the moral
law.

imagination can

still

serve as an instrument of reason even

yef profane death, then

il

in the

remains unclear what wonld stand
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face

in for

And

if the

of an cvcrlasUn^

Ihe snbjeel’s

“nonsensible standard” as the
counterweight to the violence
inHicted upon sensibility
in
•he judgment

if

of the subhnte

-

But perhaps such a
judgment could not take place

an untoward movement of the
imagination precipitates a
breakdown

among

at all

the

“mental powers” [Venndgen des
Gemuts] that destroys the
balance offerees required

upholding the constitution of
transcendental

for

subjectivity; that

sensibility exerts a symbolic
violence over reason

the point

where

it

can represent the

what happens

is.

if

which thereby expands the
former

infinite that for reason
itself suddenly

to

becomes an

abyss?^'*^

What then

is

the

“image”—properly considered

neither as a concept of the

understanding nor as an idea of
reason-that could deprive the subject
of its ability to

judge nature without fear and
It

to

to sacrifice its life in order to

figurative representation

“admit without hesitation”

uphold

of good and

its

that

it

would be possible

for

duty to the moral law?““' While
the

evil as

heaven and

hell contains

an “element of

hoiTor [while being nevertheless] sublime”,
the eradication of this cardinal
distinction

gives rise to perhaps the only case in the
three Critiques where a representation
sensibilizes a rational concept (eternity)

and transforms the foremost

(death) into a sublime object that

lies

provokes such a representation

the thought

that greets the so-called final

from

all

is

of nature

beyond the boundaries of experience.”' What
of an experience of being toward death

purpose of nature as though

“the other animals of the earth.”

qualification,

fact

No

however, unless receiving the

consolation

gift

it

were

is

to

all

but indissociable

he found

of self-consciousness

is

in this

recognized as

an occasion for putting the demand to “abstract from purposes
altogether” to
test:
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its

greatest

accede [hin und wieder^inerzufalHgen
that he feels so obligated
and imnetlfH .
nature to hamronize^lhh
rules (such as his inner

" n aTa

maxims

’

^
®

Putpose of his

‘

gte^^^^

are a^d

musfbe)

'

T""""*

evilsofdSSrrun^^^^^^^^^^^
ammals on

the earth.

And

they will stay

subiectXo

zwecklosen Chaos der Matene.
.aus dem
.

Th,s

is

what an

aesthetic idea looks like

when

sie

gezogen waren].“"

the

power of the imagination becomes

unhinged from the regulative principles
provided by the
transcendent (eternity)

is

thus represented as

21 T

rational concepts; the

immanent and reason produces

a

“monstrosity.””^ For the non-empirical
no longer designates a realm circumscribed
by
the interrelated concepts of the
supersensible.

And

if the Spinozist subject therefore

stands alone,

it is

shows what happens when

the idea of freedom

not then credited with having introduced
a law or ethic of tragedy,

despite the fact that he refuses to degrade
the Kantian concept of duty by basing

it

on

“incentives of fear and hope.”^^"

But

why cannot

this death scene

be valued

in the

same way

as the act

of self-

sacnfice Kant sanctions in the second Critique?^^^
For Kant no such question in fact
explicitly arises; for rather than attesting in
an unparalleled fashion to his respect for the

law and his unswerving adherence

to the “call

meaning. .[Spinozist] would indeed have
.

of his inner moral vocation” the ‘Veil-

to give
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up as impossible the purpose

that the

moral law obligated him to
have before his eyes and
that

in

compliance with

it

he did

have before his eyes.”^^^

The subject would thus become
morally culpable
the need for accepting

its

pardonable

guilt.

desire to extirpate the desire
for happiness,

and put into

human

beings

[as]

inclination is not evil per se;

subject

confounds

The judgment

it

it

.

.

.their

all

having attempted to
preempt

Animated by a misplaced and
impossible
blinds itself to that which

it

is

‘hmesistible

nature (as finite beings).”^’
For natural

only becomes associated
with “radical evil”

when

the

with a moral incentive.

against an “evil” nature redounds
upon the willful subject in that

resultant attempts at purification
“strains the

beyond

for

the limits

its

moral capacity ofthe human
be,ng...far

of his nature.’-’ Under the guise
of sacrificing a natural need

(and furthermore by demonizing the
victim), the subject refuses the
pardon that alone
allows

it

to understand

how

a historical ethic

can be based upon a particular relationship

between nature and the freedom of the human
purposive, reason’s

demand

will.

For once nature

judged to be

is

for totality ensures that this
purposiveness

must be

represented as a system of effects which of
course must necessarily have a cause.

And

given the specificity ofthe transcendental
constitution of subjectivity that allows the
subject to experience anything at

all, this

cause must be represented

in

terms that

prevent history from being conceived as fundamentally
atheological.^^®

There
morality.

a process

is

an inescapable logic

And
is

to the

to not recognize, or to

emergence of the

refuse—with

theological supplement to

the “Spinozisf

to

recognize such

an avoidable, contingent and therefore non-tragic decision. The need

measure that furnishes a

for a

criterion for distinguishing sublimity from monstrosity, the

95

peculiarity

idol

of innocent

guilt front the tragedy

of guilty innocence, and the

foregrounds the central problem
confronting an ethic of
history

Copemican Revolution.

It

in the

receives a particularly
clear expression in

“Tactics and Ethics”
(1919), the author’s ftmt avowedly
-Marxist”

evinces both an indebtedness

to,

ideal front the

wake of the

Georg Lukacs’

work whtch

clearly

and radical departure from
Kant:

It IS not the task of
ethics to invent prescriptions
for correct
action. .Ethical self-awareness
makes it quite clear that there are
.

traair

“
‘’'‘'‘'“‘"S ™-elf wfth
guilf
But'a"7he
at the same
sa
g fr But
time it teaches us that, even
faced with the choice
of two ways of tncumng guilt, we
should still find
that there is a

This standard

lac^ce^^

Perhaps nothing else becomes more
apparent when

Kant stages

in the

second and

m turn in need of a standard.

third Critiques

we call

revisiting the death scenes

than the degree

to

which such a standard

is

For Lukacs the axiomatic character
of an ethic of sacrifice

emerges as a seemingly necessary law once
the logic of natural history has been
converted into a pre-history and the vocation
of reason has been substantialized into a
world-histoncal

phenomenon

(i.e.

given a practical and objective

class consciousness) that can be fully
cognized and

reality.

The proscription of an

ethic that “invents

prescnptions for correct action” thus both preserves
and negates the Kantian critique of

pragmatism by transforming the transcendental subject of
the moral law

into the subject

of history.
For Kant the historicization of the moral law must
so long as this failure

structure

is

“fail”,

and yet history

is

kept open

recognized as the condition of possibility for sustaining a

of expectation designed

to

preempt a collective experience of resignation,

fanaticism or hubris.
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Perhaps the most sublime

Thou

Shalt not

make

u

in

t

commandment:

unto thee any sraven

i

thing that

is in heaven or
on earth^ \he saTe^hold”'
^
representation of the moral
law and for the
amorality. It is indeed a

mistake’ to

f

worry thardeZTng
®

representation of whatever
could common i.
Its carrying with it
no more than a cold and
lifele^''
moving force or emotion
[bewegende Kraft nd
the other way around.
For once the senses n^
them, while yet the unmistakable
and

ftis*"'’'"

7'

“

•

"“hout any
“^ctly

i

indelible

ragTnmlThan"to

WeTofm

"

°f

ft'”"®

» unrounder""'’

'

^
these ideas with images
and
childish devrees for fear they
would otherwise be
powerieT
On the
other hand this... involves
no danger of fanaticism..
.for the idea of
freedom IS inscrutable and thereby
precludes all positive exhibition
[Darste lung] whatever; but
the

rrK

M

moral law in itself can
sufficiently and
onginally detemime us, so that
it does not even
permit us to ett Ibl,
for some additional
determining basis.^^^

Only

a religion presented within
the boundaries

religion” purified

of any doctrinal

forces to be sustained.^’

of mere reason, a “universal

particularity, allows for this
precarious balance

Not unlike what happens

of

to the imagination in a
judgment

of

the “natural” sublime, therefore,
the theological supplement
serves essentially as an

instrument of reason, for “the Christian
principle of morality

For

that

which “supplements”

constitutive

itself is not theological.”^"

the “lack” that appears to the
ethical subject as

expenence of history

is

not properly understood as something
that puts

reason into a condition of heteronomy.
The Kantian measure deployed
differentiate ideal

and idol therefore

its

all

in

order to

but amounts to a criterion used for

distinguishing the useful from the harmful
illusion, the captivating myth from the
heuristic fiction and, ultimately, the

word from the

Just as Lukacs’ standard of sacrifice stood
in

thing.

want of another

standard, such

transcendental utility solicits a reexamination of the
Kantian system’s underlying
presuppositions, beginning with the value and significance
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it

accords to the concept of

When

..me.

the representations of
mechanical causation and
infinite progress are

conjoined, they create an
integrated if less than

power of desire,
Such a unity

is

hannomous

totality within

which the

natural inclination and the
subject’s inner moral
lawfulness cohere.

presented as the outcome of
a peculiarly secular
theodicy

that,

while

claiming to suspend the question
of the existence of God,
nevertheless offers a defense

of the law which sanctions striving
for

impossible historicizafion as
though

its

were

it

somehow possible.
As

a result, a hope for hope

imagine

that the monstrosity

is

offered to the Spinozan
subject which allows

of nature he discovered was
posited

in a

he can awaken. For otherwise
he could doubtless expect his
“respect

by which

this

law directly inspires him

to

obey

it,

to

[angemessenen] to

this respect’s high demand.’’“<^

character of the appeal for a conversion
that

Such

is

would enable

.

the world,

And

i.e.,

.

moral law,
result

from

adequate

the Spinozist to “form a

is

morally prescribed to

.by assuming the existence of a moral
author of

the existence of God.”^^^

in the last instance,

an assumption

.

for the

the unmistakably pragmatic

concept of the possibility of [achieving]
the final purpose that

him. .from a practical point of view

is

to

dream from which

be weakened, as would

the nullification [Nichtigkeit]
of the one ideal final purpose that

it

is

or as a

last line

of defense against lawless skepticism, such

sanctioned by reason on the seductively firm
grounds that

not in itself contradictory [es an sich wenigstens
nicht widersprechend

“it is

at least

ist].’’“*

Post-Kantian presentations of the conditions of possibility
for a historical ethic that
evince a certain dissatisfaction with such a defense of
the moral law have been

organized with varying degrees of explicitness around the following
four questions:
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how can

the “aesthetic idea”
be dissociated

by the rational concept; how
should the

from the form of
lawfulness prescribed for

feeling

an attestation of the subject's
moral vocation;
ye. non-empirical alterity
in a

way

that is

of the sublime be
understood

is

there a

apart

way of “representing”

it

from

material

fundamentally atheological;
can nature be

concepmalized as something other
than a form of necessity
inimical

of human freedom?
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to the

development

CHAPTER

III

A PROFANE reconciliation

Exiled from the presence of
nature and severed, as a
finite being, from the

immediacy of freedom, the Kantian

subject

mediation that allows the -humanity
[the moral person] is the
subject
.tself ..For this

moral law

accordance with

its

is

is

confronted by the need for
a form of

in [its]... person [to

be thought oH as holy. For
he

of the moral law and so of
that which

based on the autonomy of his

is

holy in

will, as a free will

universal laws, must necessarily
he able at the same time to agree

[einstimmen kormen] to that which

it

is

to subject itself.”^^^

Rather than signifying a relation of
logical correspondence, “to
agree”

connotes a form of consent whereby an
act of voluntary submission

from the use of coercive
particular type

force.

of experience

Further,

that

einsUmmen konnen draws

makes such self-determination

conveys how the subject must be attuned
the law in

which the concept of duty and

to,

or be put in the

noumenal quality

(and time) for

is

special form of causality

understanding.^’’

faith within

that appears capable

whose

distinguished

attention to the

possible; that

mood

for,

is, it

a relationship to

achieved not by bringing the realm of

phenomena under the jurisdiction of the moral law but by
opening
space

is

in this context

the enabling yet limited principle
of autonomy

harmonize with one another.™ Flarmony

practical

which, in

a theoretical-

which nature “promises”

to take

on a

of receiving the effects of freedom produced by a

origin and end remain inaccessible to the laws

And because the concept of freedom

is

of the

not an arbitrary product of the

imagination but the result of a peculiar deduction (presented as the fact
of reason), the
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negative (or rational) concept
of the holy, purified of
all anthropontorph.1
C predications,

can alone provide a basis for
positing a relation between
inner experience and
external
i

nature that can be thought
without contradiction.
“The moral laws enable us to
attribute
to the author

of nature, and the

f.nal

purpose enables us to
attribute to man, the

properties that are the necessary
conditions for the possibility
of canning out [the

commands

of] the law”.^^^

Pure reason’s ahistorical vocation

though the only means

holmess

(eternity).

now

Critique

it

is

at its disposal are a

This

is

upon the subject

to

become

historical

even

mechanical concept of time and
the idea of

the fate of a historical ethic

whose completion

in the third

appears something like a self-enclosed
and internally cohesive culture
that

regulates itself

because

calls

m accordance with

its

own

particular spatio-temporal laws.”^

thereby exposed to a history that

absence of a seamlessly progressive or

is

But

distinguished by the conspicuous

static tradition, the

Kantian philosophy

solicits

the t>T3e of interpretation to be found
in Adorno’s Negative Dialectics.

The agreement of the

subject with the moral law

is

there presented as a

damaging

precedent which anses as an inevitable
consequence from the supposition that the realm

of freedom must be posited by reason on analogy
with, and yet
concept of natural necessity. What
transcendental subjectivity
insofar as

it

is

determined by Kant as the constitutive limit of

would then seem

unduly constricts the way

in

(Adorno does not abandon the Kantian

to require another transcendental reflection

which the phenomenon and noumenon

referents) are interpreted. In short, “nature”

stands in need of a concept which would represent

mechanism

against

which reason

in opposition to, the

establishes

its
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it

as something other than a

identity.

And

to the degree that the

concept of freedom mus, be
finther determined in
tenns of spontaneity and
production

‘.heco„stitutionof[spec.a.]causa..tybyreason..ds[thus,a,readysubj^

That

is,

“freedom

is

so compromised beforehand
that hardly any place

outside a consciousness
complaisant toward the law.”^«
inflicts

violence on something

mandates

that the

good

more

seems

that the

than a so-called pathological
nature

must be a

will

It

for

self-positing will

and

that

it

remains

moral law

when

it

“freedom exists...only

in identific3tion with the

However, such an

act

of “identification” already offers
an intimation of a form of

experience that expands the domain
of the Kantian law beyond the
narrow confines
within which

it

will furnishes a

is

circumscribed by Adorno's reading.
For the “holiness” of the profane

fotm of identity based on a constitutive
sense of lack

appears today as a dual legacy.

On

the

that isolates

what

one hand, a Lacanian understanding
of

acculturation views the concept of
identification as a never completed
process that

prevents the experience of being in the
world from being mastered by an indivisible
subject.

On the other hand,

the very lack of a determinate concept
of identity

predisposes the subject to commit acts of
“subreption” in which a functional,
instrumental form of agency

The

fact that

Kant did not

of subjectivity furnished the
negativity.

is

confounded with the noumenal self

invest the vocation of reason with such a
determinate form

tradition

of Western metaphysics with a source of critical

But Adorno would not consider

it

to

be a corroboration of “negative

dialectics”. In fact the dual legacy in question is
subjected to a very non-dialectical

reading that identifies the

first

Critique as the “theoretical source” of a world-historical
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“false reconcilemenr that
culminates in the

work of Friedrich Engels,

for

whom

the

idea of freedom

does not

lie in

dreams about indeDendenf'pnfft.r.io

r

-

«,
"““''mg

to plan

ends. .Freedom thus consists
in our control based
of the natural necessities of
ourselves and of external

and

^

to definite

.

necessanly a product of historical
evolution.

What

'

natuVe

'iris'

thuf

aspects of the Kantian heritage
must be both accentuated and
m.nimized in

order to establish such a relation
of continuity between the vocation
of reason and

Engels’ Marxism?

What

stressed

is

confronts practical reason

is

is

how

the

antinomy of nature and freedom

surmounted through the introduction
of the

aesthetic and teleological
purposiveness in the third Critique.

how

such a hnk

is

What

is

that

principles

of

de-emphasized

forged with the use of conceptual
distinctions that rigorously

dissociate reflective

and determinate judgment,

from one another. Adorno’s
relationship between the

terse

practical

and

theoretical knowledge,

genealogy thus renews the question of how
and

freedom of the

will

if

a

and the subject’s interpretation of nature

should be represented.

The Kantian response

to

what emerged

in the

age of the Enlightenment as the

“secular” aspects of this problem brought forth
the singular concept of purposiveness

[ZweckmaBigkeit].

The purposiveness of nature

is a special a priori concept that has
its
origin solely in reflective judgment. For we. .can
only use this concept
in order to reflect on nature as regards that connection
among nature’s
.

appearances which

given to us in terms of empirical laws. .Through
concept we represent nature as if an understanding contained the
basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical
laws...77ifr
concept is quite distinct from practical purposiveness (in human art or
is

.

this

morality),

though we do think

it

by analogy with practical

purposiveness.
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in

i

The

subjec.

f.rs,

beeches ahuned

judgment of beauty, whereby
irreducible to a feeling

“basis” of nothing

it

is

to the concept

affected

by a phenomenal form

of either “agreeableness”

more determinate

of natural purposiveness
through a

than the

in a

way

that is

[Annehmlichkeit] or respect.-’

finite subject’s
receptivity to

On the

what-when

counterpoised with the law of natural
causality-^onstitutes a source
of alterity, Kant
constructs a historical ethic by
forging a path that leads
from natural beauty to “ethico-

theology” without imputing a
determinate “property” to either
nature as such or the

realm of the supersensible.^’ The
task confronting post-Kantian
variations on such an
ethic

becomes-for

Schiller and Nietzsche-one
of reassessing the transcendental
and

empirical dimensions of what are
nevertheless preserved as the two
definitive forms of

human

experience.

Such

reinterpretations,

the third Cntique

fact

of reason,

self-relation

it

however, leave scant traces of the “space”

by Kant’s presentation of natural beauty.
Like

in a

world

that

opened

in

the disclosure of the

bears a proto-phenomenological value
insofar as

of the will situated

for faith

it

arises out

impinges upon the subject

in

of the

ways

that

cannot be understood solely on the basis of
mechanical laws. For in a judgment of
natural beauty, the subject

which nature speaks

The

becomes attuned

to us figuratively in

its

to “that cipher [Chifferschrift] through

beautiful forms.”^^*

subject s disinterested fascination with what

ought to give way

from unknown

to

what

quarters.^^^

and the understanding
inability

is

is

subsequently

The

playful

felt to

harmony

it

calls natural

be a violence inflicted upon sensibility
that exists

thus superceded by a second-order

of the imagination

to furnish intuitions

104

beauty can and then

between the imagination

harmony

in

which the

adequate to the ideas of reason

fac.ma,es .he recognition of a
higher punrosiveness;
there
sacrif.ee

of the imagination which

as a result of the latter, “nature”

some

basis or other for us to

[aesthetic] liking

But the

allure

such a way only

own

is

seems

assume

of ours which

Hrs. prepared for

is

is, in

short, a -reason- for
the

by a judgment of beauty.
That

to offer a “trace or
give a hint that

in its productions

a lawful

contains

it

hannony w.th that

independent of all interest.”^*^

of beauty appears to draw the
subject toward phenomena,
nature
in

order to then confront

rational identity) that at

firs,

is,

it

with something

(i.e.,

with

creates a sense of violent
disruption

itself,

with

in

its

among the

cognitive powers. Thought of in
narrative terms, the beauty
of nature attracts the
subject to what ultimately
interrupts the feeling

becomes excessively

fascinating, to

what consequently

of disinterested pleasure and induces
the sense of higher pleasure

associated with the feeling of the sublime.

The

progression from a feeling for natural
beauty to the assent to a “wholly
moral

faith” required for an “ethico-theology”

Kant we

“consider... how

Itself as art

[i.e.,

we

is

a

“movement”

admire nature, which

as acting] not

merely by chance,

that

can be followed

in its beautiful products displays

but, as

it

of a lawful arrangement and as a purposiveness
without a

were, intentionally in terms

purpose.”^*'* Natural beauty

thus prompts another judgment, one no longer
aesthetic but teleological

with reason’s demand for unity, cannot

purpose” alone determine the subject’s

let

if with

the concept

that, in

of “purposiveness without a

relation to nature. Consequently, “since

not find this [missing] purpose anywhere outside of us,

keeping

we naturally

look for

it

we do
in

ourselves, namely in what constitutes the ultimate purpose
of our existence: our moral
vocation.”^*^
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If the source of the
“false reconcilement” in
modernity has been identified
as the

m

Kantian system on account of
how

it

both repre

from the laws of mechanical
causation, then how

is

the experience of
theology to be

mcorporated into such a historical
“constellation”? For the
Kantian “identification”
identification” of
the unrepresentable law and
the unfathomable basis
of human freedom seems
to

postpone indefinitely the realization
of the

sort

of telos that Engels descnbes
as a

product of historical evolution.
But the form of the postponement
demanded by the
idea of the highest good creates
an underlying tension within
the structure of the

“autonomous”

will that collapses

form of rational

faith

once the necessaty and internally
consistent ne

becomes transformed

into a malleable object

of historical

interpretation.

A. Toward

A Law of Aesthetic Freedom

The precanous balance offerees arrayed
by Kant
to stnve for the impossible as if it

in order to allow the being that
wills

were possible gives way

at the

very

moment

Schiller

attempts to preserve and elevate tradition
through “the further development of some

Kantian ideas.” The plural in

this subtitle to

“On

the

Sublime” foregrounds the

ambiguities surrounding any such “development”
that utilizes only one of the three

pure ideas of reason”

— freedom~in

The development of the
autonomous

the construction of a historical ethic.^^^

ideas that effectively dismantles the structure of the

yet situated will while refashioning the remnants of the
architectonic of
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theoretical

and practical reason into a
program of aesthetic Er^iekun,
(education)

will

appear to be a more appropriate
candidate for Adorno’s
search for the origins of
the
“false reconciliation” in
modernity.

ofpossibilifyfor a historical

among

yet Schiller’s aes,he,ici.a,io«
of, he condUions

Chic begins from a premise

that served as the impetus
for

nature

And

Adorno’s

surprisingly similar to the
one

critique of Kant; that

the “objects” affecting
the wrll that

the need to include

is,

demand a fonn of respect

with an attempt to locate a proper
place for freedom apart from

its

is

coupled

putative

identification with the

While the law

is still

presumed

now contains a “law” of its own

to

be

in force for Schiller, the

that purportedly renders
the

realm of the aesthetic

need

for the theological

supplement unnecessary without thereby
lowering the threshold of moral
experience

to

a pre-Kantian level.

“I shall not attempt to hide

from you''*

that

it

is

for the

most

part [groBtenteils]

Kantian principles [Grundsatze] on which
these following theses will be based.”"^

Soon

after Schiller begins to retrace the
steps

relation

Kant took

in establishing an ethical

between natural beauty and theology, however, he
takes a detour

both the destination and the philosophical-aesthetic
significance of the

What

precipitates such a reorientation is the introduction

that

changes

starting point.

of what Schiller presents

as

the “play drive” [Spieltrieb].

Now neither term of this compound is on its own unrecognizable to the Kantian
subject, for

the

when pure reason becomes

practical, the will is

power of the moral TrieMed^r [mainspring,

principle of play

determined in

its

by

motive, incentive].'^® Furthermore, the

emerges as a pivotal part of the Kantian system insofar as
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actions

it

isolates

the

movement

that transpires

among

the cognitive powers in
an act of aesthetic

judgment."' Taken together, however,
the terms produce a new
character

of the autonomous yet

The

structure

situated

of the will

is

human will

in the

Schiller stages.

now determined by the ongoing

relation

between two

forms of intentionality defined by
Schiller as the “sense drive”
and the “form

With such a renaming of what had been
represented
incentives

comes a change of emphasis

anonymous

drama

drive”.

as the pathological and
moral

that gives to the drives

an indection of

subjectivity expressed in explicitly
temporal terms: “the sense drive
[der

sinniiche Trieb] desires [will] that
there be change and that time
have a content; the

form drive [Formtrieb] desires

no change... The sense drives
object; the form

As

dnve

that time

be sublated [aufgehoben] and

that there will

be

desires to be determined, wants to
take in [empfangen]

its

desires to itself determine, to bring
forth

a being in the world

Schillenan subject finds

whose

will

is afflicted

itself drawn to a

now

its

object.”^’^

with such competing tendencies, the

familiar impasse: “since the sense drive

constrains physically [while] the form drive
constrains morally, the former will leave

our formal
say,

it

state, the

second our material

[becomes a matter

of]

state [in a state]

of contingency. .That
.

is

to

contingency whether our happiness harmonizes

[ubereinstimmen] with our perfection [Vollkommenheit] or
our perfection with our
happiness.

The antinomic

relation

between the pathological and the moral shows

its first

sign of

resolution in the interplay of the cognitive powers which Schiller
transposes from the

sphere of aesthetic judgment to an aestheticized realm of human

practice.^^"*

Now Kant

did present the principle of natural purposiveness on analogy with the type of practical
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P«n>o.iveness ind.ssociab.e fro.
both hu.a„ a« and
.ora, action; the rational
concept

of freedont thus not only shares
an

affinity with a
theological understanding

cause but also with the artwork.^”
The reason why Kant
well as fine arts in a real, set
apart from the

ethical,

inters the

however,

of the

first

“ntechanicaf as

is that their

productions

can only be understood as having
arisen from an instrumental
or unconscious form of
subjectivity.

suitable

rule

it

art

means toward

by which

unless

For the

is

it

is to

of the craftsman represents
only competence

optional

e„ds.-‘ And

bring about

preceded by a mle,

it

its

in the use of the

since -‘fine art cannot
itself devise the

product [while].. .a product
can never be called

must be nature

attunement of his powers) that gives
the

in the subject

rttle to art; in

art

(and through the

other words, fine art

is

possible

only as the product of genius.”^^^

What

renders the work of “genius” an
unsuitable object for the Kantian
subject’s

ethico-historical consideration-its

purpose of nature— becomes for

dependence on something

like

an unconscious

that very reason the starting
point for Schiller’s

project.

For the conditions of possibility
beauty which takes place

in

for an ethic of history rests

upon

accordance with a special rule or “law”

the production of

that thereby

redefines the relationship between the
subject’s interpretation of nature and the
freedom

of the

will.

If the

immense chasm separating freedom and nature

without having recourse

to a theological supplement, then the

both historicized and “aestheticized”

in a

way

is to

be crossed

moral law will have

to

that allows the subject to “act rationally

within the limits of matter, and materially under the laws
of reason.”^^* This means

an aesthetic principle, rather than the Kantian “pardon”,

109

be

will bring about an

that

‘agree^enr between

the “pathCogica.and ntora, de.ennina.ions
of the win, .be

cense, uenees of which wi„
-beconte ntanifes.

the rea,.

of tin,e. .[wherein]
ntaher
.

wtn be given

a voice [d.e Materie. .zu
bes.intnten haben], no.
.erely as sonre.hing
.

subordinate to fonn but also
side by side with

What

is

“natural

i.

and [even] independently
of it.-

brought to language and
therefore ••.emporalized”

power”

that

was evidently no. accounted

for

is

the emergence of a

when Kan. eensured

the eth.cal

doctrine of the Stoa.
I.

seems then

that a rewriting

delimited in the three Critiques

be

instituted.

of the

is

constitution of transcendental
subjectivity

required if the program for
an aesthetic education

is

to

Kant's characterization of the
tradition of metaphysics
as a “combat

arena” of “endless connict” thus
becomes a fming description for
both the inception

and execution of Schiller’s project.^"
For the recognition of the play
drive as an agent

of reconciliation
emerges now

is

presented as a response to the
putative sense of closure which

that

reason accomplished
set

up the law;

to put

all that it

could accomplish when

it

discovered and

into effect [vollstrecken] there
must be a
courageous will and living [lebendige]
feeling. If truth is to obtain
victoiy
Its struggle with forces
[im Streit mit Kraflen] it must first
1 self become a force
and set up a drive to be its delegate
[Sachfuhrerl in
the realm of phenomena because
drives are the only moving
[bewegenden] forces in the sensible world. If
truth has hitherto shown
so little of Its conquering force, [the
cause for this] lay not with the
it

m

understanding, which did not

which closed

Truth

is

itself to truth

for Schiller

know how

and

to unveil

to the drive

but with the heart,
which did not take action for

synonymous with reason and

it,

historicizing the

law thus

appears as a “secular” task enjoined upon a reconstituted
subject: “the human being

only plays when he

is in

the fullest sense of the

no

word a human being and he

is

only fully

a

human being when he plays.”The

‘'paradoxical sound” of
such a post-Cartes.an

fonnulation stems from an
unfamiliarity w.th the
stmcture of the play
drive.- Once
.ntroduced, it will fUmish the
necessao^ supplement which
alone is capable of
meeting
reason's insuperable demand
for a unified experience
otherwise thwarted by
the
“primordial and radical
opposition” between the
sense-drive and the form
drive.-

The supplement
form of subjectivity
relation

is

not exactly a

that

“new”

drive per

se,

but rather an as yet
undisclosed

allows the subject to
become attuned to the

of reciprocity can be established
between

sens.bility

way

in

which a

and the moral law.

Ultimately possible for Kant
only by juxtaposing the time
of natural history with the
time of eternity, such harmonization
occurs for Schiller when the
will

toward annulling time within
time [die Zeit

in

brought

forth,

“directed

der Zeit aufzuheben] and
reconciling

becoming with absolute being, change
with identity.- This
the subject animated

is

by the power of the play drive

synthesis

is

attained

“strives to receive as if
it

and to bring forth as sensibility
aspires

to

had

when

itself

receive.”—

The play of the cognitive powers
underlying a judgment of natural
beauty

also

takes on ^productive character
in Kant's provisional
representation of the origin of the
“aesthetic idea” in the act of “genius”

power.

.

.creates, as

it

whereby

were, another nature out of the
material that actual nature gives

It.”— Like the play drive, such an act
appears

between receptivity and spontaneity
introduction of the

the “imagination as a productive

first

that

Kant

to arise out

first

of a certain interrelationship

introduces in the opening to the

Critique;

there can be no doubt that

all our cognition begins with
experience. For
might rouse our cognitive power to its operation
if objects
stirring our senses did not do so? In part
these objects by themselves
bring about representations. In part they set
in motion our

what

else
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t;

r

impressions into a cognition
of obiects tfer"
lern,s of time [Kant’sTmZs^l
experience, and all our cognition

tCf

“'n^

"’‘P‘=rience. In

beginrw;tre~c"e.'"»

Now what Kant

is

describing here

is

the genesis of a
posteriori knowledge.

And

while the productions of genius
arise on analogy with
such a process, the
formative

power of the understanding has been
ceded
resulting

product-the

to the inragination,

aesthetic idea-.orroborates

corollary to the above exposition:
“even though
that

does not mean

While the

that all

it

is

our cognition starts w.th
experience,

all

of it arises from experience.”"’

is

represented as a universal

human

capacity, the act

traceable to a necessarily
contingent experience

encountered when the path leading from
natural beauty
is

because unlike the

beautiful in

art.

interest taken in the beauty

that

whose conditions of
The

latter is

not

of nature, “an interest in the

way of thinking

is

attached to

a result the “aesthetic ideas” are

subordinated to reason, which sanctions them
only insofar as they provide a

potentially heuristic “semblance

“unless

As

of genius

to ethico-theology is traversed.

..provides no proof whatever that
[one’s]

the morally good, or even inclined
toward it.”’"
strictly

why the

what Kant adds as an
essential

possibility he within a completely
indeterminate “realm” of nature.

This

is

subject’s receptivity to the
aesthetic idea (an intuition
deprived of a

determinate concept)

produces

which

we connect the

of objective

fine arts. .with
.

reality” to the rational concepts.

moral ideas”, they offer nothing

in the

For

way of a

propaedeutic; the “superiority of natural beauty over
that of art” thus stems from the
fact that the

former affects the subject

in a

way which

natural purposiveness while the origin of the latter
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is

solicits

a reflective judgment of

traceable to a

form of practical

pun,os,veness

,ha,.

when

isolated as a capacity

of the

will, in itself

suggests nothing

about humanity’s moral vocation.^'^
In the “force” exerted

by the play

an exemplar, fonn of action
it

into effect

The play

special causality into the

“object” of beauty.

that

drive

drive, however, Schiller
locates nothing less than

alone

capable of his.oricizing the
law, of “putting)

is

would

therefore

phenomenal world, the

What kind of product

and sense drives-a union

subject’s

human

effects

another form of

of which become manifest

that apparently takes
place, as

The production of the beautiful
states

to introduce

is this that arises

realm of time”, where “time annuls
time within

exchange between

seem

it

in

an

out of the union of the form

were, in a newly demarcated

time”?^*'*

as a “living form” presupposes
that a certain

of receptivity and intentionality
takes place that transforms the

expenence of both nature and freedom.^’^
The

effect

of the play drive on

experience appears analogous to an act
of literary-philosophical translation

insofar as the language of nature

is

carried over to that of morality in a

manner

that

no

longer remains bound to the laws of either
realm while simultaneously remaining
faithful to that

which

is

peculiar to each.

hitherto unrecognizable dimensions
relation with

As

a result, freedom and nature take on

by being brought

into a reciprocally amplifying

one another:

The play

drive... [will therefore] bring

reality [Realitat] into form.

To

form

into matter [Materie]

the degree that

it

and

takes from sensations

[Empfmdungen] and affects their dynamic power [EinfluB] it will
harmonize them with the ideas of reason and to the degree that it
deprives the laws of reason of their moral compulsion

them with

The proper

it

will reconcile

the interests of the senses.^

object of the play drive not only reverses the hierarchical relationship

Kant establishes between

natural

and

artistic

beauty. For what had been defined as a
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rule for judgment is elevated

concept which for Kant

is

by Schiller to the rank
of“pure

distinguished above

all

by

rational

the fact that

it

concept”-a

cannot be connected

with a corresponding phenomenal
intuition.^

Because aesthetic beauty thereby
becomes the indispensable
precondition
initiating a reconciliation

between the natural and the moral

mechanical and non-theological “realm
of time

its

in

an evidently non-

“deduction” must be presented

on transcendental grounds which iumish
a “firm basis of knowledge
shake.

Such a justification can no

form of knowledge

for

that nothing will

longer, therefore, legitimate
a merely “practical”

if Schiller is to establish the
objective reality

of what

is

somehow

both an empirical and a rational concept:

beauty

indeed form, because we contemplate
[betrachten] it, but it
the same time life, because we feel
it... [Thus]... in the enjoyment
of
beauty or aesthetic unity, an actual unity
is

is at

and interchange
[Auswechslung] between form and matter, passivity
and activity, takes
place [and] so the reconcilability of both
natures, the practicability
[Ausflihrbarkeit] of the infinite in the finite,
therefore the possibility of
the most sublime humanity, is proven.

The evidence
reason

testifies

Schiller brings before

above

all,

however, to

what

how

is still

described as the “tribunal of pure

the transcendental referents of human

experience have been put into question. For in the attempt
to “further develop” the

Kantian ideas by introducing a third law into the phenomenal
world Schiller detaches

freedom from the

rational concepts

of god and immortality and aligns

it

with the “ideal”

of beauty.

The

presentation of the “fact of reason” introduced a measure for determining

nothing less than the practical reality of the principle of morality. While not a
determinate object of theoretical knowledge, the
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latter is nevertheless attested to in the

experience of being toward death
whiel. “proves” (for
practical reason) that the
subject’s consciousness of the
moral law
arbitrary projection

not a n.erely subjective,
contingent and

is

of the imagination. Out of
the throes of a

.leath

scene exposing the

imagination to the thought of
self-saerinee a refutation of
,n„ral skepticism emerges
.he tradition of Western
metaphysics that

is

in

then appropriated by
Schiller essentially as

a fait accompli: “reason
accomplished all that

and set up the law.” Consequently.
“put|ting|

cotdd accomplish

it

when

into effect” without

it

it

discovered

having recourse

to

a thcologiciil supplement becomes
the task of an aesthetic
education.”^

Alternatively described as an “ideal”,
a “pure rational concept” anti
a peculiar “fact”,

beauty

Unhke

is

therefore just as indispensable for
Schiller as the fact of reason

the

latter,

however,

its

deduction

is

singularly devoid of pathos.

is

It

for Kant.

is in fact

presented in ontogenetic and phylogenetic
terms as a “gin of nature” which upon
being
received causes a magical breach in the
subject’s animal-like existence: "the
favor of
fortune alone can loo.scn the chains of the
physical condition and lead the savage
toward
bcauty.”^^^

I

in

a

he aesthetic “mood” or disposition corresponding
with the play drive then develops

manner

that redefines the will’s relation to nature;
ultimately “it seeks objects not

because they give him something which he passively endures
but because they give him

something which he can
zu crlcidcn,

sondem

act

upon

[cr sucht diese

Gegenstande

nicht, wcil sic

ihm ctwas

wcil sic ihm zu handcin geben]. 'Fhcy please him not because
they

meet a need but because they give
Wilkinson and Willoughby

satisfaction to a law

translate the

first

which

sentence of the passage just cited

“he seeks these objects not because they give him something
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as yet speaks soflly.”^^^

as:

to enjoy passively, but

because they provide an ,„cen,i.e

,o

respond acirefyr^^^

Jux.aposing ,o -act upon”

with -to respond actively”
accentuates the ambiguity
surrounding the production
of
beauty through the play drive.
To what degree is it conditioned
by a relation of

How is

reciprocity?

the stated

it

aim of-Qn

distinguished from simply
a self-positing act

the Aesthetic Education
of the

only -through beauty that

which

sets this process in

operation

is

Human

man moves toward freedom”

Being”

the activity

motion must be presented as
a

of will? Because
prove that h

is to

of the play drive

activity

whose sphere of

irreducible to the realm of
moral freedom.

The “law which

as yet speaks softly” as
soon as the play drive “begins
to stir”

rescues the subject from an experience
that, judged in

strictly

Kantian terms, would

appear to be formed on the basis of
neither moral nor natural laws.

And because

prospect of an experience shaped by
a “cause acting without any law
at all”

unfathomable
possibility

is

to the

is

Kantian subject the disparity between
the physical and moral

of historicizing the law can be reconciled
only by an

While the works of “genius” seem

to offer an instance of

be accounted for by a wholly undetermined
“reference”

act

of

faith.

law-making

to nature,

that

can only

Kant quarantines the

aesthetic process for precisely this reason
in an amoral realm of experience:

idea properly means a rational concept, and
ideal the representation of an
individual being as adequate to an idea. .Even
if one were not to grant
objective reality.. .[to the latter], they are not
therefore to be regarded as
chimeras. They provide us. .with an indispensable
standard of
reason... The situation is quite different with the
creatures of the
.

.

imagination concerning which no one can offer an
explication and give
an understandable concept: the monograms, as it were...
are not

determined according

amount

the

to

any rule that one can

to a design that hovers, as

indicate. .[and thus]
.

mean of various
experiences. ..such as painters and physiognomists claim to
have in their
minds and as are supposed to be an incommunicable shadow-image
it

were, at the

[Schattenbild] of these people’s products. .or judginents.^^^
.
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The “Letters on Aesthetic Education
refutation” of what for Schiller

is

are concerned with
virtually nothing other
than a

the

e.oneous supposition

that the “creatures

of the

imagination” [Geschopfcn der
Einbildungskraft] arise as
phenomena that should be

subsumed by reason under
“aesthetic condition

in

no

way

free

is to

the “concept

of the arbitrary”.^“ For while
the subject

the highest degree free and
free from

from laws, and such aesthetic
freedom

necessity... and moral necessity. .only
.

by the

is to

all

in the

coercion [Zwang]

it

is

be distinguished from logical

fact that the laws in

which the subject acts are nol represented
or put forward [nicht

accordance with

vorgestellt

werdenj (SchiWer’s emphasis).”^^*’

B. Schiller’s

Such a formulation
a language that

is

indicates

“Co mplete Anthropological Evaluation”

how

Schiller’s indebtedness to

itself is also

unrepresentable and incapable of being

converted into an object of determinate knowledge.
[aufhebt] the latter

is,

if the fact

itself in

both unthinkable without, and irreconcilable with
the three Critiques.

For of course the moral law

That

Kant manifests

in order to

of reason

is

make room

is

is

the purpose

of “annulling”

unambiguously

“practical.

not to be Judged as both non-empirical and irrational,

then the capacity for moral freedom
unrealizable. This

for faith”

And

it

why the rational

discloses must not

seem

to

be ineffectual or

concepts of “god and immorality... are the

conditions under which alone, given the character of our (human) reason,
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we can

conceive of the possibility of
[achieving] the effect
(the

final

putpose] of the lawful
use

of our freedom.
Everything hinges, as

far as

morality

mood, the conrprehenstbility of
which
sources of determination for
the

way of suspending

is

human

is

concented, upon the
experience of a certain

aided by the

fact that there are

will: the pathological

only two

and the moral.

And

as a

the influence of the former
while creating the conditions
of

receptivity for the latter, a
judgment

of natural beauty induces a

certain feeling

of

pleasure and a sense of
“purposiveness without a putpose”
which brings the cognitive

powers into a relation of “free play”:
a judgment of taste

[i.e., an aesthetic
judgment of the beautiful] must
upon a mere sensation, namely our
sensation of both the imagination
Its freedom and the
understanding with

rest

in

its lawfulness, as they
reciprocally quicken each other;
i.e., it must rest on
a feeling that allows
to judge the object by the
purposiveness that the representation
(by

Tn

P"--*

f'htirletp'ay!-?'™"’

With an expenence
variations

on the way

“upon a mere sensation”

resting

in

which

it

it

affects the subject. This

is

not difficult to offer

is in fact

what happens when

Schiller reverses the terms of the
hierarchical relationship Kant establishes

moment of disinterested

receptivity (taste)

While the former serves as a basis
production

is

explicitly dissociated

conception of beauty

will— especially

is

and inexplicable productivity (genius).

for teleological

judgment, the act of aesthetic

from a “lawful use

of... freedom”; for

Kant’s

not presented in order to disclose a capacity of the

if the latter is

between the

human

conceived as a substitute for the ethical-historical

concepts of God and immortality.
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W

For SchiUer the -fac. of
beauty, ccobotated by
a

sensation, exposes the

detenninability of the will to
an unrepresentable
aesthetic law which
provides the

indispensable precondition for
resolving what
(i.e.

the problem

of historicizing

human being makes

its

Schiller’s presentations

the goal for

which

it

way

of this

was

referred to as the
-problen,

Nevertheless,

fact/idea/ideal that

it

to serve as the necessary

becomes ev.dent from

it

usurps the regulative
authority of

means. For the telos of

historicization first requires a
seemingly definitive reconciliation
infinite that

was prompted by what amounted

phenomenal “force.” Beauty

is

to the

something closer

is justified

and the

principles.”^^^

that

appear to give rise to

deduction since the pure rational
concepts used

m the construction of the Kantian historical ethic have
it

finite

inadequacy of the moral law as
a

on “transcendental grounds”

to a tautology than to a

rendered inoperative. For

of the

then “brought forth by the
reciprocal action of two

opposed dnves and by the uniting of
two opposed

Such a unification

of politics'

the moral law): “it
is only through
beauty that the

freedom.-

to

is

been displaced or seemingly

was only by presenting reason’s capacity

for a hermeneutic

self-cognition and not for a cognition of
the external world as such that
Kant could aver
the suspicion that the lawfulness of
the vocation of reason

was

but another

manifestation of the law-making violence endemic
to the “combat arena” of

metaphysics.

Kantian lawfulness takes on the character of a seeming
lawfulness, however, once
the underlying rational ideas are further
determined
aesthetic reconciliation that claims to

answer the

“summons of reason” (and “summons

Schiller as the source

now more

to reason”);
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by

of an

clearly understood

nritjrr
^

drive [Stofftrieb— i.e. the
sense drivel th«t
drive, because only the
union of reality with f

On

the

one hand

this

amendment

to the

‘^e material
^

^

moral law bears the sign
of an unlicensed

imposition that retroactively betrays
the precarious character
of Kant's transcendental

dcductions-above

was

offset in part

all

the -practical” deduction
of the fact of reason.

by the rigorous formalism and
negativity

Kant’s “representations” of the a
the regulative ideal

priori principle

that

Such

fragility

accompanied

of morality, above

all in

all

of

the form of

which has a

practical power (as regulative
pnnciple) and underlies the possibility
of
the perfection of certain actions...
[The regulative ideal thus provides
a
measure] with which we can compare,
judge, and thereby improve

ourselves even though
grant objective reality.

we can

never

attain it. Even if one were not
to
these ideals. .they are not therefore
to be
regarded as chimeras. They provide
us. .with an indispensable
standard
of reason. But trying to realize the ideal
in an
.

.to

.

.

example, i.e., in an
appearance is unfeasible and has something
absurd [Widersinnisches]
and not very edifying about it. For in such
an attempt the natural limits
that continually impair the
completeness in the idea make any illusion
impossible, and the good itself that lies in
the idea is thereby made
suspect and similar to a mere invention.

To continue

to use the language

of the transcendental and of reason’s drive toward
unity

and the unconditioned while simultaneously offering
beauty as a way of redeeming

phenomenal appearances by
being”

is

bound

integrating

them

into “the complete concept

to arouse just such a suspicion.
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of the human

On

.he

Cher hand, hy

carrying over Kr.mian
principles ,o ,hc newly
den, area, cd

acslhelie realnr, .Schiller
suggests a

can be reevalualcd so that
.he

Kan. any atten.p,

a,

way

illu.sory

-Any

which Ihe concep, „r,he
•hnerc inven, ion-

image takes on a value

to the

de-formation, as

illusion- that the ideal
and the real

by the veor laws of nature
which reason
worhl but by the

iu its

own

surmounting the antiuomic
relation hetween the

and the moral principle can
only lead
ideal.

in

fact that the “idea

is

somehow

it

right.

P„r

historical exa.nple

were, of the regulative

eon.eide

is

dispelled no, only

incapable of suspen.ling for
Ihc being

of freedon,

is

i„ ,he

inscrutable and thereby
precludes

all

positive presentation whatever”."’
Although the passage in c,uestio„
inadvertently

suggests otherwise, a proper
-.llusion” would no. for Kan,
be desirable
Ihc “aesthetic i.Ica” can serve
as a heuristic instrument

presents as

symbol what

detenninate knowledge.
intuition

constitulively incapable

is

“An

of the imagination

Ithcrcforcl easy to sec that

aesthetic idea cannot

for

it

is

in

any case, for

of reason only insofar as

it

of becoming an object of

become

cognition because

it

is

which an adct|ua,c concept can never
be found... I,
the counterpar t (pendant)

of a

rational idea,

which

an

is

is.

conversely, a concept to which no
intuition can be adequate.””*^
If

beauty

is

conceived as a “rational concept”

interchange of form and matter” then

of the “fallacy of subreption”
for a

in a

in

it

by the

it

it

it

offers a paradigmatic

confounds what

is

attributes to an object as such

subject: “the illusions

misuse of a sensitive concept... can be

corresponds with an “actual

Kantian terms

two-fold sense:

concept of the understanding and

imparted to

that

example

merely sensible

what

is

merely

of the understanding, produced by the covert

called... a fallacy
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of subreption.”^”

An,ids. such confusion Schiller
d.scovers a

of a concept for reason’s moral
a third law

is

use; that

valued precisely for

its

is,

way of recuperating the mere

semblance

the production of beauty
in accordance with

scemiug lawfulness, for

as appearance, apart from, and
in contradistinction
to

its

its

treatment of appearance

significance for the

understanding. For the appearance
of beauty takes on an
ethico-historical character

only insofar as

it

is

“distinguished from, and not
confused with actuality and truth”;

unlike “logical semblance...
aesthetic semblance” [Schein]

is

loved because

it

is

semblance”.^^®

The play drive’s sphere of operation

thus appears to constitute
something like a

supplementary transcendental aesthetic
wherein the lawful production of
beauty (of

semblance”) takes place.

And

as if in grateful

acknowledgement

for the “gift

of

nature” responsible for the subject’s
capacity for producing and judging
beauty a
revaluation

of the material object emerges within what

“realm of time.” For this capacity can only
be realized

and

sensibility is presented in terms that offer
a

Schiller refers to as a

if the relation

means of expression

newfound

between reason

to subaltern nature:

matter will be given a voice not merely as
something subordinate to fomi but also side

by

side with

Once

it

and [even] independently of it.”

the play drive

is

considered in terms of the effects

conditions of possibility, however,
interpretive value afforded

different light.

Bildungstrieb]

it

it

produces rather than

undergoes a significant change

by representing

it

on analogy with

its

that casts the

the art of translation in a

Now referred to as the “mimetic form-giving drive” [der nachahmende
it

isolates an experience in

no impression without

at

once

which the subject “can meet with

striving for a living expression” [lebendigen
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[erleiden]

Ausdruck]

-

However, .he

mo^en.

firs,

is

effec.ive.y displaced
by, or redirec.ed

toward, .he fashioning of
a second na.nre
n.ore sui.abie for
.he punroses of .he
being

every beautiful or
magnificent form of nature
the Bildungstrieh
catches
sigh, of a challenge
which demands i. s.ruggle
[ringen] wi.h .ha. form."’«

The need
a«emp.s

.o

.o le.

namre speak has given way

.o .he

demand

for a violen. s.ruggle
.ha.

reduce .he na.ural phenomenon
in.o a plian. ma.erial

subjec’s form-giving
capacifies.

And because

.he Bi,dungs,rich

.ha. amplifies .he

is

direc.ed .oward

“semblance and not actuality”
ty the second
seconH na.ure fu
iha.* emerges as a
produc. of ar. “has
the advanlages of na.ure
[i.s beau.ifi.1 shapes]
wilhou. sharing i.s chains”^”

The

beaufiful produc.

in.erac.ion

be.ween

of .he play

sensibili.y

drive or .he mime.ic-fonn
drive arises ou.

and imagina.ion specific

.o an aes.he.ic process

all

of .he

whose

pu.por.edly “lranscenden.al
grounds” lay .he foundalion
for .he “s.a.e of beaulifi.1

semblance” [S.aa. des schonen
Scheins]
demarcaled realm of lime proper

lo Ihe

Does

.h,s .hen

mean

.ha. .he

play drive crea.es nolhing
more .han an

insulaled, self-conlained experience
lhal displaces ralher lhan
solves Ihe

his.oriciza.ion

of Ihe moral law?

freedom has been diverted

I.

seems .he lask of finding a

lo ihe poinl

where Ihe

signs for such a delour appear lo
be clearly

drive as lhal

the

human

which makes possible

newly

.ransilion

problem of .he
from namre .o

way has become Ihe goal, and

marked by

Ihe

.he represenlalion of Ihe play

Ihe “union of realily wilh form.
..[lhal] comple.es

being.”^'^^

The need

for such a union arises

when

a “complete anthropological valuation”

[Schatzung] of being in the world takes the
place of what

now

appears as Kant’s “one-

sided moral valuation” of that condition.^"*^ Setting
the “further development” of the
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Kan, .an Ideas" into motion

is

a three-fold
transcendental reflection
that delimits the

conditions of poss.hility
for the awahening
of the play drive,
establishes the proper

realm for

its

sphere of operation, and
prepares the subject
for the reception
of „s

beautilu, product.

relationship

back

The

first

moment

introduces an element
of reciprocity to the

between sense and understanding,
the rudiments of
which can be traced

to Kant’s expos.tion

of the transcendental

aesthetic.

And

while the play drive

is

presented as something mean,
to redefine the
subject’s relation to both
sens.hil.ty and
the moral law, what Kant
would call the "domain” of
the play drive is
relegated to the
hitherto ethically
inconsequential experience

of the aesthetic process
.deal

-he

is

of artistic production.
What emerges out

then received as the
beautifi,! object, a singular

which seems simultaneously

to lie outside of, challenge,
appeal to

power of jurisdic.on wielded by

the tribunal

fact,

idea and

and rely upon

of pure reason. Nothing brings
these

contradictions to the fore clearer
than Schiller’s presentation
of the idea of beauty as
regulative ideal.

“fallacy

What

of subreption”

for

is

Kan, could be invested with
such a

status only through the

then given precisely the type
of historical significance that

had been reserved for the regulative
idea of the highest good: “the
highest
beauty

is.

.

.to

be sought

in the

of

most perfect possible union and
equilibrium of reality

and form. This equilibrium, however,
remains no more than an
be

ideal

idea,

which can never

fully realized in actuality.”^'*^

Notwithstanding a newfound respect for nature,
the discovery of a non-mechanical
‘realm of time” within which a synthesis
of the finite and the infinite occurs and a
certain world-historical narrative that
charts the progress of the play drive from

Greek origins

to its

modem telos, the

Schillerian subject
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still

its

finds itself mired in the

time of infinite progress.^'*^

How

can such

for an aesthetic education
oriented

no longer held back by the

above

j

in

all

outcome he reconciled with

the

program

toward the historici/ation
of the moral law

failure to recognize
the proper identity

of the “being

that

wills”?

On

one hand, Schiller’s
rcprcsenlation of ,hc moral
law brings

the

will,

aura associa.ed wi.h ,ho
Chrishan hall (ha, pervades
(he (hree Cri.u,ues:

ofa moral
.1.0

will

with

will

is

strict

stale

must

thereby

upon the

rely

drawn

.noral law as an effeetive
force

into the realm

always remains contingent, and

that

we know

’.(he

(he sramc

seuing „p

and ,he freedom of

of causality where eve^thing

necessity and constancy.
But

i,

is

joined together

that (he detenninability

of (be htttnan

only with absolute Being
does physical

necessity correspond with moral
necessity.”-' Rather than
then couferrittg a sense of

pardonable

guilt

Schiller offers a

upon (he

subject’s recalcitrant, sensible
need for happiness, however,

form of respect

possible: “although rea.son

is

(hat

seems

to

satisfied only if

expand (he bouttdaries of the
its

historically

law hohls t.nconditionally” a
“complete

anthropological valuation” of the
Unite subject recognizes

how

“content connts along

with fonn and that “living sensible
feeling” also has a voice [lebendige
Emplindnng
zuglcich etne

demand

Stimme

for dtversity”

hatj.”’“

What

is

(hereby capable of being cxprc.sscd

which “lays a claim upon (he human being”
no

is

“nature’s

less lawful

than

reason’s desire for unily.^^'

That such a “complete anthropological
valuation”
an actual historical experience

is

is

capable of corresponding with

suggested by the emergence ofa referent prominently

absent in Kant’s works which allows the source
of the regulative ideal

from the pure rational concept of God

to the

exemplary
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“art

to

be relocated

and feeling of the Greeks.”

While such an -example-

is in fact

inimitable, this

aporia in Schiller's narrative;
rather

it

-facr does not present

provides an occasion for
a

.tself as

an

modem culture to

actualize what appears retroactively
to have been a Hellenic
aestheticization. For “the

Greeks transferred to Olympus what
was meant

What

is

“meant

to

be realized on earth”

fully realized in actuality.”

be realized on earth."«^

also presented as that

is

How is the persistence of the time of

of the theological supplement
“profane” reconciliation

to

to morality therefore to

made

Such questrons point toward

be understood?

Why is the

the Marxist readrng of
Schiller’s “reconciliation” as
but a
to the “state

For what kind of state other than an
aesthetic

appropnate spatio-temporal conditions
a state makes possible a reconciliation

of beautiful

state

would provide the

for representing illusion as
illusion?

that, rather

freedom and nature, reinforces and accentuates

outcome of an

infmite progress bereft

possible by the disclosure of the
play drive unattainable?

Simulacrum projected for and by the
subject attuned
semblance.”

which “cannot be

Only such

than harmonizing the realms of

their relation

of mutual opposition. The

aesthetic education thus seems to cause
a modification in the structure of

expectation accompanying the Kantian subject’s
infinite progress. Instead of being

guided by a pnnciple of hope, the recognition of
the ideal of beauty would offer a form

of consolation.
latter

If the

former

is

represented as the only

dispenses with, or rather exposes

at least

one

way

to

keep history “open”, the

illusion.

A form of compensation is thus offered to the subject since morality or “truth is the
prize of renunciation alone”; “only beauty makes the
world happy and each being
forgets

its

limitations so long as

it

experiences
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its spell.”^^'^

But would not the
appearance. Or

is

spell

such a

be broken as soon as
appearance

mode of perception or

is

perceived as mere

-beautiful representation”
[sch«ne

Vorsteliung] precisely the
goa, of an aesthetic
education: to prepare
the subject for
reconciliation with the

The

semblance of the

real.^^^

this-worldly ideal incapable
of realization, the respect
for a nature that seems

motivated primarily by the need
to appropriate

it

for the

w.ll, puproses. the

at

once

rational-empirical character of
beauty and the simultaneous
development and

displacement of the Kantian
system appear as the
contradictions endemic
ethic based

upon two ruling metaphors of
uncertain epistemological

self-positing subject

and the human artwork. The

first

principle

to

a historical

specif.cation: the

was presented

at

the

beginning of this work in the
following passage cited from
Schiller’s “On the Sublime”:
“Culture should place the
concept.

It

human being

in

freedom and

should thus enable him to
assert his

will,

him

assist

because

man

in fulfilling his

is

whole

the being that

wills.”^^^

Basing his project “for the most
part” on Kantian principles,
Schiller leads the
“being that wills” to the very limit
confronting and disarming the
Spinoizst

Only now

the subjectivity

of the

latter bears

what Lukacs describes as

historical-philosophical imprint: the play
drive.
fully

human when he plays”

The

identity

subject.

Schiller’s

of the subject as “only

furnishes Lukacs’ narrative of the
emergence of Marxism

out of the tradition of Western metaphysics
with an irreversible, fateful turning point.

For because “the aesthetic principle [nach

Schiller]

has been extended

far

confines of aesthetics. .the question of the
meaning of human existence

beyond the

.

presses itself upon any prospective ethic of history
that
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is

thereby

left

in society”

with the following

cNhcr/or: -either the worlr,
.l.e real

he t,c.,he,ici.e.,...|whieh

prohle,.,...|„„„ es.t,hhshca|

a, .other

way

i„

whieh

a,..,,,,,,..

to

n.ahe the sahjeet ptaely

contentplative. .or the aesthetie
prit.eiple aa.st be
elevated i„to the prit.eiple
by which
.

obicetive reality

is

shaped.-

h, short

-with the discovery ora,t

it

hceo,.,cs possthte

either to provide yet another
don.ain for the ,ra«,„e„ted
sahieet or to taehle the
prohlea.

of ‘crcalion’ from the side of
the

siibjccl.”^^^

la.ktksMormah,tion effectively easts
the eoatradictionsofSchiller’s-Aesthetie
Hrlaeation” into .sharper relief,
for the aareali/,ahle ideal
of beaaty borrows the
la..g.,t,ge

tfivesling

Kaat ases to represeal the
sabjeefs
it

re

to the highest goo.l
while

of the (theological) eoadilions
of po.ssibility whieh make a

reamcilialioa conslih. lively impo.ssible.
The ethic of history
lor Kaat,

.slraclare

aced lor
cast

new

will (presapposiag

faith as a ralioaal-aalaral

by the
site

lies ia the

aad his “aegalivily theology”
sects belter able to sastaia

olThe self-posiliag

Ideal

of beaaty seems

of coarse,

need) than the tiesthelic

is

ao

iairiasic

way

to the goal

atal liatil ||,e

that rea.soa recogaizes the

stale.

to provide the sahjeet with

of passive coalemplalioa, there

historical

Hal while the -spell-

what l.akacs.leseribes as a

reason

on

.Schiller’s

lera.s-

why

an aesthetic edacalioa caaaol “bring
into being a third charaeler |lhe
play drivej

that.

..might prepare the

law aad

Wbat

that..

way

for a Iraasilioa from the rale

the posl-Schillerian sabjeci

logical

to the rale

of

.might serve as a sensible pledge |l>laad|
of an invisible morality.”’-'"
lias inherited is

moral voaehsaled by the acsihelic. While the
lltc

of mere forces

aesiheliciztilioa

oaleome of the discovery of the play

Sliblated in.solar as

it

allows

tlle

the promise or “pledge” of the

drive, sad. a |irocess can al.so he

“problem of creation”
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of the world appears as

to

be “tack le|d|... from the side

of the subject." This
represented

in the

is

the metaphysical
problem for Lukacs, the

work of Kant and

Schiller

same problem

by the image of immense
chasm lying

between freedom and nature,
moral necessity and
physical necessity,
happiness.

And

it is

Lukacs’

own

Hegelian-Marxist standpoint
that invests
i,
the

‘aesthetic education” with
the retroactive distinction

with a reality determinable
at

last

virtue and

of having presaged a

not as an unknowable

X

reconciliation

but as “the product
of a

creating subject.

But once Lukacs’ philosophy
of histoiy

amnity between

the discovery

subsequent moment of the
significance.

of the as yet

is

dissociated from history
as such, the

‘‘pre-historical’’

play drive and the

‘‘creative’’ subject’s
self-recognition loses its
univocal

Based upon the supposition

that the

being that wills constitutes
the sole

form of ethical subjectivity and
animated by a valorization of the
artwork as a
paradigmatic fomt of human experience,
the movement from Schiller
forth the idea

in

of a reconciliation which

terms of the distance separating

it

rivals Engels’ identification

from the

to

Lukacs brings

of freedom and law

critical negativity indissociable

from

Kantian morality.

The

contradictions that arise

when

Schiller attempts to articulate the
conditions of

possibility for the aesthetic state in
historical terms stem from the
less as an agent

chasm”
faith

of reconciliation than as a means

for further

way

in

which

it

serves

widening the “immense

separating freedom and nature. If annulling
knowledge to create a space for

no longer suffices as a source of mediation,
annulling existence

for aesthetic

to create a space

semblance displaces the concept of mediation altogether.
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For only
will

in a self-onclosod
realn.

be ma,nta,ned.

ofacsihcic” experience ean
,he auioneny of ihe

In fact Ihe fom.al,
material

and efneient causes
ofthe production of

beauty seem designed to bring
forth the eapaeities
ofthe being
unparalleled manner that

is

that wills in an

reinforced by Ihe absence
of what Kant describes
as “a

concept that mediates between
the
me concepts
concents nTn
itut-o
ol nature
and <i
the concept of freedom.”^'’"
i

For that place of mediation was
occupied by the concept of
a “purposiveness of naturederived from a jmlgment of
natural beauty which
offered an intimation of
a certain
affinity

between the freedom ofthe

The absence of this concept

will

and the subject’s relation
to phenomenal nature.

in Schiller’s project is
a

necessa^ consequence of his

transformation of the judgment and
production of beauty into an
occasion for the
subject to re-assert

its

•securing the borders

ofthe acsihelie

autonomy ofthe being
[in

dem

independence from nature
state

anti to

creme a second

seems designed above

all to

that wills- albeit “in the
incorporeal realm

And

nature.

preserve the

ofthe hnaginat.on”

wcscnioscn Reich dcr Einbildungskraft]:

Since

all

actual existence [wirklichc Dascin]
derives

from nature as an
semblance originates from the human being
as
representing subject, he is only availing
himself of his absolute right of
ownership [Eigentumsrechtsl when he takes
back semblance from
essence [wenn er den Schein von dem
Wesen zuriicknimmtj and
disposes of It m accordance with his own
laws... Nothing need be holy
alien might, while all

[lieihg] here to

him other

than his

own

law, so long as he respects the

boundary which separates his realm from the
existence of things
i.e.,
from the realm of nature. This sovereign human
right he exercises in the
art of semblance, and... the more
carefully he separates form from
substance [Wesen] and the more autonomy
[Selbststiindigkeit] he gives
to the former then the more he will not
merely extend [erweitern] the
realm of beauty but also preserve the borders of
truth;... but it is in the
world of semblance alone that he possesses this sovereign
right, in the

incorporeal realm of the imagination; and he possess
it there only so long
as he scnipulously refrains from expressing its existenee
in theory and
renounces giving it existence in practice. You see from this
that the poet
steps

beyond

his limits both

when he

attributes existence to his ideal
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and

of experience with liis
ideal iiift ili..e .i,
actual existence by
means „ni,e n,erel“,^,si

I'old ol (he realr

•

1,’!"!':"

r

''"

semblance

aesthetic.^'

I..

I1.C

allennatb oftbe

Copemiean

- -‘.abe baeb- sentblanee nr tbe
.he nnntnentd

X

it”, is

<l.sc<,verc<l

being

who

•n.c

pbennntenal rorm

by tbe understanding.

lawless abibty In “create,
as

gives

Kevnlutinn, tbe “representing
subjecr

it

that

And wbat Kant

is

enjoine.1

bad been lawlully
prniected onto
describes as tbe

were, anotber nature nut
nftbe n.aterial that actual
nature

apprnpriated by a self-pnsiting,
autonnmnus subject that bas at

last

a ntcliun, nf expressinn
and spatiabtempural
experience appropriate fur tbe
wills.’^^’^

work

niutgmatinn

m art pr.uluced by tbe «, /,/„„«.«„</, provides
to position tbe

l.isu,rieally possible,

eigbteentb century

from iippcanmce,

n, ensure that ttllows tbe

subject along the outermost
limits oftbe

bor Scbillcr tbe forentost failure
oftno.lernity

lies in

tind

autonomous

a

tbe fact that

it

at tbe close

oftbe

bas not “sulliciently .listinguisbcl
existence

thereby nuide tbe frontiers of cticb
scctirc forever.”’" Once these

borders are established, tbe historically
possible
possible” to the precise extent that

sotiittbmg that could be

it

;ictu;dt/,cd.

is

I

is

demoted

to tbe rank

threatened with actualization

hc impasse

in

question

is

oftbe “merely
or mistaken for

created by Schiller’s

acceptance, on the one hand, of the antinomic
relation Kant establishes between the

moral and physical capacities of the self-positing
subject: “we know
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that the

de,e™i„abil.,y of the hun,an
will always remains
contingent and that only
with an
absolute being do physical
and moral necessity comcide
with one another.Schiller then leaves this
constitutive limit to a
historical ethic intact
while

simultaneously revaluating both
terms of the opposition
aesthetic serves as ike
foundation

supplement.

Edu£St|0D

An

at the

of the moral

indication that this

veo^

in

a

way

rather than as its
atheological

may be the case emerges

moment when

Schiller

is

that suggests the

“seeking a

in the Letters

way

on Aesthetic

out

material world and a passageway
to the world of spirit
[einen Ubergang in die
Geisterwelt].”

At such a

critical juncture, the

“material world” no longer
seems to em.t any sign of

being on the verge of speech. If
anything,
reduced

to silence, as

it

its

value

now

lies in the fact that

were, for the discovety of the
“passageway”

is

it

has been

presented as

nothing less than the origin of
freedom:

from being a slave of nature, which
he remains as long as he merely
lawgiver from the moment he begins
to think it.
at which hitherto merely
mled him as a power, now
object before his directed gaze.

What

upon him,

is

feels

stands as an
object to him, exerts no force

for in order to be an object,
it must be experienced
as
[something subjected to] his power
[Gewalt]. To the extent that he gives
form to matter, and so long as he does so,
he is immune [unverletzlich]
to Its effects; for a [human] spirit
demonstrates its freedom

form

by giving

to the formless and. .the

human being is superior to every
he knows how to give it form and transform
it
.

nature so long as

terror

of

into his

object.

Schiller concludes this disclosure of the
“passageway” leading from the natural to the

moral by confessing

autonomous power
author: “while

I

that the

very imagination endowed with a legislative and

in the aesthetic state has

was merely seeking

a

way

momentarily usurped the authority of the

out of the material world and a passageway
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into the world of spirit,

from mere
If there

refutation

hit

upon a

my

life directly to

is

imagination has run

and put us in the

latter.

Beauty

pure form and to the
pure object.”^“

evidence that the theme
of the

of the claim

free

that aesthetic

on •‘Aesthetic Educatio„”-the

letters

freedom

is

synonymous with lawless
freedom-has

fruitfid topic for further
research, then

it

lies in this

untoward movement of

the imagination.- For
rather than being passed
over, the condition
of poss.bility for
the production of beauty has
been identified as the
fonn-matter dualism that
serves,

moreover, as the unacknowledged
basis of constitutively
moral

The

peculiarity of such an
aestheticization of morality

is

action.

accentuated by the fact that

Schiller’s allusion to the Kantian
sublime (“superior to every
terror of nature”)

coupled with yet another valorization
of self-positing

was presented
of the

in the third

will to create

Cntique as a

limit to,

and comprehend form.

aesthetic semblance corresponds

more

subjectivity. After all the
former

and not a reinforcement

In fact

it

is

seems

of, the capacity

that Schiller’s realm

of

closely with a judgment of the
sublime than the

beautiful insofar as Kant explicitly
dissociates the former from the
“idea of a

purposiveness of nature” which

is

markedly absent

in Schiller’s

work. “Through the

Ideas of the sublime... we do not
present a particular form in nature, but
only develop

the purposive use that the imagination
makes of the representation of nature.”^^* These
ideas appear to be eminently suited for
being “further developed” by an ethic which

prescnbes a law for the imagination

in a

realm of aesthetic semblance designed to give

the being that wills the time and space necessary
for

it

to

autonomous. And what appears as an effacement of the
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become

(or

seem)

theoretical distinction between

practical possibility and

“the

human

semblance

in this context stems

being should value matter
only insofar as

it

from Schiller's supposition
is

that

capable of receiving fomt
and

extending [verbreiten] the realm
of ideas. «369

The repercussions of such an
extension of the Kantian
faint

resemblance

to their original

form thanks

of beauty” manifest themselves
most

ideas

which already bear

to the introduction

fully in Schiller's essay

a

of the “pure concept

“On

the Sublime”, where

the suspicion that something
remained incomplete about the
program for “Aesthetic

Education” that lay the groundwork
for a profane yet unrealizable
reconciliation
confirmed. Having already

“On

lost sight

of the passageway

in the face

the Sublime” in turn implicitly
redresses the imbalance caused

of the

by

is

destination,

the

transformation of a means into an
end.

The boundaries of the

historically possible

seem

at first to

expand immeasurably

with the discovery of the play drive;
when directed toward the production of
beauty,
appears as a power that “might prepare
the

way

for a transition

it

from the rule of mere

forces to the rule of law and [thus]...
serve as a sensible pledge of an invisible
morality.”^^®

Just as the disclosure of the fact of reason
could only affect a finite, sensible being,

the “fact of beauty” also attests to the
“situated” character of a subject

endowed with

a

special” causality which allows the imagination
to think of it as something potentially

other than a “mere link in nature.”

human

will is unable to

As

in Kant,

produce actions

that appear as independent

determination as their origin (in freedom)
limit to self-positing subjectivity

is

however, such a power ascribed

is

held to be.

to the

of natural

What Kant then presented

as a

converted by Schiller into an occasion for disclosing
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.he lawfulness of aes.he.ic
freedom. For the problem
with moral freedom
effect,

That

is

i,

limits the putatively

“moral- (but actually

why the play drive “takes from

aesthetic)

is that, in

powers of the subject

the laws of reason
the.r moral

compulsion.-

Anticipating, in part, Adorno's
critique of Kant,
Sch.ller regards the
compulsory,

imperative quality of the moral
law to be a constitutively
contradictory principle

that

negates the distinguishing
characteristic of human
subjectivity.
Included

among

.he aesthetic state

the “objects" procured

is

such for Kant; the

the

by

subhme. There were,

tern, rather indicates

tnner and external nature

may

how

when

arise

the

BiMu.g.rieb within the borders
of

strictly

speaking,

be incomprehensible so long
as

The sublime

it

objects as

the thought of the
supersens.ble underlying

the subject

is

exposed to something that
defies

.he laws of the understanding.
This “something” was a
natural
.o

no sublime

phenomenon

was represented merely as a

natural

that

proved

phenomenon.

“object” therefore emerged
only in a judgment of nature
and not in an

artwork.

In

It

IS

“On

the Sublime”, however, the
concept takes on

its

greatest value precisely

when

produced by the Bildmgstrieb. And
here the productive-mimetic
principle

animating the

and nature

latter

gives a definitive expression to
the relation between the

that serves as the basis

rationally; the

human

prerogative

of Schiller’s
is

volition. All other things must; the

historical ethic: “all

affects

aesthetic freedom that

human

human

acts

simply to act rationally with consciousness
and

human being

is

the beings that wills.”’’^

Given the expansive quality of the play drive and

which the moral law

of nature

human will

consciousness,

action takes

it

the unsuitably coercive

is

manner

only with the experience of

on an adequate degree of self-conscious
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in

vohfon. Such an experience
state

Which does

not, Schi.ier maintains,

become
p.ay drive to be

arises within the
bordets circumscribed

its

“victorious in

its

pose a

threat to truth;

and yet

conflict with [natural]
forces”

“delegate” in the phenomena,
world

»

by

it

the aesthetic

if -truth-

or

must appoint the

Truth would, however

thereby encroach upon the
sphere of aesthetic
semblance. “And to the
question .0 what
degree should semblance
exist in the moral
world’ the answer is.
.to the degree
.

aesthetic semblance;

i.e.

semblance

that neither

that

it IS

aims to represent reality
nor needs to be

represented by

But the unifying tendencies

integral to Schiller’s

work do not merely leave

the

aesthetic and the moral in
such an antinomic relation
to one another. For
ultimately the

only

way that

“aesthetic

semblance can never be a

acknowledges the singular instance

in

which H

is

threat to the truth

threatened by the

of morals”

is if it

latter.

C. “Death as a Sublime Object”

Up
ideal

till

now,

the primaty

consequence of instituting the aesthetic

whose conditions of possibility

lie

within the power of the

state as a regulative

human

will has

been

to

displace or rather reestablish this
“primordial opposition” of freedom and
necessity on

new grounds:

the aesthetic state is preserved
so long as the dualism remains intact.

like the theological supplement,
the aesthetic supplement

And

emerges in accordance with

an inexorable, and not merely natural need:
“reason, on transcendental ground, makes
the following demand:.

hope and a theological

.

.let

there

referent

be a play drive.”^” However, without a principle
of

(however “negative”)
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the consolation offered

by the

aes.he.ic .a.e appears
inHerenU,

wha. emerges see^s
Bu. perhaps
.ha.

.his

.0

....an,, ,

be something ,i,e a
need for a ra.iona,

or raUona, iUnsion

only appears “contradictoryfront the standpoint
of a Kantian reason

judges a law of tragedy (bu.
not a “wholly

rational faith“) .0

be inimical .0 the

moral law.

A tragic ethos in

fact enterges in
Schiller’s representation

Singular “object”: “the world
as historical object
conflict of natural forces
with

why the aesthetic state

is

bottom nothing other than
the

one another and with the
freedom of the human
being

Such a world thereby de-huma„izes
the “being
“prerogative”. This

is a.

of world-histoty as a

that wills”, depriving

it

of its inviolable

alone creates a time and
space for the

subject .0 act “rationally and
consciously” apart from the
realm within which
physical

and moral necessity converge
of the

of the

latter: i.e,

the realm

historical.

But

in

one

specific case

aesthetic state .0

what

.0 the unconditional
detriment

for

open

its

Kan. amounts

it

is this

borders.

to the fact

experience, no. truth as such,
that forces the

Once

this

of nature

happens, the Endzweck

is

violent.

.

.is

confronted by

that establishes the a priori
validity

ratronal concepts of god and
immortality: “ifa claim..

everythrng [m nature] that

is

found

.to

in a being

htghest rank rn the realm offerees,
then what results

is

of the

absolute liberation from

which does not maintain the

an ill-fated [unglUcklicher]

contradiction between drive and capacity
[Trieb und...Vermdgen].”^^^

For Schiller the image of a
spectacle in

its

own

sublime objeet.”^^^

right,

And

free will ensnared in natural history
is an arresting

and “looked upon from

if the

sublime “object”
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is

this standpoint... world-history
is a

dissociated from nature and the idea

of god and conceived as
some.hing
.hen .he

iha. is

produced by .he subject's
fonn-giving power

encountered by the Spinozis.

is s.,rpassed

appropriated as moral necessity
by the

by the being

that wills

when

physical necessity

is

This crowning act
accomplished

emerges as the logical
outcome of the confrontation
between the

of history and the vocation
of reason which had
been merely postponed
by the
promise of the moral law
W. For
for the subject can
no longer be the being
that

logic

•

wills, if

there

It

is

even a single case where he
absolutely must do what
he does no. will.”^™

turns out that the prospect
of death-of becoming

does no. posit-stands out as
the “singular
aesthetic education

being toward death

muiungsirieh so

is

is

that,

designed above

preempt.* That

program

is,

for

an

the experience of

can

it

a. las.

provide an acU.a! transition to

to a certain point, “the
capacity to feel the

.

spirit,

all else to

an end the subject

For because the ideal of beauty
can only preserve the subject's

sublime. .deserves to be developed
to
to

for

terrifying instance” the

properly aestheticized,

semblance of autonomy up

our calling

means

something that can be transformed
into a product of the

the “world of spirit.”™'

is

a

be directed

in the

its

highest point of completion.”

And “because

it

midst of all sensible limitation to
the lawbook of pure

the sublime must be added to
[hinzukommen] the beautiful in order to

make

the

aesthetic education a complete whole.”^^^

Exposed, even

in the aesthetic state, to the
fact

of natural death, there

is

no other

recourse for the being that wills than to
“destroy with a concept a force which
he in

must endure. But destroying a force with

a concept [Eine

vemichten] means nothing other than submitting
aesthetic education

is

then achieved

when such
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to

it

Gewalt

dem

voluntarily.''^"-'

fact

Begriffe nach

The goal of

a rational and conscious submission

is

a..a,ned through an
exemplary ac, of subhnta.ion.

Directed toward world
hiato.^ as

such or the artworh-specihcally
the tragic artwork
representing -imagined
and
anificia, ntisfotfune[eingehildeten

nature, the concept of
the suhlinte

is

und kUnstlichen UnglUck,
-rather than toward
utilized

by

Schiller in order to
indicate

subject can convert reality
into semblance and
then recognize

ofthe real.^« For “human
nature soars to

its

The

its

it

resolves actual
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aesthetic-practical act that
historicizes the moral law

elevating the subject’s autonomy
to

the

as the sublation

greatest height...[when]

suffenng into a sublime
emotion [Riihrung], »»

how

by “preserving” and

“greatest height” through
a singular act

of

negation either accentuates or
eliminates the ambiguity
surrounding the translation
of

Aufhebu„g-«,, question

is

resolvable only by an
ethico-historical “value”
judgment:

“if [the subject], .has learned
to endure
.

dign.ty what he cannot save”
then

it

is

what

cannot change and to surrender
with

poised for those “cases where
fate scales

bulwarks [AuBenwerke] on which
he based
to

it

do and. .no other means of withstanding

the

all

his security and there is
nothing left for

him

.

the might of nature than

and through a voluntary sublation
[Aufhebung] of all sensible
morally before

it

is

done by

a physical

power (ehe noch

accommodating

interest take its

eine physische

Macht

own

it

life

es tut,

sich moralisch zu entleiben].”^^^

While
such.

It

for

Kant the

antithetical relation

between morality and tragedy

is

not

named

as

nevertheless becomes evident in the
representation of the “limit” that confronts

and disables the Spinozan

subject.

The

typology of historical moods sketched
Schiller s

works

as a moral feeling

“tragic emotion” that remains extrinsic
to the

in the

second and

third Critiques is classified in

which animates the singular
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act in

which the law of

nature (as in hunran finitude),
the nroral law
(which prescnbes the
principle of

autononry to the being that
.he logic

of history

wills,,

and the law of aesthetic
semblance (which converts

into a sublime spectacle)
converge to produce yet

But the simultaneous absence

of,

and rational need

for,

institution

rise to the

Kantian principle

of the aesthetic state
isolates an antinomy
ultimately

“resolved” by reintroducing
the very power agamst
which the subject as
to establish its rational,

law.

an experience of history
solely

determined neither by natural
nor moral necessity that
gave

of hope and the

one more

moral and

somehow

E„,^eck was

finite identity.^^^

Thus away with the false,
understanding indulgence and with thp
slack, pampered taste that
throws a veil ovl the stm
fa” [Ces^htl
of necessity and in order to put
itself in favor with the
sensL ifes aboi a
haimony between well-being and
good behavior [Wohlverha’lten]
ft

f®..'

us
us^

^^hef^
'f
the terrifying
and magnificent

wodd-Fate

[Verhangnis shows

[herriiche] spectacle

destroying everything, recreating
it and then destroying
art of tragedy bnngs [it]
again before our eyes.^^*

The
the

subject constitutes

law-a

its

of ctonge

it

again
^

and ^
the

proper moral identity out of its
very failure to historicize

failure that is elevated into a
virtue if it leads to the one

form of action

in

which human freedom coalesces with
the recognition of the “stem law
of necessity”.’*’

The “ultimate purpose of art”

is

then attained

when

the exemplary act of “voluntary

submission” that closes the gap separating
the subject’s moral and physical
capacity

freedom

is

presented before the eyes of the captivated
spectator.’”

The outermost
established

letter?)

for

limits

of the historically possible therefore seem

by a “secular”

ethic that attempts to

of the moral law by

remain

to

have been

faithful to the spirit (or is

it

the

singling out the only form of experience
capable of

preserving the autonomy of the being that wills.
Deciding whether
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this

occurs through

a sublation or negation
of the experience of being
i„ .be worid depends
on

transcendental claim

is

bow

sucb

assessed.

Whereas Lukaes would bold

that the

“rear (“necessity”)

is

thereby hypos.atized,
’

Nietzsche would aver that the
purity of aesthetic
sentblance and the experience
of
tragedy have been contaminated
by the renmants of eeriain
“rat.onal concepts.” For
the
“farther

development of Kantian ideas”
undertaken by

certain historical interval
created

God and
indicate

immortality.

it is

No

Schiller places his

by the displacement of the
pure

work

in a

rational concepts

of

longer corroborated by
anything external to itself that
would

capable of changing the course
of world history, the idea of
freedom

nevertheless manifests itself through
isolable acts of self-sacrifice
which provide the

proper subject matter for the
strongly

where we

frnd

ours that lies beyond
in this reference to

art

of tragedy: “obstinate, mute pain
grips us

no help from nature but

all that is natural;

far

rather must take refuge in
something of

and the pathos and force of tragedy

what transcends the senses

more

[in dieser

lie

precisely

Hinweisung aufdas

Ubersinnliche

The “something”
act

in question

is

precisely the capacity for freedom
actualized in the

of suicide whose “purposefulness” no longer

explicitly services a “final purpose”

determinable (from a practical point of view)
through an

act

of rational

can be a form of human experience which
does not simply amount
gratification

of a “pathological” or instrumental

nor Nietzsche would deny. That such
that

human consciousness

is

alterity

interest is

to

faith.

That there

an immediate

something neither Schiller

makes “sense” only with

the supposition

capable of being affected by what reason must define as
a

source of non-natural, moral necessity

is

something which becomes more
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difficult to

maintain without having
rccourao to thcologicai
concept, for the eoncep,
of freeclotn
provides a tneasure for the
being that wiits that is
also a being toward
death which
allows

But

i,

to dissociate acts of
voluntary tu.d involuntary
snhntisston front

this distinction in tnrn
stands in neetl

of a

freedom of the will and the
concepts

in Schiller-s

ttre

one another.

further rellcction because
while the
treated as essentially

syuonyntous

works, neither necessarily
corresponds with a moral
action.

Nevertheless, -‘there can no longer
he any question of how to
pass front hca.tty to
iruth since the

power of the

latter

already

lies in the forttter.””^

Indeed the capaeity for

fornt-giving as,soeiated with
aeslhetic freedom whieh
serves as the foutt.lalion
nrorlol for the

bcaulifttl

experience of morttl attlottomy

SCci,.

-plastic

ttrt

tttanifcsls itself in the
protiuclion

a.ttl

of

|bihlc,tdc Knnst|... detaches
all cottlhtgent lintilttliotts
frottt

Ichoscnl object.. .|by| imitating only
the appearance and not the
actuttlity.””’ The

Its

power of the nachahnu-mh
“object” in rptestion
the

symbolic and the

is

the subject’s llnitu.le.

natural, united

becomes an action of the

The
system
pivot

W/t/nng.vr™./, then reaches

will

by the

I

its gretttest

height wlte.t the

Icrc ttlone are ttppearattce

acsthclic-nioral experience in

and

actt.ality,

which “death

[Tod wird cine Willcnshandlungj.”^'^'^

principle of autonomy seems then to
have been rcincorporatcd into the “Stoic

which Kant censures

on which

all

for

having “made consciousness of strength of
soul the

moral dispositions were

to turn.”^‘'^

This

is

the point at

which

Stoicism no longer renders a service to the vocation
of reason which otherwise benefits

from Us valorization of “simplicity, prudence,
wisdom and

of these “moral ideas” he not
but rather in

how

in their legitimation

liolincss.”^'^^’

For the value

of Stoic or Christian doctrine as such

they allow reason to develop the kind of sensibility necessary
for the
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recognition of its
is in its

own

a priori moral identity.

Where Stoicism

falls short in this

regard

detennination that “the mere
use of [the subject's]
natural powers [are]

sufficient for [attaining]
the moral ideas.
Christian morals, because

precepts so purely and inflexibly.
.depnves the
.

be fully adequate to them
[the “moral .deas”],

by enabling us
within our

to

hope

to

frames

human being of confidence

at least

its

that

he can

m this life, but again sets them up

that if we act as well
as is within

power will come

it

our power, then what

our aid from another
source, whether or not

is

not

we know

in
i

what way.”^^^
Renunciation in the “face of necessity”
emerges in Schiller's works as
an experience

of tragedy analogous

to

what had confronted the Spinozan
subject as an insuperable

barrier that prevented an ethic
of history

from being conceived

But since Christianity had been
demoted-with great

tact

in atheological terms.

and circumspection-by the

vocation of reason to an essentially
instrumental-heuristic status, a
theoretic-practical

space opened within tradition that
allowed Schiller to separate the
theological from the
moral.

The peculiar
autonomous

fate

will

of the subject threatened

to

become

a tragic fate

proved constitutively incapable of converting
the

when

fact

the

of reason into a

histoncal expenence. For Schiller the
rational concepts of God and immortality
toward

which reason

is

led displace rather than

upon morality. Beauty

is

overcome

then introduced as another rational concept
in order to

illuminate the intrinsic “aesthetic tendencies”
subject

which culminate

the problems natural history imposes

(i.e.

the capacity for form-giving) of the

m the feeling of the sublime.^^^

conducive to the cultivation of the

latter

And

nothing could be less

— “Nichts wemgerr—ihm
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the supposition that

the

“

represe„.at.o„ of death, if
co.b.ned with sublintity,
preserves .his subbnti.y

.hrough .be idea of
i™„or.a,i.y. ..[which

in fact] is a

ground of pacifying contfod
for

our dnve toward continued
existence [ein Beruhtgungsgntnd
Fortdauer]. .and thus
.

is

fiir

unsen, Trieh nach

no. able to contribute
anything whatsoever to
the representation

of death as a sublime
object.”^^^

Cut off bon, the benefits
of religion and based
aesthetic, the principle

form of experience

in

to an unrecognized
degree

of ntoralify ntus. nonetheless
furnish

which the subject

-‘regards

its

the

name

on the

for a specific

physical condition, which
can be

detennined by nature, as something
foreign and al.en that
has no influence on

its

moral

person.”^®®

The

act

of suicide

essentially serves as the
condition

of possibility

for

moral

experience; but deprived of
the two rat.onal concepts
which allowed the Kantian
subject
to posit the

highest good” as a regulative
ideal and telos, Schiller

is

faced with the task

of distinguishing an aesthetic
and moral sacrifice from one
another on the basis of

“examples” whose value appears

to

be dependent upon the judgments
rendered by

contingent and particular traditions.
Thus the “self-sacrifice of Leonidas

Thermopylae” as recorded by Herodotus
immolation of Peregrinus Protheus
impartiality)

by Lucian

But describing the
amoral value

it

was

is

judged

latter as the

at

to

is

at

both aesthetic and moral while the

Olympia”

be merely

“self-

as narrated (with no pretension of

aesthetic."*®’

“merely” aesthetic

fails to

convey how the limited

allotted in the third Critique has since
increased

immeasurably-a

transformation evidenced by the type of object
Schiller has brought under the

junsdiction of aesthetic judgment.

To adjudicate between
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the ethical claims put forth

.

by disparate

event., (and their scientific
or poetic representations,

fundantentaily i„-coneeived
task since

it

would allow

is

Kant a

for

the principle of
nrorality to be

determined on the basis of
merely historical evaluations.
For the •‘sublimity” of
morality lies for Kant in

its

unrepresentable character.
This

sublime passage in the Jewish

any graven

what

is

image.-

of interest

Law

Nothing

to reason is

is

the

,s

is

why

commandment: Thou

“perhaps the most

shalt not

make unto

thee

said thereby about
the morality of Judaic
law as such;

how

i,

facilitates

a self-recognihon of
its

own moral

sublimity.

The ban on

idolater

is

even extended

which becomes a living heritage
singularity defies the laws

conceded

to

to the

to

Kanfs understanding of the
work of genius,

degree that

it

provokes further works whose

of natural causation. And the
element of provocation here

is

be ambiguous:

^"‘•“wmont must give the rule

wh^rv^''

to fine art

a precept.

Rather, the rule must be abstracted
from what the artist has
from
the product, which others
.
may use to test their own
talent letting it serve them
as their model, not to be
copied
/AkrcAmoc/iimg/ but to be imi/Med

done ne

[Nachahmmg] How

that is possible
ideas arouse similar ideas in
hi
apprentice if nature has provided the
latter with a similar proportion
IS difficult

his

to explain.

The artist's

mental powers. That

in

why

is

of transmitting these ideas

the

models of fine

art are the

only means

to posterity.'*®^

Such a “historical” process of production
and reception has nothing moral about
and such qualified recognition of the value
of the phenomenal example
wholly indetetminate and carefully

restricted to the

realm of fine

art.

is

both

it

left

For Schiller

this

process provides a particularly suitable basis
for moral judgment precisely because
of
Its

aesthetic character. That is

why an

aesthetic
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judgment of the sublime

is

now

focused

...n ,h.

of Leonidas)— a

moment

that

Kant

locates only in the
symbolic representation

of a holy

will."'®'*

The death scene
aesthetic judgment

such, as an

whose

I

of reason thus becomes
an object of

in

motion by a fonn of special
causality: “i„ an

forge, about the individual
[and] abstract from the
relation

law of the will and [thus] think
of the human will

the species

m relation to the power of nature [Naturgewalt]

The “purity” Kant
that

discloses the fact

‘-purity stems from the
subject’s ability to regard
the will as

autonomous power set

aesthetic evaluation

will to the

which Kan,

in

in general, as

of its

a capacity of

as a whole.”''“

isolates in an aesthetic
judgment in order to expose the
subject to

which remains apart from the objects
capable of being posited by an
autonomous

subjectivity is

now

appropriated in order to establish
the conditions of possibility
for the

expanded powers of “aesthetic
Schiller’s distinction

Aristotelian

representation”.''"'^ I, is therefore
not surprising that

between aesthetic and moral judgment

movement from

we direct our judgment to

possibility to actuality: “i,

is

makes

presented in terms of the
all

the difference whether

the moral capacity in general and
to the possibility of an

absolute freedom of the will or to the use
of this capacity and to the actualization
of this
absolute freedom.”'*®^

The movement from

aesthetic to moral

from aesthetic to moral action which

is

of possibility, as an act whereby form

judgment corresponds with the movement

understood—aesthetically— as

is

imparted to a matter more or

the actualization

less receptive to

being shaped for a determinant purpose/®* Moral
experience thereby becomes a
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possible object produced
subjectivity

would seem

by human
n
to

xmn
Tc;fV';. and such
s.iei, an
accomplishment

of self-positing

have been prepared for
lor oy
by the
tne Kantian
representation of the
1

subject as an

human

action,

For the

latter

emerges as the -finaP
and ‘TormaP cause of

while the material cause

is

determinable as the capacity
for freedom.-

However, the application
of Aristotle's fourfold
typology of human

autonomous

will

only hecomes complete
when

illuminates

it

how

causality to the

Kant removes the

“efficient cause”
responsible for actually
y bringing
nciln into
g g a moral action
existence

,

form-giving, -production”
process.
the

human being” being

result, the

.3

“straincd...far

-value” of Christianity

something the

A

human being

failure to

beyond

lies for

do so

all

bears along with

it

results in the -moral
capacity

the limits of his nature

reason above

al, in

how

it

its

As

of

a

suggests the moral

for the duration of its
finite existence

without ever being able to
cither fully appropriate
or even identify

cause of this or that action;

from the

it

as the efficient

unrepresentable -presence”
affects the subject by

inducing a sense of guilt (of
constraint and humiliation)
whose origin cannot be traced
to

any identifiable phenomenal
form. This

is

what makes the “incomprehensibility”
of

the “original moral disposition”
sublime for Kant.

And

this is

what ought

to

prevent

any representation of human
action-including an “introspective”
self-representationfrom being mistaken for a sublime
“object” (especially since the very
positing of any
such object— whether aesthetic
or moral— amounts for Kant to
an

The

structure

of the

ethical-historical will

is

act

of “subreption”).

therefore maintained only by an
experience

of “incessant laboring and becoming”
animated by a principle of hope."" And
the
emerges as a special category of modality
irreducible
the possible.
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to the will’s

latter

power of actualizing

^

The point of departure
conststs in seetng

for Schiner’s ethic
of history

how progress

is

arrested

see^s

by such a hope.

.he realm of expertence
capable of being produced

by

to

have been: progress

,n transposing the

.ora, to

the being that wills,
the

boundaries of the historically
possible were expanded
to tnclude a
qualitative element
of
.entpora, differentiation
that intenmpts the

.he Kantian subject.
.he only time

distinction

movement of

These boundaries were then
greatly contracted

and space ,e«

for

negated. Progressing

to the

an ethic of histo^ was
the act ofsuic.de

between symbolic and

in

pomt where
which the

natural death serves as
an incentive only to
then

beyond the pnnciple of Kantian
hope wh.le

antinomy of nature and freedom
then leads .nexorably

World History

-endless progress.mpelling

retaining the Kantian

to -Resignation”:

World Court of Justice
Hope: now you are rewarded
Your Faith was your Measure
of Happiness
But you could have asked
the Sages
About how the Minutes given up
Give back no Eternity.'”^

You

is

the

lived with

D.

alural destination

A Fate Both Tragic and Peculiar

and our

would be an endless stntggle between
our

rational destination. In the
striving to fulfill
ur spintual vocation [Geisterberuf],
we would neglect our humanity
and, prepared at any moment
for the departure from the
world of the
senses, we would constantly
remain strangers in this sphere of
acting
assigned to us. Without the sublime
beauty would make us forget our
igni y.
hrough the debility of an uninterrupted
pleasure we would lose
the strength of character and, tied
to this contingent form of
existence by
indissoluble bonds, we would lose

sight

of our permanent

destination. .Only if the sublime is
coupled with the beautiful and our
sensitivity to both has been shaped in
.

equal measure [in gleichem MaB
complete citizens of nature, without on that
account
being Its slaves, and without squandering
our citizenship in the
intelligible world.”
ausgebildet] are

we
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be

It IS

acion

the act

(i.e.

death that

of self-sacnfice alone

that attests to the
possibility

freedom) and .he persistence
of heau.y

is

both sublinte and beautiih.)

•herefore the defining
experience

moved from

the sublimity

in the

.hrou,h ,he appropriation
of a

(i.e.

absence of worid-histonca,
hope.

of tragedy? After

of the

of both “spiritual”

,s this

nothing could be funher

all

subject’s “rational
destination” (’’Nichts
wenigerl”)

than an idea of immortality
that would “actualize”
the possibility of
reconciling
sensibility

and reason which properly
emerges only within the
sphere of aesthetic

semblance.
sublimity

is

And

ye. the “idea of immortality”
judged

no. at such a great distance
from truth after

arise for the subject as a
“ruling idea”,
it

were, as a backdrop [Hintergrunde]

feels

to

it

in

can

somehow

order to

come

all; or,

mind, however, death loses

But

how can such an

perception

is

its

moral

to

so long as

it

does no.

continue to subsist, or “stand,
as
to the

exposed-defenseless and without
consolation-.o

hilation [Zemichtung]...lf
this idea

be antithetical

all

help of sensibility

if

i,

the horrors of absolute

of immortality becomes the ruling
idea

in the

fearfulness and the sublime
disappears.”'"'*

idea be anything other than
a “ruling” one? What kind of
depth

required in order to

make sense of events

presented against such a

backdrop on the tragic stage?

The

central tension animating Schiller’s
historical ethic stems

tragic ethos out

purpose."'

of Kant’s representation of the subject
as a

But perhaps such an ethos

sacnficial scene presented

For the
concept

latter is

if

is

brought

final

to, rather

from how he educes a

puipose

to

no

than brought out of, the

m the second Critique as the disclosure of the fact of reason.

introduced not as an object of moral emulation

(itself a contradictory

thought in strictly Kantian terms) or aesthetic
representation but rather as a

I
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condition of possibility for
the imagination to
recognize a limit or
borderline that
manifests itself negatively
as an existential feeling
of guilt.

For Schiller
object” for

its

art

can transform such an
inner drama into an

‘.ultimate purpose.,

senses and the

art

of tragedy

.is

the presentation

in particular brings
this

..aesthetically significant

of that which transcends

the

about by symbolizing

[versinnhchen, to us the
independence of morality from
natural laws

in a

condition of

emotional disturbance [Affekt].”'*'^
Schiller thereby inaugurates

what was

become a dominant

to

metaphysics over the following
two centuries: the privileging
of the
a medium of expression which
allows a particular

human

Westem

tradition in

‘‘aesthetic”

realm as

experience to take on form

against the backdrop of another
tradition whose disappearance

is

somehow

preserved

through the idea of the sublime.^'’
The concept of the “tragie”
therefore becomes
irreducibly historical, at

and a diagnosis of a
It

has for

its

once serving

modem

as a regulative ideal, an
interpretation of tradition

condition.

proper object the freedom of the
form-giving subject which alone

provides the model for a constitutively
human experience that

reshaping history into an artwork.

As

is,

however, incapable of

a result the newfound idea of
beauty takes on the

strange temporal character of an
unrealizable, profane, and redemptive
ideal.

then where tragedy reemerges as a
paradigmatic form of experience,
the

Westem

tradition

where the boundaries of the

historically possible

contract and expand once the “problem of
creation
subject?”'”® This dualism

between

the

becomes apparent

modem drama

at the

is

Is this

moment

seem

to both

tackled from the side of the

in the relationship Schiller presents

and Attic tragedy.
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in

What see.s
.estantents

to place the latter
at an

of the Greeh chorus,
which

remove fro™ the fonner
for Schiller

are the

evohe the sense of an
a-histoncal

“nature- l,ing -nnaer the
ve.l of phenonrenathat retrospective!,
appears
fust the sort of ntaterial
alterity seenringly
inaccessible to
ts

not found can be created:
“the
create

,t

modem poet

poetically. .,n order to
put the
.

to

s,n,hol.e

modern expenence. But
what

no longer finds the
chorus

[modem] drama back

in nature.

He

into that childlike

time [kindhche Zeit] and
into that simple fom,.-’
But, as indicated by
the “presence"
of the backdrop to the tragic
stage Schiller erects,
there is something
besides an
inimitable experience

of naivete

that prevents such a
recreation

from being equated with

a restoration. For the
intimation of a certain telos
emerges in the

seems

what

either to negate that

which

as yet unnamable: “do

IS

is

modem drama that

specifically “tragic" or to
redefine

we modem

really

have

to

renounce

it

in

terms of

[the attempt] to

restore Greek art ever again
because the philosophical
genius of the age and

culmre

in general is not favorable
to

poetry?-« The answer

Greeks did not or could not recognize
was

it

perpetrated

on

The damage done
Hellenic

art,

no because what the

that tragic art “rests
primarily

[and therefore] perhaps here
alone our culture can

which

is

make good

modem

upon the moral

the theft to tragic art

art in general.

to “nature”, to the experience

can be sublated in a

way

of naivete extrapolated from

that satisfies reason’s

demand

for the

unconditioned or a final purpose. The
countenance of the “stem face of necessity”

which was read

as a

law of history can nevertheless somehow
also appear to reason as a

transfiguring mirror in

which

it

recognizes

its

moral and aesthetic

identity.

This is why the best pieces of the Greek
stage leave something to be
desired, for in all these pieces there
is ultimately an appeal made to
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necessity and our reason

which demanHc
vemunftfordemde Vemunftl is
alwavs left
However [now! even this dissolf ^ u

r

^

^

unresolved

knot.
™ ^ '’'^^misfaction with

loses itself. .in the
presentiment o^ rh
teleological connection
among things hhatl"
.

fate

“"'uiousness of a

dissonance within the
granrhamon^Crtf
this pure height of
tragic

emotion

this highest

demand and

it

thus to unfoW

art

What
to

is it

that

comes

to distinct consciousness

be reconciled with one
another?

inaugural lecture
is it

Studied?’’«3

at

„

the University

i,

3^died,

An

^

is

?h^complete

and allows the tragic
and the rational

indication can

of Jena: “What

in short, so that

it

moral dignity of

is

be found

in Schiller’s

1789

Universal Histoiy and to
what End

can be converted into a
certain

structure that then serves
as a beautiful pendant to
the sublime object
of ’Vorld
history.”

The ongoing

failure to historicize the

law

is

sublime insofar as

it

represents a

capacity for freedom striving
for realization. But such
a “failure” can also appear
beantiftil if it is elevated to
the status

moment of a
spirit”

“universal” history. For

of a purpose
it is

that survives the act as
a particular

the collision

and the appropriately described
“matter” of world history

Schiller’s universal historian
to reshape the products
into an artwork:

f]

between the “philosophical

“one phenomenon

that

provokes

of chance and amoral necessity

after another is [thereby]

removed from

[the

realm

lawless freedom and joined together
[again] as links in a harmonious
totality that to

be sure

This

is at

hand only in his representation

[.

.

.nur in seiner Vorstellung vorhanden

totality is patently a created totality
that arises as a

demand of reason which

then “transplanted into the order of
things” otherwise recognizable only as an

aggregate of ffagments.”^^^

And

as to the question of whether this “harmonious
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is

....n

,„.i« -„ ,,., . ,,.

many

events the universal
historian declares this
question

open.-“

™„i» .nh.
..d .bo..

.11

,h.

„„

,h.i

^

a„™,„„
._

b...™ do.M o, -o„. - *.
. „.„
Signify something other
than an insuperable barrier
to the moral
that

can only be “preserved” by
being diverted, as

theology or semblanee regulated
by reason?
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it

^^

autonomy of the

were, into an experience
of

will

CHAPTER

IV

reshaping history into
an artwork

‘•By extending the aesthetic
principle far
offers the tradition

beyond the confines of
aesthetics”

Schiller

of Western metaphysics
the possibility of
either aestheticizing
the

world and thus making the
subject '.purely
contemplative” or mythologizing
reality into
something that can be created
through the aesthetic
process.- Lukacs' identification
of
such a

is

critical h.storica, juncture
effectively illuminates
the

explicitly refused

scope of the either/or which

by what have become the two
most conspicuous attempts

appropriate the Sch.llerian
hentage: the

to

Marxism of History and Class

and the so-called cultural
politics put forward in
Nietzsche’s works dating from
the
early to

history

mid
is

1

870

s.

What

is

common

to

such seemingly

of

a certain understanding of
the relationship between
metaphysics and tragedy

and a valonzation of an autonomous,
self-positing,

backdrop

antithetical philosophies

to the Schillerian stage is

other stage properties are

removed

left in place,

“artistic” subject.

And

in Nietzsche’s early works,

if the

many of the

including the representation of the

choms

as a

“living wall that tragedy
constructs around itself’ as a defense
against the contagious

poverty of empirical nature."” The
concept of “nature”

is not,

however, thereby

extinguished, and what emerges within
this particular and encompassing
time and space
IS

something other than the supersensible
substrate posited by Kantian reason.

Nevertheless, what Nietzsche introduces under
the sign of an “other” nature evinces an

—

indebtedness to both Kant and Schiller

to the former’s allusive reference to that
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strange, indeterminate
origin
rule

to the spirit

of genius and

existing “beneath the
veil

What Nietzsche
aesthetic

of the artwork

that furnishes an
amoral, non-empirical

to the latter’ s
evocation

of an “idea of the

of phenomena”.^29

derives from these
sources

is

a -hasis- for a
particular form of

judgment directed toward
something Kant deemed
unfathomable but which

received a preliminao.
typological determination
in Schiller's
the specifically historical
(neither natural
possibility for the production

of the artwork

neither mechanistic nor
"infinite” thus

process

spirit”

whose sphere of operation had

Schiller’s aesthetic state.

On Naive and

n"|;^^naitions of

The absence of an expenence
of time

becomes the construction
initially

site for a

production

been confined within the
borders of

The proper vocation of the being

that w.lls,

whose actions no

longer appear to be determined
or arrested by the logic of
histoty, must accordingly
be

renamed.

“The realm of metaphysics,”
Nietzsche declares
Deussen, “and with
the ranks

the realm

it

1

868

to Paul

the province of ‘absolute’
truth has been unquestionably
shifted to

of poetry and

religion. .Metaphysics
henceforth belongs to
.

of spiritual need [and amounts]

IS [thus] art,

in a letter written in

essentially to edification;

namely poetic concept-production

metaphysics as neither religion nor

art is to

human beings

in

on the other hand

it

[Begriffsdichtung]; but to cling to

have something

to

do with so-called

‘truth

in itself or being’”.'^^’

Considered as a historical object, metaphysics
has become

at best

an edifying

artwork that can in turn inspire a work of
“poetic concept production” that augments

and supplements (but does not serve as a
substitute
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for) the

work of art. The

latter

thus

becomes the focal point for
an understanding of
history as something

that is

fundamentally interrelated
context, “not under
circumstances they themselves
have
chosen but under the given
and inherited circumstances
with which they are

directly

confronted.

For both Nietzsche and
Marx the ‘•historicar appears
as an object

that

can be

constmcted, although the
conditions of possibility for
produet.on and reception can
best
be represented as the same
but otherwise. For the
“given and inherited circumstances”

which confront the Nietzschean

will as

an empirco-historical reality
and

positmg subjectivity poised

to

still

an enabling limit are not
furiher determinable as

less as the alienated,
objectified

overcome

its

form of a

self-

Schillerian fragmentation
through an

appropnation of its proper, unified
identity."’

And

yet

what

is to

be “made”

is

not

thereby relegated to what Schiller
presented as the “insubstantial realm
of the
imagination.”^^'*

Do

Lukacs’ prescnptions and proscriptions
vis-a-vis a post-Schillerian ethic
of

history here encounter an unassimilable
distinction

between history represented

called into question

state

still

moment

in that tradition?

For the very

alternatively as science and mythic
fiction

by a “production process”

while simultaneously re-establishing

it

that

on

expands the

territory

different “grounds.”

is

of the aesthetic

While

it

may thus

be considered in terms of what Schiller described
as a “middle sphere”, the

Nietzschean aesthetic

is

no longer

situated

between the endpoints delimited by the

moral and the natural. The after-images of both

still

appear, however, insofar as the

causality specific to the production of the artwork
functions for Nietzsche in a
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manner

.ha. is a, ,he leas,

its

analogous

.o

wha. Kan. posi.ed as
.he ac.ion of a wHl
cle.ennined by

conscousness of .he n.oral law.
For

lihe .he la..er .he
ar.is.io will

is suhjcc. hu.
no.
au.hor of a non-enrpirical
ye. affec.ive law ,ha.
seenrs .o solid, responsive
projecions.

And (un)hke

.he moral law, ,his aes.he.ic
law

is

some.hing

.ha., since

i,

can affec. ,he

subjec, mas. be capable of
producing effec.s in .he
world. Bu. ,ha. which
his.orici.ed in .his ins.ance

is

is

,o

be

no. .he voca.ion of reason
(,he subjec. des.,ned .o
a f.nal

purpose). Moreover, .he .ask
of his.oriciza.ion

is

no. primanly preemp.ed
by wha.

appears to confront the will as
an inexorable natural law
of inscrutable origin.

The production of the

aesthetic

phenomenon by a

instrumental nor subservient to
rational concepts
external to the ethico-historical
determination

^

Adomo-s
fact that

it

thetic

Theory as

is

rsxvt, neither arbitrary,

isolated

of the autonomous

“art’s paradoxical sleigh,

has not been “copied or repeated;

it

by Kant

is

as an aporia

will.

I.

reappears in

of hand”, which consists

free yet at the

same time bears

in .he

the

»435
feeling of necessity.”

If history is represented as
if it

were an artwork, or

creating subject” then such ambiguity

is

in fact as the

“product of a

resolvable for Lukacs by the recognition
of a

teleological process that furnishes the
ever-renewed “circumstances” under
qualitatively

new event may be produced.

If such a version

which the

of dialectical materialism

marks the apex of aestheticization under the guise
of science, then what Nietzsche
offers as a reflexive “aesthetic science”
[asthetische WissenschaD]
to address

from Plato

what has been considered a “paradox” by a Western
to

Adomo.'*^^
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may be

better suited

tradition that extends

The has.
.he Play

for

dHve

doing so had

as a

in fac. already

been

fo™ of essen.ially anonymous

and .ntentionahty cohere

in a

way

by

laid

agency

Schiller's represen.a.ion

wb.ch

.n

stales

of

of recep.ivi.y

Iha, dissolves
.he distinction

between eduction and
production. If this distinction
nevertheless re-asserts
itself in the
“Aesthetic Education-

due

to the constricted

manner

in

which the matter of
nature and .be heedom
of the

could possibly be construed
to be in a “reciprocal"
relation with one another,
provides a clear indication
of how an element of
“recep.ivi.y"

it

will

also

cm,«be further

determined.-” For the seeming
lawfulness associated
with the artwork stems
from
relation to a tradition that
is kept in motion
as
in

It

were by

who

heirs

its

define their present

terms of an ongoing relation
with a past; such an experience
of history offers

indications but no.
that appears to take

examples of how the qualitatively
new can be produced

on a form of retroactive necessity.

traditions

of modem music, painting and

to the rank

though

It

of a regulative principle orienting a
form of practice

of whether history should be thought
of as an
terms of life and death: “only

pure aesthetic structure, can

it

if history bears

to

art

be yes

if with

or a science

is

a

can

it

also

be elevated

that treats history as

Nietzsche the question
thought of essentially in

being reshaped into an artwork, into
a

perhaps sustain or even awaken
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may serve as

and reception of art within the

literature in particular,

were an artwork? The answer seems

manner

If such a necessarily

indeterminate conception of
subjectivity, history and
lawfulness
heuristic device for the
inteniretation of the production

in a

instincts.”^^®

A. “Teleology since Knnt”

I. is

with Nietzsche’s conception
of tnonuntentai history
that the situated freedon.

associated with the creation
of the artwork emerges as
a paradigmatic form
of human
practice. Perhaps then the
’’apex”

unlike

and

of aesthetieization was

Marx and Lukacs, Nietzsche
dissoca.es

historical representation

identified prematurely,
for

the relationship between
historical even,

from the realm of epistemological
knowledge.

Furthermore, by preserving a
version of the Kantian thing
in
“receptive” to tradition in a

genius

in

way

itself

Nietzsche becon.es

that allows the rule
nature prescribes to the spirit

of

the third Critique to be
redefined as an indeterminate
and unrepresentable

“ground” of action which provides
an enabling

limit for the transformation

of history

into an artwork (if not for the
construction of history as such).

For both Lukacs and Nietzsche the
form-giving capacity of the Schillerian
subject
identified as the

in the world.

To

aesthetic cnteria

between

idol

means of expressing

the proper identity

of the human subject as a being

evaluate these two appropriations
on the basis of something other than

renews a Kantian question: what

and ideal? Expressed

in

still

is

the basis for

more “transcendental”

making a distinction
terms: what are the

conditions of possibility for the determination
that the need for such a distinction
constitutes the founding

praxis

become

is

moment of a

historical ethic?

Does an

aestheticized fomt

“ethical” in terms of its production and
reception if it

constituted character that

is

is

of

aware of its

otherwise indistinguishable in form from an unreflexive

mythology?
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“Wha. son of treasure

e^M-ofP.^

is this,”

.,, 3 .

Kan. asks

we „ean to bequeath to

metaphysics that has been
purihed by

What

is

inherited is a

measure

in the preface to
the

critique,

second edition of the

posterity, i„ ,eav.ng

them a

though thereby also
made durable^-’

that restricts the use

of specu.ative reason
within

the

boundaries of experience and
expands the use of practical
reason beyond those
boundaries; and

if

the latter conela.es-as

it

must for Kan.-wi.h the
former, then the

will is directed to regulative
ideals that, while
impossible to attain,
nevertheless serve

the negative function

been or ought
Receiving

to

of exposing the speciousness
of the claim

be based upon a positive

this treasure

primarily by

that a

theoretical determination.

way of the neo-Kantian

Schopenhauer and Friedrich Albert
Lange. Nretxsche converted

doctrines of

it

into the precursor

the art of Begnffsdichiung
introduced in the letter to Deussen
cited

such a distorting or

form of action has

at least transfrguring light,
the

the following three theses
presented in Lange’s

of

above." Viewed

Copemican Revolution devolves

in

into

The History of Materialism which

Nietzsche cites approvingly as early
as 1866:
I.

A

The world of the senses is the product
of our organization
Our visrble (physical) organs are, like all

other parts of the

phenomenal world, only images of an
unknown
3.

Our

real organization is therefore
as

exte^mal things are

product of both.

object.

much unknown

A metaphysics purified by critique is thus represented to the
nothing more than

may

its

to us as real

We continually have before us nothing but the

subject “certain” of

defining capacity for production as an aesthetic
object that

may or

not serve as a source of edification. Such a
revaluation of tradition appears to

require the type of judgment that will be
deployed in the practice of monumental and
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cnuca, h.s.ory presented
.

868 prospectus

for a

in the -Utility

never contpleted

and Liability of Histo^
for Life.

And

it

is in

an

dissertation appropriately
entitled -Teleology

Since Kant- that the
foundation for these
representations of histortcal
expeHence
not established, recognized

is,

if

as a certain need.

The

-since” in Nietzsche’s

title

seems

to take its

cue from the division
of Lange’s

work. Which takes the
Kantian system as a
world-h.storical turning
point

development of modem
-materialism.”
Begriffsd,ch,ung, the a/s

oh

by Lange

as the origin of

structure of the Kantian
regulative ideal serves as
the basis,’

or rather as the instrument
of a tradition
the third Critique. That

Identified

in the

is, it

in the

same way

allows the subject

that Christian doctrine
did in

to represent the

experience of being in

the world in transcendental-practical
rather than merely
empirical tenns.

The Kantian

philosophy therefore becomes
for Nietzsche an edifying
doctrine that discloses a certain

human

capacity that

is

fully realized

when “reason”

is

no longer represented

as the

unitary source of the subject’s
identity and destiny but
rather as “merely” another
aesthetic constmction.

The

constitution of transcendental
subjectivity thereby endures

as If upholding a state without
a sovereign

whose regulation then becomes

histoncal ethic based upon the
supposition that “there

can be solved only through the
acceptance of an

is

the task

of a

no question which necessarily

intelligible world. .[for] the
necessity
.

of which Kant speaks no longer

What has been superceded
Begriffsdichtung

ethical

is

exists in our time.”^"*^

in the narrative that culminates
with the art

of

the necessity of thinking that the
conditions for the possibility of an

expenence of history are determinable only by
the

rational concept

of a creative

understanding underlying phenomenal nature which
thereby confers practical-logical
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vahduy

,o ,he

demands of .he .ora,

,aw.

The concep. of freedom
which

.he ,a..er

presupposes emerges indirec.ly
in “Teleology
since Kan.” as .he
fonn of non-na.nra,
cansali.y capable of
producing .he .radi.ion of
Wes.em me.aphysics as an

amalgamation of errors which
nevertheless continue
product[s]:... [T]eleology
is [thus] assessed

to

be valued as “aesthetic

m terms of its value for the world

of human

>?444

ideas.

And of wha. value is such

a world for .he
producing subjec.

who

can comprehend only .he
maihemaiicalcompleielyl?] In
all else fill
a
before the unknown. In order
stands
to ovprrr.rv.« X.galher logelher a sum of
appearing charac.eifsti^
Zid!"h““^‘'a"‘''‘''’
'^hich however, do not
hold of the thine Therein helnn„ r
get a
‘"^‘"dual,
law,
organism,
final cause."’
a.om.
.

.

,

The sense of declaring here
life is

fomi;

Excep,

how we

I

s.and and cannol do o.herwise
becomes; “wha,

see .hem, as individuals,
wha,

.ha, .he “I” in ques.ion

“noumenal”

origin

no longer

a.lesls lo a

is

in

moral des.ina.ion. Nor

man no

oiher

is

is i,

power ,han

see of

unknowable.”"’
inscmlable

displaced by

[.he

human]

being .he ground of all realily).”"’
If ftis nvo-fold depriva.ion
does no,

immedia,ely .ransla.e in.o a new “ideal”
or measure
direc. .he “subjec.” .0 .he

immense chasm

NiCzsche can be designa.ed only by a

_

behind lha,

now signifies a phenomenal form
whose

Schiller's delerminalion lha,
“.here
will... (power

lies

we

for aeslhe.ic edifica.ion

i,

does

separa.ing i.self as form from wha,
for

ffaclured equa.ion: “Life-force
[Lebenskraft]

7»448

In an unpublished

indicates that the

work contemporaneous with “Teleology Since
Kant” Nietzsche

unknowable

subject as something

it

X is not simply to be appropriated by the producing

cannot help but

posit, as its “purest”
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form of self-positing;

it

rather stands in for the
abyssal foundation
upon which an art of
Begriffsdichtmg

is to

anse.

Schopenhauer’s system accordingly
becomes edifying
demonstrates

how

this

X is not to be represented: i.e. as

knowledgeless wiir, the very
idea of which
representation

it

how

i,

a “foundation, ess.

derived parasitically
from Ihe world of

otherwise illuminates as
the constricting t.me
and space endemic

“principle of individuation”.”’

perceive

is

to the degree that

Nietzsche attnbutes
Schopenhauer’s “failure”

to the

to

such flagrant anthropomoiphism
controverts and thereby
undennines his

entire system to the fact that
“he did not

want

to feel

what was obscure and

contradictory in the region where
individuality gives out.”^^®

The Kantian

heritage

thus properly upheld so
long as the formula “life
force= ”

is

not converted into a “calculation
yielding the result that

sought above
“it” is

all

something

discovered.

And

it

= X, which means that

by Schopenhauer] has not been
found.”«> Such
that

could

there are

still

representation of a finite subject

is

[the

is

one precedent— for the

somehow becoming exposed

to

something

that affects

Ihe will as a certain modulation of
feeling like no other “pathological”
feeling and that

corresponds with no given intuition of the
imagination or law of the understanding.

But since there

is

no question which necessarily can be solved
only through

the

acceptance of an intelligible world”, only the
“form” of being affected by the
consciousness of the moral law through a feeling
of respect or sublimity provides a
source of edification for the producing subject.
That

system

is

is,

what remains of the Kantian

an aestheticized existential experience whose radicalism
vis-a-vis the
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X

a critique implies that

be found once a suitable mode of
discovery

precedents—or there

is

skeptical claims of
empiricism is

no longer camounaged
by an elaborate

assembled out of the vestiges
of Chnstian
“Teleology smce

doctrine. Charting
the

Kanf therefore seems to give

structure

development of

nse to a corresponding
need

for a nonpathologtca, fom, of self-affection
that can be comelated
with something other
than

moral

feeling.

And

precisely

existential experience

why did

the dtsclosure of the
fact of reason through
the

of being toward death
present an aporia for
Kant

that could

be
resolved only by an “acceptance
of an intelligible world?”
Because only by having
recourse to a theological
supplement could the spatio-temporal
distance separating the
possibility of historicizing
the moral law from

its

actualization appear as
anything other

than an “immense chasm.”

How ts such a distance to be measured

after the bridge constructed
out

of the

concepts of natural beauty, the
natural purpose, the puproses
of nature and the human
subject as final purpose collapses
in “Teleology Since Kant”?
For “in truth only one
thing

ts certain, that

we only know

the mechanical.”^“ But in
fact such a limitation no

longer has debilitating consequences
for the producing subject
since what
the hither side of the
chasm-intelligible

product. There

is,

freedom-now appears

lies

opposite

as but an aesthetic

accordingly, no longer either a chasm
or a realm of freedom

confronting the subject as insuperable
barrier and unconditional duty
respectively.'’"

The concept of the

natural purpose, along with the idea
of moral duty are

diagnosed as but the symptoms of a

freedom of the human

will [lay] in

intelligible because the [realm]

mechanism and chance] was

common “subreption”:

how

now

“the [problem] of the

a solution was searched for in the realm of
the

of coordinated

overlooked.”'’^'’
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possibility

[i.e.,

the interaction between

T^e i.pHcaUo„.

fo. .He

p.oaucing Hein,

concep. Of .eedon,
Has -evoiveaterms as a “world of
poiesis
-,s.

moral

in .He “Aes.He.ic

Nie.zsche

is

.e .Hen Ce.:

.o .He poin.
.Ha.

THe n,oven.en.

Eauca.ion” .o

i.s

i.

.He so-ca„ea
na.iona,

can He nnae.s.ooa
in Lan,e.

leaa.ng f.„„,
.^e a.spiacen,en.
of .He

seemino
*

rr

facemen. in .he
works of Lange ana

.herefore no. aifficul.
.0 ..averse,

...»

^

^

s„. K„-.
»l.».

» d ™.„ X- -,h.

intellect is too insensible
to
is

become
ecome awar,:.
aware of persis.ing change:
wha.

is

aiscemible .0

i.

called form.”'*^^

The Chasm

.Ha.

opens HeHveen fonn ana
inae.emiina.e snhs.ra.nn.
aeprives

of any epis.emological
significance apar. from
wha.
.ha. is for

Lange ‘..hicar

.0 .he fiegree .ha.

i.s

.he subjec. impar.s
.0

i.

in

.He ,a..er

an ac.

ma.eriahs. ye. nonobjec.ive
charac.er

is

recognizea as such. As a resnl.
.he .ranscenaen.ai ac.
of syn.hesis which Kan.
a..nbu.es
.0 .he .n,agi„a.ion>s

power of apprehenaing.

sense in.o objec.s of knowleage
certain types

is

isola.ea

moaifying ana reproaucing
.He manifoM of

by Lange

as .he basis for .he
proauc.ion of

of fonn aisfinguishable from
one ano.her only by .he aegree
of “freeaom”

they afford to the self-positing
subject:

from the lowest stages of syn.hesis.
in which .he inaiviaual
still appears
completely bonna by the characteristics
of the species, up to its creLve
ommmce in poetry, the essence of this act is always
airectea to the
proauction of unity, of harmony, of
perfect form. The same principle
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which

rules absolutely in the
sphere

of the beautiful

in

^

^

shap,ns,ron::,i.tf«^^^^

The

subject of such an aesthetic
law of form-giving
augurs

describes as the fate of a

human being imprisoned

contours are no longer visible:
“the
led to a situation

modem

in

what Hannah Arendt

a form of its

age. with

its

own making whose

growing world-alienation, has

where man. wherever he
goes, encounters only
himself All the

processes of the earth and the
universe have revealed
themselves either as man-made
or
as potentially man-made.”'*^^

And

yet the experience of being
in the world also confronts
the will with “evidences

of something

else,

of a power that

now compels

now

us and

is

That which remains apart from the
subject, however, amounts
formal or logical limit that does
nothing to

which

“leads. .to the
.

knowledge and

to the

alter the

dominated by us.”-®
to nothing

more

than a

underlying method of synthesis

mastery of nature” as well as to the

production ofbeauty: “even in the notion
of [something].. .that standjs] out as
a unity

from the

infinite

coherence of existence, there

lies that

subjective factor which. .only
.

helps to nil up, on the analogy of our
reality, the gap for that which

inconceivable but which must

at the

is

absolutely

same time be assumed.’”"" As long

as such a place-holder, the historical
significance of the

“X”

is

as

it

functions

reduced to a vanishing

point that has no bearing on the constmction
of an “ideal world” seemingly in need of

nothing further

in the

way of a

appears to have been closed.

transcendental refrection.''®

And

The “immense chasm”

yet the realms of mechanical nature and aesthetic
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distinguished from one
another as if by degree
and not by kind.

How then is the subject represented
phenomenal forms “created” by
a

bound

in

“Teleology since Kant”
as but one of the

life-force able to recast
such

to a rational vocation
that destines

It

to be both a part

forms

if

it

is

no longer

and

independent of nature?
.n other words, what are
the conditions of
possibility for the
appropriation of the means

and

relations

of “production” by a subject
described

“completely wrapped up

becoming

in time, space,

in... and

individuality gives ou,” and
in itself and

The Birih of Tranefo,

.llusion...[of]

as

apenretual

and causality-in other
words... empirical reality.-^
These

are the questions that
appear to

Ihmg

composed of ..the

in the

draw Nietzsche toward

that “obscure... region

away from both Schopenhauer’s

where

doctrine of the Will as the

Lange’s determination that the
“standpoint of the ideal”

is

based upon

the synthesizing capacities
of a self-positing subject that
ultimately displaces the
the limiting principle for the
experience

of being

X

as

in the world:

If the principle IS

once conceded that we should
create for ourselves in
“agination a fairer and more perfect
world than the world of reality
hen we shall be compelled to allow
validity to myth as myth. But
it is

more important that we shall rise to
same necessity, the same transcendental
still

the recognition that

root of our

human

it

is

the

nature which

supplies us through the senses with
the idea of the world of reality
and
leads us
the highest function of nature
and creative synthrais to
fashion a world of the ideal in which
to take refuge from the limitation
of
the senses.

whmh

m

Such a transcendental
reflection.

principle

is

for Nietzsche in need of another
transcendental

For how can the perception of “myth as myth”
be distinguished from a

mythic experience not identified as such unless
the

somehow

conditioned by

—or

at least situated in
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acts

of the producing being are

a relation toward-what Lange’s

“materialism” only allows him
to refer to as the
“something else?-« The
origins of an
aporia toward which much
twentieth cenmry
structuralist and
post-structuralist

thecy

converges emerge

at this critical

juncture in the history of
neo-Kantianism. That

Lange's work appears retroactively
to have

set a precedent for
the

,s,

development of

value-philosophy, which in turn
influenced a form of
stmcturalism that was

systematized in Foucault’s

something

like

IheAml^eol^^

THese works constitute

a particular philosophical
tradition insofar as they

all

attempt to

transform the “static” categones
of Kant’s transcendental
aesthetic into the a priori
conditions of possibility for the
production of cultural forms.
However, by delimiting

an organized system of signification
(what Foucault

calls

an “episteme”) for a self-

positing subjectivity that claims
to be neither arbitrary nor
attributable to the

development of an objective teleological
process, these
intensify the insolubility of their
founding question:

represented?

projects ultimately restate and

how

is

How is the movement from one “episteme” to

historical experience to

be

another to be understood

if

each establishes as the “social a priori”
for a particular epoch a threshold
beyond which
all

other forms of “historicized” perception,
knowledge and bases for action remain

unfathomable?'*^^

In a turn that

becomes evident

in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”,
Foucault

ultimately valorizes a form of “practice”
(the self-fashioning of identity) based
upon a

model of aesthetic form-giving deemed capable of
reconstructing
tradition is thereby established

which can be named “from Lange

the social a priori.

A

to Foucault” insofar

as the conditions of possibility for this
aestheticized form of practice that

is

able to

convert the subject produced by culture into a producer
of culture are not identifiable.
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Furthe^ore. .here
social forms

back

is

no cn.erion

would be evaluated

,ha,

would de.ennine how

the

apart from the fact
that they

newly established

would presumably

reflect

their constituted character.

Nietzsche’s relation to

this tradition

would
a appear
annear to
,
kto ho
be ambiguous,
notwithstanding

Foucault’s appropriation of
his work in the essay
cited above. For
although the
transformation of the subject
as product into subject
as producer is a task
prepared for

by “Teleology since
Foucault’s work

is

Kant’’,

an attempt to find the
type of measure that

signaled both in the
dissertation prospectus and
in

is

absent in

“On

Schopenhauer.”

“The obscure.

.

.region

where individuality gives

out.’’

“Life-force=.

...”

On the basis

of these two seemingly meager
fragments, Nietzsche’s works
of the 1870 ’s introduce
the “Dionysian

that wills

Worldview”

may have been,

that

and

emerges as a

may still

historical sign,

which indicates the being

be, destined to something
other than a condition

of “radical world alienation.”

B. Openin g the Borders of
the Aesthetic State

The puppet
dramatize

how

theater appeared at the conclusion
of the second Critique in order to

the subject can

unrepresentable moral law.

between upholding the

spirit

unanswerable so long as

it

assume

What was

qualitatively different relationships to
the
at stake

was

the viability

of the distinction

or the letter of the law. While this question
remained

was addressed by judging

nevertheless served as a regulative ideal

different historical events,

whose lawfulness was “established” by
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it

the

pracca, deduction of the
concept of freedont
through
subject

w.th

was confronted with sontething

.ts

spatio-tenrporai categories.

the fact

of reason. For here
the

that the understand.ng
co.dd not appropriate

And because this

instance of aiterity

was then given
a ••pos.t.vedetemtination^aibeit as a strictly
syntbolic representation
conceived on
analogy with, but not
,Ue„Ucal

,o.

the schenta.ic
representations of entpirical

Phenontena-it provoked a secular

crithjue

of Kantian ^orahty

that

deprived the

rational-“theologicar concepts
of their necessary and
“intelligible” character.
Wh.le
.he autonomy and
spontaneity of pure reason
appear as the linguistic and
conceptual
signs that indicate the
ordering of the hierarchical
relationship

the theological

is

m

fact not

between the

an operation fully under
Kanfs control,

n.oral

and

this historical limit

does not obviate the a-cmpirical
significance of the experience
of being toward death

which

The

for

Lange gives

the doctrine

of freedom an unavoidably
“mystical character.-’

of reason does not establish
the freedom of the

fact

singular character emerges in
a

will as a substance

whose

moment of externalizing immediacy.
There

of an objectification of human
freedom here

that

wo.dd then provide the

is

no sense

Schillerian or

Arcndlian poet-historian with the
material for an act of remembrance
and
representation.

the kind

of pure

And

that

which

becoming and

who creates

possibilities that are

concrete reality.. .In the
precluded.

not brought to presence

is

also not hypostalized as

possibility that Carl Schmitt tellingly
ascribes to the “romantics

could not play the role of the ego
eternal

is

the world.

for a

the stale

of

never consummated to the confines
of

moment of realization,

A world is destroyed

They preferred

who

all

of the other

narrow-minded
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reality.

infinite possibilities are

The

‘fullness

of the

idea’

is

sacrificed ,o a wretched
specificity. In
consequence...[e]vety foundation

with the foundation, a limit
If it

were an occasion

is

always given as

is false; for

well.”'’*^^

for either idolatry
(Arendt describes the act

of freedom as the

advent of a “miracle”) or resignation
(for Lange Kant transfers
morality “entirely into
the intellectual world in

which alone freedom

is

conceivable”), the experience
of

freedom would no longer be associated
with a singular force capable
of suspending the
laws of natural causality. The
particularity of the Kantian
regulative ideal, however,

does not allow for such an exposure
terms other than those of an

infinite

to

non-mechanical time to be conceptualized

in

progress to a theologically derived
“secular” telos

(the highest good). Nevertheless,
there

would appear

to

be more of a possibility for

representing an open future within the
terms of such a historical ethic than
in what

is

afforded by Lange s presentation of
a subject recognizing and producing
empirical and
beautiful forms against the backdrop

vaponzed form of fate.™ Since

of “something else” that appears

the idea

of freedom has been reduced

aesthetic ideas that inexplicably arises
from

at

most

to but

what can only be represented

to be a

one of the

as a

mechanical-natural origin the only remaining measure
for an evaluation of action
the perception of myth as myth.
the

problem of judgment

to

And

yet this very distinction succeeds only in
allowing

be restated in a

way

that accentuates the limits

transcendental reflection whose point of terminus

is

of a

the producing subject:

The whole
is

difference between an automaton and a morally acting being
undoubtedly a difference between two phenomena. In the phenomenal

world those notions of value have their root, by which we find here
mere
mechanicalness and there exalted earnestness. We conceive the one and
the other with our senses and ideas, and establish a distinction which
not in the least impaired by the circumstance that we find in both the

common

lies in

feature of necessity."*^*
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is

Kan. would acknowledge

.ha. .here is a
rela.ion here

behveen

for

“even .he causalLy of freedom...
is .he causah.y
„f..,he suh.ee., regarded
as a hun,an
be,ng and hence as an
appearance.-- Bn. .his
does no. mean .ha. .he

‘Vhole

difference” hehveen .hese hvo
fonns of experience has
been es.ablished since
.ha.

Which canno. be concepmalized
which acions

arise on.

is

no.

dissolved in.o d,e emply

medium

wilhin

of an undifferen.ia.ed
subshamrn of ‘necesshy”.
Ra.her,

be

,o

pu. in a s.a.e of exiremily
inducing a sense of ehher
exal.a.ion or humilia.ion
indica.es
the subject has

become exposed

to

something

that

cannot simply be judged
or

reproduced as an empirical or
beautiful form. Both of
these moods receive
degree of intensity

when

respect brought about
the

their highest

they merge without negating
one another in the feeling of

when

the principle

of individuation (of the
self-representation of

phenomenal, pathological being)
collapses as an abiding inmition
of the imagination

and axiomatic concept of the
understanding. What prevents the
suspension of the laws

of natural causality from then
devolving

into

an experience of sheer indeterminacy

the recognition of the “intelligible”
moral vocation

whose “necessity” and

is

therefore

very existence was received by
Nietzsche as a contingent and outmoded
cultural
valuation.

art,

But

in the spirit

of Schiller’s dictum

that “truth lives

on

in the illusion

of

the conditions of possibility for the
subject’s experience of itself as another
(of

alterity) outlive their

Kantian specification. The aestheticization
of the “intelligible”

consequently leaves as an indivisible remainder
the remnants of an unnamable
experience perhaps incapable of servicing an instrumental
reason.
In the place of the

X upon which Lange conferred a significance essentially

interchangeable with what Schiller allotted to the matter
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at the disposal

of the being

that

W.l,s .here

indication

emerges

of how

i.

in the -pre-thetic"

is

language of dream,
gesture and .one an

poss.bie for .he subject
.0 recognize itself
both as a

as something other than
a prodnet. Although
the endpo.nts of the
lacerates the experience of
being in the world are

rather than

ifeedom and

That

is,

immense chasm

ident.fied as life force

that

and form

nature, a non-mechanical
quality bearing a certain
mediating

value continues .0 be imputed
.0 the

Worldview.

now

-producr and

latter in

Nietzsche’s sketch of “The
Dionysian

“nature” here appears as a
sign whose legibility
(if not

its

significance) stems from
Schiller’s supposition that
the advent of aesthetic
freedom

emerges as a

gift

of nature which the being

that wills

cannot help but aceept with
a

peculiar sense of indebtedness:

it

is

nature herself that raises

fumishmg him with two

man from

reality to

senses that lead

him

to

semblance by
knowledge of

s^^blance alone. In the case of the
eye and

L

real

she
herLlf
h
herself has
turned away pressing matter
[andringende Materie] from the
senses and moved that object away
from us which has direct contact
with
our ammal-hke sensibility [tienschen
Sinnen], What we see with the
eye
IS something differe^^
what we feel [empfmden]...The object
of
touch [Takts] IS a force to which we
are subjected [erleiden]; the
object
of eye and ear a form that we produce
[Schiller’s emphasis].''^

Perhaps

it

is

ear,

the representation of such a
simultaneous devaluation and elevation
of

“reality” to the level

of semblance

that

allowed Lange to presuppose the laws
of

mechanical nature and the unrepresentable law
of aesthetic freedom can not only coexist but

mutually reinforce one another. The component
parts of the receptivity-

mtentionality synthesis conditioning the operation
of the play drive here appear to be
isolated

is

from one another

in order to accentuate the dualism

of form and matter which

further determined as the opposition between
vision and sensible perception integral

to Schiller’s ideal

of beauty. As a genealogy of the producing being
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(that displaces the

on of the emergence of
the

q
nature),

l.ght

to

however,

this narrative renrains

of the “Dionysian Worldview,-

be two-fold: the

ongm of the

form

free will out of
the realm

of phenomenal

fundamentally ineomplete
when read

Its

historico-philosophica,

that the

in the

insuir.cieney appears

eye produces does not
account

for the

producing being’s recognition
of itself as just such
a form; what Sch.ller
emphasizes as
.he ontological-aesthetic
difference between
visual perception and
sensible feeling

presented as a reconcilable
or functional opposition
in which neither term
into

any

sort

of determinate

in

terms

that indicate

how

something other than form or
as something
sensibility

brought

relation with the other.

f such a relation can be established, then
be reconstructed

is

is

it

the genesis of the
production process could
is that

that

the subject could be
considered as

“becomes” fonn. The significance
of

and vision would also undergo
a change

that

was prefigured

in the

Kantian

presentation of how the feelings
of respect and sublimity affect
the phenomenal subject
as though

which

On

it

it

had come

into contact with

an indelible yet invisible force

in relation to

appears as neither author nor
“animal-like” object.

the basis of a “substratum”
of nature neither empirical nor
“supersensible”.

Nietzsche suggests there

is

a connection to

emanating from the “region” impenetrable
“wholly wrapped up
serves for

be established between the “life-force”
to self-positing subjectivity

and a

in illusion.”^” Just as the
“pathological” character

Kant as the condition of possibility

point of access for the crossing of the

for

moral experience,

chasm between

something other than form.
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it

will

of the subject

serves as the

subject as form and “subject” as

The matenahst”

basis for such a

liric

emerges though

the experiences

and “intoxication” which
Nietzsche sing.es out
as privdeged

of “dream”

sites indicative

of how the
subject can appear to itself
as both enfolded in
and released from the
phenomena,
world. ,n both cases the
subject's sovereignty
appears to he displaced
onto a “med.um”
through which

its

own

font, is both

produced and taken apart
“as a continuously

manifested representation
of the primal unity.”^"^

What

Schiller took to be the
powers of the SpieUrieb here
take on an altered

significance insofar as they
are assigned the duty
of incoTtorating such
experiences into
a reconfigured aesthetic
(and histoncal) process:
“plastic art (in its widest
sense, is play

with the dream. ,.[T]he
creation of the dionysian
.s

artist is

distinguishable as “dionysian”
art to the degree that

it

play with intoxication.’""'’
Art
originates out of a “tragic”

recognition of “nature”, the
“life-force” or the “primal
unity” [Ur-Eine] as the

purposeless “substratum” of
“so-called world-hi story”.

The monstrous image confronting

the

Spinozan subject as a

represented as a source of procreation,
as

it

historical

being

is

here

were, apparently devoid of any
sort of

determinable agency. The Kantian
principle of purposiveness without
a purpose
underlying the reception of natural
beauty

is

thus

now ascribed

to the

process of meta-

sociological acculturation through
which the subject takes on a “form”
independently of

any

particular, self-positing act.

been formed in a manner

For

that, for

all

such acts already presuppose

that the will

has

Nietzsche, in itself bears no intrinsic
historical

significance.

If the

phenomenal subject

is

thereby recognized as the contingent yet seemingly

necessary outcome of such a formative process
then the sense of pre-established identity
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necessary for .he sustenance
of pathological
ins.runren.al or nroral
subjectivity gives

way

to the

relattons

‘

WIedge" of the abyssal

U.-Eir,e.

But only with such
knowledge can the

and nreans of production
be appropriated

subhnuBt

Ires in its

in

an e.hico-hrs.oncal

simultaneous negation and
elevation of the being

our humiliatron and exaltation,..!,

is

act

whose

that wills: “for to

only as an aesthetic
phenomenon

that ex.stence

and the world are eternally
justified.”^^*

The producing being can become
capable of reshaping

itself

and thus of

transforming an anonymous
“aesthetic” process into
an intentional one by
recognizing
the relation

and
to

its

amoral “substratum”, between
the forms

which

new

it

is

subjected.

The

It

beautiful

perceives or creates and the

life

image
force

conditions of possrbility for a
certain his.oncal experience

become synonymous with

thus

that

of necessary rn.erdependence
between the perception of the

those for the production of a
partrcular type of artwork

expands the borders of the aesthetic

state

while simultaneously furnishing

it

with a

abyssal “foundation”:

The

subject, the willing individual

that furthers his own egoistic
ends
can be conceived of only as the
antagonist, not as the origin of art.
nsofar as the subject is the artist,
however, he has already been released
om his individual will, and has become, as it were,
the medium through

which the one truly existent subject celebrates
his release in appearance
for.. .only insofar as the genius in
the act of artistic creation coalesces
Lverschmilzt] with this primordial artist
of the world, does he know
an)(1;hing of the eternal essence of
art."*^^

The rule” nature prescnbed
toward an

.

.

.life

to the

Kantian genius

art that constitutes “the highest
task

since the “province” once governed

to the ranks

of poetry and

some way determinable

religion.”"*^®

But

now directs the being

that wills

and the properly metaphysical

activity

by reason has been “unquestionably

how

character of that which
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to

is

of

shifted

account for the evidently lawful or in

“release[d]” [erldst] into this life?

How could the -life-force” introduced
“rigorously

human

in

‘Teleology since Kant”
on the basis of a

standpoint” assume the
fomt of a “primordial

which bears a strong resemblance

to the

Schopenhauerian Will

identified as but a misplaced
anthropomorphic projection?-

a. long as

it

is

understood as a heuristic or
functional illns.on

artist” [Urkunstler]

that Nietzsche

had

The answer seems
that offers a

to be

“symbolic”

representation of the workings
of the ontological-aesthetic
production process.

Furthermore, such “symbolism”

is

corroborated by a certain
“fact” of nomeason that

i.

encountered in a material yet
non-empirical experience in
which the subject’s Kantianlike recognition

of the

limits to its “egoistic

reserved in the third Critique
for the
takes the place

of the moral law

spirit

as that

ends”

is

coupled with an aesthetic

of genius. As a

which

result, the

affects the subject

moment

human artwork

(who

as spectator

reenacts the experience ascribed
to the “genius”) as
something that seems to bring
out

or educe

As

it

its

form-giving

capacities."*^^

stands Nietzsche’s attempt to
provide a second order refiection
for what Lange

presents as the “transcendental
root” for the production of
illusion would ultimately not

introduce a measure forjudging
such beautiful formations were
significance conferred

upon a

specifically

it

not for the

“symbolic” forni of representation.

Neither a “symbol of morality” nor
an idea prescribed by reason

in order to

unify the

sense and form drives under the aegis
of the self-positing subject, the object of
beauty

is

presented in the “Dionysian Worldview”
as the appearance of something other
than
illusion recognized as illusion

or— in Lange’s

formulation— “myth as myth.” For “the

idea of the tragic” allows the beautiful to
be interpreted as a sign which

an experience of being in a “middle world between
beauty and
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is

truth.”^*^

indicative

of

Such a world

anses ou, of the reception
of a particular type of
artwork which const.tutes
a potentially
foundattonal or ‘ Wunrental”
cultural montent
capable of inaugurating
a collective

expenence of living myth

way analogous
What

is

to

that thereby preserves
a kind

what Kant describes as

the transmissibil.ty
of the

tradit.on in a

“spinf of genius

described in the third
Criti,ue as the -imitation”
[Nachahmung] rather that

the “copying”

[Nachmachung] of artistic
models remerges

of History for Life” as a
paradigmatic

Liability

of subterranean

capacity for form-giving

is

in Nietzsche’s
“Utihty

historical experience
in

derived from a “judgment”
of a cultural

and

which the

artifact that

appears

have been an effect of
freedom-or rather of the subject’s
“shaping power”/*’ “Socalled world history” thereby
takes on a certain value
in spite of itself in the
sense that tt
to

“preserves the

power of the
product

IS

memory of the

real

--

set apart

justify a particular

great fighters against history,
that

The capacity of the

is,

against the blind

subject to refashion itself
as a self-producing

from what Nietzsche characterizes
as the “Hegelian” tendency
form of socio-cultural

to

identity as the “necessary
result of the world

[historical] process.”'*^^

Such a capacity may be inferred from
contingent content but in the

which Nietzsche

way

cultural

they reveal and

forms whose value

awaken a

lies

not in their

certain force or

fetishizes as the highest possible
expression

power

of an amoral, non-

instrumental experience and which
Kant refers to in passing as the inexplicable
“skill”

or “talent” of the

(practiced

artist.'^^^

from the

In a

manner

similar to the “exemplar” theory of
history

fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries
in Europe), events and

works

thus take on value to the degree that they
attest to ahistorical virtues; the time
of history
Itself IS implicitly represented as but

an empty
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medium through which

everything that

appea.

apart

from such examples amounts

to

nothing more than what
Kant descnhes as

yet another “barren
addition to our historical
cognition.”^*’

To
it

the degree that a
historical cognition could
estabhsh determinate

becomes

for

the principle

Nietzsche a “liability-not
because

of morality of course but
because

the producing being.

And because such

a

it

it

is

knowledge

thereby incapable of
servic.ng

fads to arouse the shaping
power of

power or “drive” stands

in for the

idea of freedom as that
which ought and must produce
effects in the world,

means of expression-the

creation of the

at all

work of art-is

Kantian

its

“natural”

identified as a prototypical

form of human experience which
serves as the origin, ideal
and guarantor of an ethic of
history: “the

is.

.

.that

shaping power [plastische
Kraft] of a human being, a
people, or a culture

power

assimilate what

to

is

develop

singular character out of itself,
to shape and

past and alien, to heal wounds,
to replace what has been

recreate broken forms out

[Metaphembildung]

is all

lost, to

of itself alone.”^^*^

The “fundamental human

the

own

its

drive... to ward the formation

that remains

of metaphors”

of the spontaneity and autonomy of
reason once

supersensible substrate of nature” has
been converted into the locus of the Ur-

Eme.^^'

No

longer bound by the rational concepts
or confined within what Schiller

presented as the “incorporeal realm of the
imagination”, the “artistically creating
subject” emerges as the being in the world
capable of fashioning an aesthetic-practical

law for

itself as

knowledge.

compensation for

The “given and

its

constitutive lack

its

historical

inherited” circumstances underlying a particular

historical experience thus furnish the material
out

ought and must accomplish

of determinate

of which the

aesthetic destination.
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self-positing subject

The language of ideal,

necessity

and morality are here
appropriated and condensed
into an imperative
which gives a
renewed significance to the
critique of Kantian
“formalism”:
ask yourself why you, as
an individual

great

A

exist-

and

if

„„

«nmae magnac prodigus

sou^

[prodigal of a

value can be imparted to
the purposeless character
of the “historical process”
only

through the imposition of an
irrational “reason” for
existence upon the otherwise
contingent yet palpable experience
the subject passively
receives as

For only

to the

degree that “what comes

the “reflexive” rc^vn
aesthetic

later” (“a posteriori”)
has

of the producing being

is

its

inherited nature.

been formed through

a historical experience
“justified” as an

phenomenon.

The impetus

for creating a “second nature”
lies in the judgment of
a

monumental

event based upon a certain ntle
Nietzsche’s exemplary historian
prescribes for himself
in the

will

absence of an objective law.«« As
a

have no need

for... absolute veracity:

ultimately identify nonidentical things,

between motive and causes
effectus as

monumental

While such a rule
inflicts

—

is,

is

its

and

will continue to diminish the
difference

as exemplary

of the causae, the

and worthy of emulation.”^^^

is

not constitutively arbitrary.

It is

new

''physis

”

it

not arbitrary if the

rendered by a self-positing subject destined to give

destiny by constructing a

matter that passes for

will continue to approach,
generalize,

of course, sanctioned by reason, the unavoidable
violence

upon the matter of history

judgment of the past

of “monumental histoty

in order to present, to the detriment

that

is not,

it

it

result, the practice

itself a

out of the amalgamation of cultural-historical

pre-formed identity or
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“first nature”: “the

judgment of the past

always an oracular judgment;
only ify„„ are an
architect of the future
and are
familiar with the present will
you
is

understand

Being familiar with the present

VernunMegriffe were

at

first

requires a recognition

bottom harbingers of the

encumbered the former was an
unrequited

a relation with something
other than
affected

by the moral law

“feeling” induced

autonomy of the
history”

is

own

will

and the anonymous

that

attests to a transcendental

the consciousness of

the antinomic relation
between the

“life-force” underlying
“so-called world

[Trosts]."*’^

comes

into being is

knowledge
itself as a

that the

ephemeral and

“newpAysis” or “second

worthy of perishing”— nevertheless

form-giving capacity, the ethico-historical
necessity for

evinced in the experience of being toward
death, of being exposed

For the collapse of signification

positive

Once

resolved through an experience
not of hope (of a “wholly
rational faith”), but

nature”—“everything

Eine.

the self-positing will
into

taken to be but a misdiagnosis
of the peculiar

basis for such consolation lies
in the tragic

is

the Kantian

lawful character of the
“symbolic

particularity.

morally unjustifiable form the subject
fashions for

which

of how

oi BegriffsdiC.ung. What

manner brought

by a judgment of the subhme,

of “metaphysical consolation”

The

is

its

art

faith in the

representations” that in an
incomprehens.ble

bemg

it.”^^^

moment

in an experience

indicative of how the subject’s “shaping

the world iiradiated

by

to the

Ur-

of the sublime brings with

power” can bring

the after-image of its abyssal origin.

Such an

it

a

a form into

act has as its

unmistakably Kantian condition of possibility the
recognition of the unconditional duty
or “Apolloninan imperative” to produce illusion not
merely as illusion but as symbol of
tragic

“knowledge.””” Only

in

such a manner can the subject or for
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that matter a

“people or a culture” be rescued
from a condition of heteronomy
which

is

here

understood as the perpetuation
of a nominally historical
experience “produced” through

an aesthetically disquieting
synthesis of chance and
mute necessity.=»»

“We modems

have nothing

that

we have drawn from

ourselves alone.”“' For this
to

happen, the Nietzsehean subject
would have to be fomted on analogy
with the product

of Kantian genius

that originates as

an affective response to a
similarly fashioned

artwork. Out of such an aesthetic
experience the spirit of genius
emerges as both

nghtful heir and “architect of the
future.”*'

An ethic of history

viewing past events as sublime
artworks which

in turn

is

thereby forged by

were inspired by

the recognition

that the “life-force” underlying
“so-called world history” precludes
the possibility of

establishing a rational and determinate
foundation for

such a lack of knowledge

is

human

action.

Compensation for

then afforded by the aesthetic
experience of form-giving

that preserves historical objects

Fulfilling the task

human

“worthy of emulation.”^*^^

of self-formation therefore requires an
aestheticization of both

practice and historical interpretation
on analogy with

what

Schiller presented as

the law of aesthetic freedom and the
task of the universal historian respectively.

both cases the amorphous matter inhering

in the pre-historical object receives

its

In

value

only from what the Bildungstrieb or the universal
historian’s imagination imposes upon
it.

Except that for Nietzsche the

latter is

and the historicization of the aesthetic law
possibility

whose

actualization

is

no longer under the supervision of reason

is

no longer presented as but a

logical

preempted by the constitutive gap separating physical

and moral necessity. If a concept of justification, the principle of
autonomy, and the

measure of the transcendental continue

to serve as the
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means

for presenting ethical

prescriptions, then the possibility
for a redemptive
world-historical event seems
to rest

upon Nietzsche's valorization of
what he
to the subject

just such a

calls the

exposed to a particular artwork

moment.’* But who

is to

that

say whether

experience of the sublime.

was
its

unfathomable origin

attributable to such an experience?
Is this a judgment

fomts? Are

we

once
be

accrues

midst of

is in fact

imposed on, or read

into past

faced here with sheer indeterminacy
and “undecideability”? Ulrich

Wilamowitz, for instance, seemed

The

itself composed in the

It

to think so.^°^

introduction of the sublime as an
incommensurable measure that withdraws

it is

approached as an object of knowledge
renews the question of how the claim

to

m a relation with material alterity can be assessed. Why was
the sublime of such

importance

to

Kant

that its “foundation”

was discovered

in

“human

nature”?^®*

Because the pnnciple of morality had been
disclosed through the medium of
mere
feeling

on the condition

that such a derivation thereby required
a revaluation of human

affectivity in order to account for
non-“pathological” emotions indicative of a force
(the

special causality of freedom)

whose

practical reality

indeterminacy. Without a revaluation of this

was not

sort, the affects

belied

by

would be

its

theoretical

associated only

with the sort of physiological experience induced, for
instance, by a certain aesthetic
experience: “the art of music [Tonkunst] speaks through
nothing but sensations without

concepts, so that unlike poetry

why the “continuous
to

music amounts

it

leaves us with nothing to meditate about.”^®^ This

agitation” and “quickening of the

to nothing

more than

music “has the lowest place among the

mind” associated with

is

listening

a ^^plajdng with sensations.” Accordingly,
fine arts” if the latter are
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judged

in terms

of their

ability to

“expand" the mind “in order
for

[the]

cognition [of rationally
sanctioned

aesthetic ideas] to arise.”^’®

The

visual arts are accordingly
valued

by reason

to the

degree that they “bring
about

a product that serves the
concepts of the understanding
as an enduring
vehicle.-

measured by the proto-moral

criteria

,f

of duration, order and
purposefulness, musical

“appreciation” amounts to an
experience scarcely
distinguishable from a form
of “mere

enjoyment” bearing no

intrinsic cultural-let
alone

proceeds from sensations to
indetemrina.e
to sensations.

one

The

latter

produce a

moral-signrficance.- For “music

ideas; the visual arts

lasting impression, the

from determinant ideas

former only a transitory

«513

Th.s hierarchical value judgment
reemerges

form

that is

in Schiller's juxtaposition

produced with the material sensation

of the visual

that is passively received.

It is

reversed, however, in Nietzsche’s
identification of the elusive
criterion that not only

allows illusion as illusion to be
distinguished from pathological
delusion but also from
illusion as

“symbol”.- “What conquers

“absorbing”

it

so that “illusion

as a sign of truth”? “It

This

is

between the

is

just the sort

is

the

power of illusion” while

no longer enjoyed as

at the

same time

illusion as such, but as symbol,

music.”^’^

of distinction

that

is

“artistically creating subject” (the

required if an intimation of the relation

producer of illusion not necessarily

captivated by illusion) and the “life force”
(as symbol of truth)

is to

be

at all

communicable. For the necessarily “indeterminate idea”
of the Ur-Eine illuminates the
poverty of the concept while accentuating the need for
bringing singular sensations
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to

expression through a

medium

particularly suited for
this very purpose:

what Kant

describes as the “art of music”
or the “language of
affects.”’

While the moral law animates the
subject with a “moving
force or emotion” only
insofar as

its

representation is deprived of
‘Whatever could

.he indeterminate idea of the

phenomenal

signification

life

only

commend

it

to the senses”

force exposes the subject
to the collapse of

if it is

symbolized through a phenomenal
form.’- In

both cases the realm of “feeling”
provides the only available
medium through which a
non-conceptual language (or a language
whose signs do not link intuitions
with
determinate concepts) can exert a
singular effect upon the

human

imagination. The

distinction between upholding the
spirit or the letter of the
moral law

and producing

illusion as illusion or as

symbol on

on the one hand

the other is in both cases enabled

by

the recognition of an a priori
transcendental principle. While both
the moral and the

“dionysian” can only “appear” negatively,
the former does so as a sense of
guilt (which
binds and expands the imagination by
exposing

while the

latter

it

to the supersensible idea

of freedom),

does so as an aesthetic form.

Ultimately the fact of reason must base
interpretation of a feeling

its

claim of universality upon an

which cannot be determined

as anything

more than

expenence without presupposing— as of course Kant
does—that the a priori
of morality

is

a singular

character

educed and not produced in such a reading.

Nietzsche’s privileging of music fares no better against
the tireless accusations of
subjectivism that emerge out of the tradition of Western
metaphysics despite or because

of its putative disavowal of the language of reason. The

latter’s

imperative tone

reverberates throughout Nietzsche’s works of the early 1870’s and becomes
most
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pronounced

at those

moments when

the claims of an ethic
of histoty capable of

dissociating ideal from idol
are put forth. For
Nietzsche such a distinction

thanks to the power of music,
and the ‘•symbol of truth”

it

is

is

poss.ble

capable of producing

appears indebted to a concept
of Kantian origin:

In

“The Dionsysian Worldview”

it

becomes apparent

that the presentation

“unitary nature of the will”
underlying the phenomenal
world-referred to

omagedy as the “primordial

law of natural

is

“symbolized” here

causality.

accompanied by

And

the feeling

in the Birth

artist”-is derived from an analogical
inference rather

than an intuition of the thing in
itself (i.e„ the Schopenhauerian
“Will”).’"'
for Nietzsche what

of the

is

Of course

not a rational concept but the
collapse of the

the loss of signification that is
then recuperated

of sublimity no longer

satisfies the

when

demands of reason

it

is

for

unity and the unconditioned. Yet these
demands and needs that impress themselves

upon the

subject continue to arise in response
to the “art drives” [Kunsttriebe] no less

pnmordial

m origin or unremitting in their propulsive force than the Kantian “power

of

desire.”^^®

The

aestheticization of the subject’s destination to
reason culminates in the

Apollonian demand for unity and order which

is

coupled with the Dionysian

intimation of the Ur-Eine that stands in for “truth”, totality
or the unconditioned. The
subject of such an experience

is

confronted by the foremost
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command of what

«.e.zsc„e presents as the tragic
,aw: phenomena, fonns
must be produced

symbolizes
^alue.

their abyssa, origin,
otherwise nothing wi,. be

For how could a work that
either

in

a

way that

produced of eO,co-Ms.or.cal

-naturalistically” imitates

an

illusion no.

recognized as such (the empirical
world) or creates ye. another
illusion gua

illusion

within an undifferentiated realm
of “mere appearance”
(analogous to a dream world)

adequately bring forth the “shaping
powers” of an autonomous,
self-positing,

spontaneous and singular subjec.?“'
Jus. as pure reason ought
and must beprucricu/,
the form-giving being ought
and

must

institute a “higher

form of praxis” no longer

quarantined by reason within the
borders of the Schillerian
aesthetic

commandment
human

The

Whatever was once capable of
extending the concept of ‘the

reads:

being- and of giving

order for

it

state: “its

it

a

more

beautiful substance

must be eternally present

in

perpetually to have this effect.”^^^

regulative ideal animating such an
experience of history evokes the
Kantian

definition

of the

beautiful as that

which

is

“cognized without a concept as an
object of a

necessary liking.”^’ For while the
monumental historian’s “oracular judgment”
of a
culture and/or artwork

is

deprived of a determinate objective principle
that would

provide a basis for the valorization of the
tragic myth,

nevertheless puts forth what

it

Kant would describe as a claim of “subjective

universality.”^^''

liberal pluralism is hardly appropriate

comes

when

it

to

After

all

the ethos of

upholding the validity of either

the moral or aesthetic law against the claim that
cultural forms can only be evaluated in

terms of what each subject happens
ethic

of history stands

in

to find “agreeable.””’

Consequently, Nietzsche’s

need of a meta-psychological measure on analogy with the

Kantian '"sensus communis ”

if the experience
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of tragedy

is to

be universally

communicable through
Itself not in a judgment

symbol-an

certain feelings rather
than concepts.

of natural beauty but

Such a measure manifests

in the recognition

of the

illusion as

experience induced by a
certain “power”:

music^. .The^righTest^^^^
this

seemed

to

wish

something... Those

iust as

who

much

longer suffices, for

^

tn

i

Le nev ^had

pr.sL‘'*';rdr*:si!;sr^ contemplates the

tragic myth.^2^

The uniHcation of the

beautiful

and the sublime does not
emerge as a demand of

reason in the third Critique
since neither experience

is

Schiller's “Aesthetic Education”
that such a synthesis

unrecognized rational need. But
because

remain bound,

in practical terms,

is

affects a subject

this idea

whose

aesthetic

of unity corresponds with a

powers
it

is

only

historical-

form of praxis” by severing the

tragic

human

myth from

action and elevate

the moral law?’”

C. Conclusion: Idol and Ideal

The terms of the above

question point back to Lukacs’ formulation
of the either/or

confronting a historical ethic once Schiller’s
conception of the constitutively aesthetic
subject

is

taken as

its

i

Does the “coupling” of Apollonian
beauty and Dionysian

sublimity then both expand the time
and space reserved for
to a “higher

It is

presented as a hitherto

by what remains of the vocation
of reason,

through the act of self-sacrifice
that
practical experience.

it

treated as an end in
itself

grounding principle— as
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in fact

happens

in the

work of both

it

Luk.cs and Nie^sche. Either
another way

is

found to -^ahe the
suh.ec. purely

conte™p.ative"byaestheticizingthewor,dor.hheaesthetic,^^

prrncple by which objective
alternative rentains tnired
in

reality is

shaped.’- For Lukacs
an adherence

myth so long

as

it

to the latter

does not recognize that
the ’’underlying

order and connections between
things were to be
found

[in]

h.story .

.
.

[as, the

product of

a creating subject.”^^’

The -Ur-Eine ” would seem

to offer an exemplary

.mage of what such

mythologization would look like
when seen from the perspective
of historical

matenahsm. But
recognize

if the latter in turn
is

itself as such, then the

of appropriatton. That

is.

considered mythic precisely
because

Kantian-Sch.llenan heritage lends

itself to

only by producing beauty
as a symbol of truth

“looked. .into the [abyssal]
essence of things’’

it

doesn’t

another act

after

having

.

become

properly

it

possible for the being that
wills to

“historical.”^^*^

The dualism of myth and
if the

is

“ground” of the

history which

latter is

is

indispensable for Lukacs no longer
holds

symbolized by the Vr-Eine and the
former emerges as an

expression of the lived experience
of a producing being no longer bound
by law to the

vocation of reason. In

fact

myth

is

represented in

The Birth of Tragedy

as an a priori

condition of experience on analogy with
the transcendental aesthetic; or
so
it

is

induced from an exemplary past: “the
Greeks had

felt

it

involuntarily impelled to

relate all their experiences immediately
to their myths, indeed to understand

m thts relation.””'
intuition

However what Kant

appears if

them only

presents as the “pure forms of sensible

(space and time) are here subject to a process
of historical fluctuation. For

the experience imputed to Hellenic culture

is

presented in the past tense in order to
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accentuate

how

the “demise of [tragic]

no longer bearing
I. is

“when

becomes

myth” can he

inferred, or read off
cultural

a people begins to
comprehend itself histoncally”
that this origin

forgotten.

What Hegelian Marxism,
Marxi<;m Histoncism
Uiof
and
•

historiography each presented
in their

•

own particular way as

product of a debilitating
secularizing tendency
.hat thought, using the
thread

to

mythic foundation.^^ Converting
history

maturation,

how

motion by the “unshakeable

be possible,

into

fa.th

it

it.”«.

requires an “ahtstoncal”

an object of scientific
knowledge

mythology.”™ But once

sort

thus reinterpreted as
the by-

only of knowing being but
even of cotrecting

For a collective experience
of histoty

depnves a culture of the

set in

is

the singular historical-

of causality, can penetrate
the deepest abysses
of being

that thought is capable
not

therefore amounts to a “bad

the “Prussian
School” of

^

philosophical accomplishment
of the nineteenth century

and

forms

the sign of a “dionysian”
origin.

the process

of secularization

of “unconscious metaphysics”
necessary for

its

organic

could that which serves as an
indispensable precondition for the

formation of a culture become
something the will posits as a conscious
goal? Only

such a seeming contradiction

is

if

resolved by the recognition of a
tragic law. For there

remains no other basis for an ethic
of histoty once the

striving for the “highest

good” or

the patient expectation for a
beneficent outcome to emerge out of the
teleological

“world process” are diagnosed as but
symptoms of an “unshakeable” and dogmatic
that

blmds

itself to the

“Apollonian projection. ..illuminated from
inside by music.”®’

The sense of altenty and sublimity induced by
the

faith

need for self-preservation as a ruling principle

Kant’s presentation of the subject

who

the

power of music which displaces

is implicitly

defined in opposition to

refuses to bear false witness once
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it

is

affected

by a

feeling of guil, ,ha, takes

you would explain
peculiar to

fear,

it

outside of itself (in
an experience of
“ek-stas.s”).

it

the tragic tnyth, the

firs,

requirenrent

is

to seek the pleasure
that is

in the purely aesthetic
sphere, without transgressing
into the region

or the nrorally sublinre.This second order feeling
of pleasure

the beautiful

moral

is

certain

is

of pit,

aroused when

recognized as a synrbol of
truth that presents the
subject with neither a

-command

the necessity

••If

[n]or [a moral] reproach

Such an

ideal releases the
subject

of rendering impossibly
unequivocal moral judgments
and exposes

images indicative of the

life-force

‘•at

the bottom of things,
despite

all

from
to

it

the

changes of appearances, indestmctibly
powerful and pleasurable.””*

But the subject remains mired

in the

world of judgment,

for

how

else

is

it

to

distinguish which cultural forms
from the past and present are
“tlluminated from inside

by music” and which are not?
necessary

if

The need

How else it to make the distinction that for

an experience of history
for an aesthetic law

is to

emerged

be

“justified as an aesthetic

in Schiller’s

work once the

Nietzsche

is

phenomenon”?
rationally

sanctioned yet not rationally determined
play drive had been identified
as the only force

capable of “fulfilling the whole concept”
of the human being.”’ For what

it

produced

had to take on an ideal character that
could not be understood on the basis
of a lawless
or naturalistic aesthetic: “arbitrary
lining up of fantastic pictures one
after another

penetrating into the ideal, and imitative
reproduction of actuality
nature.

is

is

not

not portrayal of

A measure was then found in the form-giving capacity of a proto-moral

subject capable of aestheticizing the
experience of being in the world in accordance

with the principle of autonomy. In the Birth of
Trage dy the power of music stands
the

power of desire

in for

as the transcendental condition of possibility for
the production of

,

3J1

artistic truth”

whose

historicizatinn
stoncizat, on ic
,s

imposing the moral law unto
phenomenal

Even assuming

the forms amplified

no longer preempted
by the impossibility of
i

nature.

by the power of musie

that

appear on a

transfigured operatie stage
could be judged on the
basts of a
hts.ortcal-philosophical
rule, the distinction

between good and bad
mythology remains insufficiently

“transcendental” insofar as
both.

it

obscures the fundamentally
similar structure shared
by

For the “shaping power” animated
by the

spirit

fonn of causality whose means
of extemalization
in the art

of classical

sculpture.

ts

of music

is

a narrowly conceived

based upon a certain rs^,
evinced

The form-matter dualism necessa.^

for the latter ts then

transposed to the sphere of
practice within which “a
human being, a people or a culture”

becomes capable of justifying
manner.^' The inspiration
a

monumental

existence only if it produces
itself in an analogous

for such

an act of self-formation arises
from an exposure

past reconstituted by the
“creative artist” in

becomes malleable elay.'-«
the task

its

It is

whose hands

to

“history

the “sovereign privilege”
of the latter to recognize that

of historical “representation” calls

for a “compositional

moment of the

highest

order.”^'*^

Precisely this
creative

moment is the most powerful and most
spontaneous
moment m the inner being of the artist [or]... the

dramatist... [who thereby] thinks of all
things as interrelated, [and]...
weave[s] isolated events into a whole—
always with the presupposition
that a unity of plan must be inserted
into the things when it is not in

them. This

^^^^544

is

how the human being spins his web over the past and
It, this is how the artistic
drive [Kunsttrieb] expresses

While the Kunsttrieb

is

counterpoised with the “drive for justice”

[Gerechtigkeitstrieb] the relationship between the Kantian
moral subject and the
artistically creating subject” is not reducible to
the opposition Nietzsche constructs. In
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fact the

much

moral law from which the
producing subject

in force in a

manner that can be accounted

IS
i<

putatively severed
remains very

for within the terms

of Nietzsche’s

own

exposition of “critical history.”
For the possibility that
an expenence of history

lives

on or endures

apart from

how

of historicism and the
supposition

it

IS

conceptualized

that a subject

is

suggested by both the
critique

produced by a

tradition is not

wholly

identical with that “product.”

“A

historical

phenomenon, when purely and
completely understood and
reduced

an intellectual phenomenon,

is

dead for anyone

undergoes a symbolic death when

phenomenon.” But

its

it

who understands

it.”^«

The

to

subject

understands itself as just such
a “historical

after-life-the not yet fully
acculturated remainder that

Nietzsche refers to as “life”-remains
receptive to another experience
of history.

The evolution of the

“life force” into the

concept of “life” corresponds
with the

m emphasis that occurs when the interpretation
supplemented by the
Utility

of nature

cultural prescriptions presented
in

and Liability of History

identity, a purposiveness

for Life.”

and a goal; that

its

use

in

is, it

the subject with an

is

impelled by a propensity of its

is

self-positing will after

the principle of life as that “dark, driving,

that lusts after itself.”^'^^

The being of the
that

of Tragedy and “The

performs the same service that had been

What remains of the

Nietzsche’s aestheticization of reason

power

Birth

is

experience” toward the recognition of its
practical

destination to a final purpose."*

insatiable

The

“Teleology since Kant”

Such a concept provides

rendered by the Kantian power of desire:
“reason
nature to go beyond

in

shiff

presupposes and

subject

is

is

thus represented less as a substance than as a
process

conditioned

by a mechanical concept of time: “existence
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itself is

nothing but an nnintenrupted
having been, something
that hves by negating,
consuming

and contradicting

The same

itself.”^*^^

principle that constricted
the Kantian representation
of historical time

reemerges as the limit experience
of a subject
metaphysics” remains bound
itself in

a punctual

instant.

to

who

in the absence

of an ‘•unconscious

a force that perpetually
comes to presence and negates

Such a process

is

properly understood to be
aes„e,.c

the subject both arrests
and “coalesces” with the
flow of time by recreating

appropriating the

power of the

life force.

“The goal of culture

promote the emergence of true
human beings.” Accordingly

i,

,s

is

enlist that instinct that is
uncertain

about

its

by

nothing other than to

“very necessary that a

conscious intention finally take
the place ofthat ‘dark
drive'...so that

be possible to

itself,

when

will

it

no longer

goal-the celebrated dark

drive— for other

The proper goal of an
that

ethic

of history

is to

prepare for the “production of
genius”

ought to arise as a monumental
artwork capable of serving as a
mythic foundation

for a culture; the latter is thus
provided with a spatio-temporal prism
as

which

It

can selectively view and reinterpret
past events

in

it

were through

accordance with a present

“need” that emerges as an indispensable
residue not wholly absorbed by a
dominant
cultural formation (by a first nature).
This “residue” or remainder can

when an

inherited tradition puts a present in a
relation with a past in a

become apparent
manner that

creates the possibility for something
like an alienation effect to occur.^^®
Like the

expen ence of the Kantian sublime or the consciousness
of being affected by the moral
law such an effect

is

accompanied by the recognition of an a

priori capacity:

i.e.

the

exercise of the “shaping power” poised to construct
a second nature. But what if this
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production

is

contprontised and constricted
beforehand by the residue
of a “situated’-

but not detemtined

life that

it

in turn w.,1 fail
to

master when

“seizes or forcibly

it

appropriates” [aneignen Oder
anzwingen] a past?“Life” i„ .Ws case would
not be
reducible to the nrechanical
flow of time; it would
express itself as that which

silently

endures and reemerges
unnoticed as a force that
conditions what the shaping
power
creates.

There are then two representations
of time

to

be found

in Nietzsche’s

meditation” on histoor: the rectilinear
and destructive flow of the

life

“untimely

force that fosters

the need for illusion and
the duration of an
a-conceptual tradition that
persists apart

from that which
priori principle

is

explicitly

isolates the latter not as the
a

of morality but as the inviolable
condition of possibility

production of beauty that
also

handed down.“^ Nietzsche

is

“transmitted” above

emerges as a constraining force

all

through the power of music.
But

that prevents the formation

precipitating an unequivocal rupture
with the past.

for the

it

of a second nature from

The non-mechanical representation

of time thus serves the dual function of
enabling and limiting the production
of culture.
“For since

we

are. .the products [Resultate]
.

products of their aberrations...[I]t
chain. If we

condemn

not alter the fact that

By considering

is

are descended

and regard ourselves

this

as free of them, this does

from them.”^^^

inhibit or misdirect [verirren] the artistic
subject’s

shaping power, Nietzsche provides an exemplary occasion
for his
is

also the

the Kantian “intelligible” to be just such an
“aberration”[Verirrung]

whose preservation would only

present

we are

impossible to free ourselves completely
from

these aberrations

we

of earlier generations,

unable to dictate the terms of its relation to a heritage
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own

suggestion that a

in a unilateral

manner

be co.ob„..ed. Ko.
Nie.scbe. e„.i.
p.Jec.

.0

aestheuczaucn of reason

poHbcs- .s.s upon an

.ha. does no.
recognize .he condi.ions

of de face appropria.ion.

ac.

fo. a

If anyrhing .he
cri.iea, nega.ivi.y

of inrposs.b.h.y

for i.s

of .he Kan.ian sys.en,
h

revdahzed as a his.orical force
by .he emergence of
a projec. whose
aes.he.ic
valoriza.ions remain .horoughly
dependen.

A "new and

improved p.ys." can only

and self-posi.ing cul.ure whose

upon moral

cri.eria.

ar.se as .he produc.

rela.ion .o an
aes.he.icized

of a uni.ary, au.onomous

moral law accordingly

manifesls i.self Ihrough ac.ions
allesling .o a "harmony
of life, .hough., appearance
and
will

By conlras.,

.he moral

law

is

.he Kan.ian dis.inc.ion
behveen upholding .he spiri.
and le..er of

derived from .he feeling of
respec. .ha. canno. be further
de.ennined as

a his.orical judgmen. of a
particular even..

1.

serves as a measure only
insofar as

i.

exposes .he subjec. .0 a non-empirical
faC, a non-pa.hological
desire and an occasion
for

assuming responsib.li.y

Bui even

if an

characler

of .he Kan.ian

.ha.

never culmina.es in a
self-jus.ifying accomplishmen..

unequivocally moral in.en.ion could
be isola.ed, .he self-posiling
will

would

s.ill

be confronled wi.h .he

limi. experience

of

being in a world .ha. prevenls an
elhical aclion from being
imposed onlo his.ory as

.hough a form were being imparted
question of discovenng

io senseless mailer.

how much history can

I. is

Iherefore no. so

much

tolerate, suffer or “bear” [ertragt];

a

it

refuses “to be reshaped” into either a
moral order or a “pure aesthetic structure.”^^^

This

is

a ban on idolatry that strikes the imagination
as a law

also confronts the being that wills with
the

imagination

likely

is

then drawn toward the

“form” of a law

memory of what

it

it

cannot represent.

It

cannot produce. If the

the will has produced,

it

will

discover the experience that forbids us to conceive of
history as fundamentally
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^
e

may await the contemporary
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reader of Schiller and

epilogue

The

recent works of Ernesto
Laelau are based primarily

authored with Chantal Mouffe

(Hegemon^a

^

upon

the

described as the source of “perhaps
the most radical breakthrough
in
theory.

For Zizek the value of such an
innovation

lies in the

1

989

text

he co-

modem social

Lacanian- inspired

recognition that an objective social
totality and an essentialist
subject do not (and

cannot) exist. Furthermore, substitutes
for both outmoded concepts
are

emerge through a process of political

contestation

whose exigencies

now

poised to

are incapable of

being met by following the protocols of
liberal pluralism. For the
newfound “ontology

of the social” delineates the transcendental-historical

limits

of human experience

in

terms of the psychoanalytic categories
of the lack and repetition rather than the
utihtanan calculus of pain and pleasure that
directs the will of the unified and rational
subject.

The

impossibility of a free, substantial subject, of a
consciousness
identical to itself which is causa sui, does
not eliminate its need, but just
relocates the chooser in the aporetical situation of
having to act as if he
subject, without being endowed with any of the
means of a fully
fledged subjectivity. .It is not possible to do away with
the category of
subject what it points to is part of the structure of
experience. What is

were a

.

.

possible

is to

that

possible to play with

What

it

is

deconstruct

raises the stakes

that “nothing ethical can

it... to

enlarge the field of the language games

it.”^^^

of the Wittgensteinian “language game,”
be derived from

the general structure
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is

the supposition

of experience... [for]

there are... no ethical
principles or

cotnntnnitarian

nonns whose

spaces.- But something

“stmcture of experience” so long
as
concept.

The same underlying

breakthrough

may

is

it

validity is

independent of all

“ethical” can therefore
be inferred from the

not presented in the form
of a determinate

principles that for Zizek
constitute a theoretical-practical

then also be read as the
unmistakable

symptoms of a

singular

tendency pemteating eontemporaty
socio-political theoty: the
valorization of a
constructed form of identity that can
be expressed only

in

opposition to a reputedly

superceded historical-philosophical
conception of the “substantial”
subject which
then hypostatized as a certain
theoretical and practical

is

limit.

But the relationship between Lacanian
post-Marxism and the

tradition

of Western

metaphysics evinces something other than
a sense of irrevocable rupture
when Laclau’s
negative ontology
decision

is like

is

translated into the language of
a practical imperative: “to take
a

impersonating God.

of being God, and one

has,

however,

It is

to

like asserting that

proceed as

if one

one does not have

the

were Him.”^^'

This appropnation of both the als ob trope
and the conception of fmitude^“
to the

second Critique

moral law belongs

is

first

means

integral

then coupled with the determination that
the subject of the

and foremost among a particular class of unduly
constricting

modem concepts; respect for something

like the

movement of tradition

is

then

maintained by erecting monuments that serve the function
of providing the present age

with a palpable object against which

it

can define

itself:

the act of identification cannot have a source of
justification external to
itself, since the order with which we [then]
identify is accepted, not

because

considered valuable in terms of the criteria of goodness or
rationality which operate at its bases, but because it brings
about the
it is

possibility

of an order

[that is constructed

discovered. For]... one approves of the
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and not simply recognized or

Law because

it

is

Law, not

™

because

it is rational
There is a np<^H
i c
contents become a secondary
consideration.^^’

The Kantian

signs of “goodness”
and “rationality” are here
used to invoke a

usefully obsolete operation
that cannot, however,
be carried out in strictly
Kantian
terms. For the rational-moral
as

it

is

Law

serves as a measure for
practical action only insofar

dissociated from anything
that could be identified
as the actual ground
or

governing principle of a social
order.
Laclau’s reference to a
non-rational yet unmistakably
“formal”
accentuates the

moment

that

it

way
is

in

which the Kantian system
continues

subjected to critique.

What Laclau

to

Law

thereby

be upheld

at the

very

introduces as the catalyst

“effecting a [Heideggerian]
‘destruction’ of the history of
Marxism” can therefore also

be described as the most recent
bearer of a living “neo-Kantian”
legacy
a critical genealogical reconstruction.^-

have been traced

in this

work

to

two

The

origins

that

of such a subterranean

particular historical-philosophical

now

solicits

tradition

moments:

Schiller’s attempt to supplement
and/or “put. .into effeef ’ the moral
law without having
.

recourse to theological concepts and the
intensification of this aestheticizing
turn

Nietzsche’s transformation of the vocation
of reason into the

The
to

tradition in question

is

then transmitted by

contemporary projeets oriented toward

The recumng sense of duality
posited by

way of a critique of Kant which

of Begriffsdichlung.^^

way of the works of Lukacs and Adorno

poststructuralist

that arises

art

in

when

a

and neo-Lacanian

law for the

principles.

historical imagination is

then amounts both to a self-definition and a

misrepresentation becomes particularly evident in Lukacs’
characterization of the moral

law as a depleted source of illumination no longer capable
of providing the subject with
“the

map of all

possible paths.”^^^
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For what

this dissertation

has emphasized above

Kantian conception of the moral
law ought
road

map

that indicates

all is

to be severed

the degree to

how to negotiate what Derrida

it

refers to as the

unrepresentable force (the principle
of morality) that
self-positing will.-

would then seem

to

“absent fullness” or“origmal lack”
were

is

destabilized

by an

incapable of being appropriated

sort

of experience that Laclau def.nes
as an

not for the reigning historical
judgment

it

the enabling indeterminacy
of the ethico-political to the repressive

determinacy— and dated simplicity-K)f the

rational-moral.^"^^

For Kant the lack underlying human
experience

autonomous

In fact such a

Being affected by something
non-empirical yet material

comespond with just the

which counterpoises

“simple relation

gives rise to a never to be
completed task undertaken

by a subject whose conceptual
“determinability” has been

by the

the

from the image of a
reassuring

between the categorical imperative
and a determinable subject.”*’
relation can only be sustained
if

which

subject as a sense

of guilt

that

affects the

would-be morally

preempts the assumption of responsibility

from being equated with the definitive
accomplishment of an

The obverse or even necessary consequence of
the
construction or apprehension of an aesthetic

ethically justified action.

lack does not therefore result in the

form— whether it be what Nietzsche

presents as the sublime object or what Laclau
describes as the “visibility of the acts of
[political] identification... [that] are actually
postulated

and fought for

in the historical

arena.

Such a

struggle began with Nietzsche’s determination in the
early to

historical experience can

nature” for itself as

if

it

be justified only

if a collective subject posits

mid 1870 ’s

a “second

were producing an artwork. For both Nietzsche and Laclau
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that

the

need for an impossible ye,
unavoidable act of
poH.ical-culmral
a response to a historical
first,

summons

that aestheticizes
the moral

identification

law

emerges as

in a hvo-fold sense:

substantive, determinate or
positive characteristics
:s are imputed
to the Kantian

formulation of the law; secondly,
the ensuing construction
which
guise of a critique

is

is

presented in the

then disassembled in
order to create the
theoretical-practical space

within which the a priori
lack can serve as a
particular ethico-political
incentive.

This lack

is

then conceived in terms

a self-positing will

condemned

mitigated if no, negated only

to

of^Abgrund that innervates rather

produce aesthetic forms whose
idolatrous character

when

they are recognized as such.

the “highest form of rationality
that society can reach

And

this is all that

than limits

is

that

As

is

a result, for Laclau

of a regulated madness."”'

can be demanded of an ethic
of history once the origin of the

“Dionysian” artwork or the Lacanian
act of identification has
been transformed

into the

object of a transcendental refiection
which establishes the outermost
historical limits of
socio-political possibility.

Ultimately, the law for the historical
imagination which arises out of a
hitherto

unrecognized tradition

that

extends from Schiller to Lacanian
post-Marxism

upon the following determination:

to

is

founded

be without either a pre-formed sense of
identity or

an objective historical law are but two
expressions of the same political and ethical

problem

that lends itself to a fundamentally
aesthetic solution.
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inteUtatioTonL
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tnbunal of reason

instituted the
m order to answer three questions the human being cannot

help but to

The answers
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ihre interrelated questions
three
presuppose that the subject

to all

destined for a certain
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it

is
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to
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to the singularity
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University Press, 1993)
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1

Pluhartrans. (Cambridge:
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Kant, Cntique of Practical
Reason.

bZo cfsmVeriTl^
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Mary Gregor trans tramhnHo

Haa^„mo.ried,Je’o^eJ!ni^^^^
20

Kants Werke: Rand V
19^’
S73 (Hereafter
m
y 4), p. 523
referred to as C
1

1

Bnmo Caassirer

J).

2

CPR, p. 6. The “modem” here indicates
the canonized three-fold division
of political
philosophy into ancient, medieval, and
modem periods. Cf. e.g. George Sabine A
~
History of Political Theory (New York:
’

Holt, 1950).

22

23

CPR,

p. 6//5.

Cf CPR,

^d

pp. 21-2

The Copemican revolution overthrows the
presupposition that
possible only “.four intuition.. .confonn(s)
to the character of its objects”
institutes the fundamental principle
of the transcendental aesthetic: the relationship

knowledge

,s

between human knowledge and expenence is
based upon the a prior principle that the
Object (as object of the senses) conforms
to the character of our power of intuition.”

CPR,
25

p. 8//7.

CJ, p.288/7483

The

Urteilskraft ebenso

CJ,
27

1

regulative, not constitutive principle “fur unsere
menschliche
gilt, also ob er ein objektives Prinzip
ware.”

notwendig

47/244.

CJ, 23 87/7 “With this [work]

I conclude my entire
endige ich also mein ganzes kritisches Geschaft.”).

critical enterprise.”

(“Hiermit

CJ, pp. 64-5.
CJ, 84/7322.

Prolegomena

to

any Future Metaphysics, Paul

(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), p. 84.
to as

CPR,

Cams and James W.

Ellington trans.

pp. 728/7670; 536/7489 (Hereafter referred

“PTM”).
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CJ, p. 332Z/523.
32

CPrR,

p.

1

14//8.

33

-™«»ing

domain
associated with thp

power offAdesire,

is

like

recumng expen ences of pleasure and
pain

i’

a

Pathological purposes occurs
‘TTlhewill as the
in the world, namely the
one

one of the many natural causes

th t
acts in accordance with concepts.”
If it is the “lower” power of
desire that initiates a
*'* practical possibility is “technicar, or
pragmatic, which means
fhTm'*''''”"’
hat the operative pnnciple of the
will is not autonomy; rather,
the act is carried out in
Ptttlicular, contingent end. This
conception of the will gives rise
to the phenomenon of a “natural
histoiy'
history in which nature is
represented II

mtr

-a

”

borderland that

human

hhhertoT''^T’'‘'l"”
T'“‘’
hitherto
largely subsisted,
set apart both from an ethic
of history
physical causality.” (CJ, p. 10).
34

CJ,

p.

history has

and the reSm of

3327/523.

35

Cf. CJ, pp. 220-7 for Kant’s critique
of “dogmatic” teleology.

CJ, p. 3 36/7527.

On the “kingdom of purposes”[Reich der Zwecke] cf Ground
ing For The
Metaphysics Of Morals James W. Ellington trans.
(Indianapolis: Hackett
Ibid.

,

(Hereafter referred to as

’

GW).

1981) p 39

38

Immanuel Kant, “Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason”
George
trans. In Re ligion and Rational Theology
(Cambridge: Cambridge

di

Giovanni

University Press,

1996), p. 92. (The former

work

will hereafter be referred to as

RBR;

the latter edition as

CJ, 342/7533. Cf. St. Augustine: The Political Writings Henry
Paolucci ed.
(Chicago: Gateway, 1962), pp.2-3.
,

GW, p.

197/Kritik der praktischen

Vemunft/ZGmndlegung zur Metaphysik der
Werkausgabe Band VII (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1956), p. 34. “In der Tat ist es

Sitten:

schlechterdings unmoglich, durch Erfahrung einen einzigen Fall mit volliger GewiBheit
auszumachen, da die Maxime einer sonst pflichtmassigen Handlung lediglich auf
moralischen Griinden und auf der Vorstellung seiner Pflicht beruhet habe.”

GW, p.

36//20-1

.

The question of idolatry

in this context will

vis-a-vis Nietzsche’s “aesthetic” justification of a historical
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be renewed in chapter 4
phenomenon. In her

,

^ctures on Kant’s Politica l Philosophy
(Ron^lH p^,nrr rH
Chicago Press, 1982) Hannah ArenHt Ivr
u

Tra;sposing“ fecus

principle.

of history she presentsTcoL
r
the “example”; whether the
signified he a ?ahl
is

and remains a

that otherwise could not

University of

paTuto that

n

™‘"

Critique

''

validity” that rehabilitates

s

reveals the generality

be defined ” (77i Fv

“go-cart of judgment” in

tL

Ln.ian

»'is

to the realm

exemplar

•

it

first Crit^^^^^

'he

b

benetit. .[but]
.

examples often weaken the understanHina’c
f
(h«r adaiuacy, in a uni versaUay
.nd indeptndiliiy of the
•

™l.s, as

10

lowing passage from

•

•

,

nllfi''^'

The Concept of History”: “The scene

[in Homer’s Odvssevl
paradigmatic for both
poetry, the reconciliation with
reality, the catharsis which,
according to Aristo^e was
the essence of tragedy, and according
to Hegel, was the ultimate
purpose of histoi^
'^'"erebrance. The deepest humL
motive for history
and Ltiw
poetry appears here
unparalleled purity: since listener, actor,

where Ulysses

listens to the story

of his own

his^^

life is

m

same

person..

and sufferer are toe

Between Past and Future (New York;
Penguin, 1968), p 45 The
histoncal imagination is thus aided by
the example and the recollection—
^o
phenomena which can only undermine the Kantian
subject’s relation to the
In

moral law.

Cf. CPR, p. 8.“0ur age is properly the
age of critique, and to critique everything
must
submit. /ie/igion...commonly seek[s] to
exempt...[itself]

sancrity.oBut

from

m doing so...[it]

critique...through

its

arouse[s] well-deserved suspicion and
cannot lay claim to
unfeigned respect; such respect is accorded by
reason only to what has been able to
withstand reason’s free and open examination.”

GW, pp.

19//34; 34/757. “Hier

wird nun die Philosophie in der Tat auf einen
miBlichen
der fest sein soil, unerachtet er weder im
Himmel, noch auf der
Erde, an etwas gehangt, oder woran gestiitzt wird.”

Standpunkt

43

44

45

46

Keenan,
CJ,

p.

1

GW,p.
CPrR,

gestellet,

p.

1

35/7347.

62//101-2.

p. 28//36.
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must of course co^ize

in

will in the sensiblfworld

si^eThe™1s!lcf

iTh

GW, p.

’"'

“*'

,

any deed. But as for the coTceot
.
need not determine it theoretically
^ with a^
”
existence.” (CPr“p ^4
48

7^ 7
"

rdeS^m

'**

'

“f *e

‘=‘“'®“ldy as

?'» cogn.tton of

its

noumenon,

it

supersensible

38/764.

yet umversal legislation and that
he is

bound only to

act in

accordance wit!

his

own

Stachel der Tatigkeit hier aber
sogleich bei Hand und
empor arbeiten darf, um Kraft zum
Widerstande gegen
Neigungen durch lebendige Vorstellung
der Wtirde des
R
auBerhch
••

ist...nicht allererst

Gesetzes zu sammeln.”

GW, p.
52

CPrR,

On

44//74.

p. 122//159.

the

novd

interpretation

of the puppet theater put forth by Kant’s
contemporary
cf
Abyss Deep Enough: Letters of Heinrich von
Kleist, With a
|election of Essays and Anecdotes, Phillip
B. Miller trans. (New York: Dutton
1982)
For a relatively recent reading cf Paul de Man,
The Rhetoric of Romanticism /New
York: Columbia, 1984).

Heinnch von

GW, p.

Kleist,

^

Although the “ideal of holiness” that evokes an
experience of
which the will would no longer be exposed to the
temptation to transgress
the moral law is “not attainable by any creature”
it nevertheless functions in the
Kantian
system as an “archetype [Urbild] which the subject should
“strive to approach and
resemble in an uninterrupted but endless progress.” CPrR,

freedom

44/774.

in

p. 71//92.

Ibid, p. 102//133.

Ibid,p. 107//139.

Ibid, p. 91//70.

CPR,

p. 744.

CPR,

737/7542.
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CPrR,

p. 100.

GW,p.

14.

wherein recognition and compliance
with the
law IS achieved. What Walter

spirit,

not merely the letter of tL
moral

Benjamin thus describes as the categorical
imperahv?!
uhtless incontestab e minimal
program” [i.e. the command to treat
the humanity in
one s own or anyone else s person as an
end in itself—a final pntpose— and
never
merely as a means] would therefore
provide the foundation for the positing
of moral ’
rather than merely pragmatic or
technical, ends. Cf. Walter
Benjamin, “Critique of
Violence in Sd ected Writings: Volume
ed. Marcus

W

‘4X®ed

T

Wriiin"^^

he nrcpd

’

1

Bullock and Michael
j,
University Press, 1996), p. 241.
(Hereafter referred to as
ng interpretations of whether greater emphasis
should
or theological character of the kingdom
of purposes, cf Rudolf
Kant (Chicago: Chicago University Press,

Matr 1
"
moV!f
1990),
p. 140, Yimiiah Yovel, Kant and the
Philosophy
I

Pnnceton University

of History (Princeton.

Press, 1980), pp. 70-2; William
Connolly,

Why Am Not A
I

Seculanst (Minneapolis: Minnesota University
Press, 1999), pp. 169-1 71

CJ,p.

12.

CJ, p.

1

77/246.

Ibid.

The

habitual application refers to the concept of causality
as a category of the
is used to represent phenomenal objects
of nature; the exceptional

understanding which

application denotes the concept of causality as an idea of
reason
practical through an act of freedom.
67

Rudolf Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 322.
Cf.

68

Human

which becomes

Studies , (Princeton:

Georg Lukacs, Soul and Form trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: MIT, 1974)
[hereafter referred to as Soul and Form1 //“Uber Sehnsucht und Form” Die Neue
Rundschau (Berlin: S. Fischer; 191 1), p. 193.
,

CJ,p. 17/7246.
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“compulsion”, “necessitation” has
become the term ofdt^ce
f
interpretation in that it al lows the
moral dimension of necessity to be
expressed
through
a concept that does not simply
denote the use of coercive force
or siiggeEilen
®
®
action IS set
motion by natural-mechanical forces.

m

’’

On

the distinction between schematic
and symbolic hypotyposis cf CJ
p 226 “All
hypotyposis consists in making (a concept]
sensible, and is eler schematic
or
symbo he. In schematic hypotyposis there is a
concept that the understanding has
fomed, and the intuition corresponding to it
is given a priori. In
symbolic h^otyposis
is a concept which only
reason can think and to which no
sensible intuito^ be
adequate, and this concept is supplied
with an intuition

toe

mere y analogous

that judgment treats in a

way

to the

procedure it follows in schematizing; i.e.,
the treatment agrees
with this procedure merely in the rule
followed rather than in terms of the
intuition itself
and hence merely in terms of the form of the
redection
rather than

Ibid.

its

content.”

Kant presents the moral and pathological

feelings in the second Critique in a
that allows a pathologically-affected
but not (necessarily) pathologically
determined subject to discover a rule for action that
neither follows the pleasure
pnnciple nor negates if Such a negation, as prescribed
for example by the Stoic
pstem, places impossible demands upon a subject that can
undermine respect for the

way

law.

The Kantian

of pain and

ethic offers

pleasure.

something

The moral

like a “sublation”

disposition

is

of the subject’s experience

necessarily connected with

consciousness of the determination of the will directly by
the law... [thus a ]
determination of the power of desire [which] is always the
ground of a satisfaction
[Wohlgefallens] in the action produced by it; but this pleasure...
is not the determining
ground of the action [rather the determination]. .of the will directly

by reason alone
since this determination has exactly the
.

the ground of the feeling of pleasure.

.

.Now

is

same inward effect, that of an impulse to activity, as a feeling of the agreeableness
expected from the desired action would have produced... [it can appear
that we act]
merely passively... and take the moral incentive for a sensible impulse... But
one must
be on guard against degrading and disfiguring [abzusetzen und zu verunstalten] the real
and genuine incentive, the law itself... by such spurious praise of the moral determining
ground as incentive as would base it on feelings of particular joys... Respect as
consciousness of the direct necessitation of the will by the law is hardly an analogue of
the feelings of pleasure, although in relation to the power of desire it does the same
things but from different sources ” (CPrR, p. 98//127-8; emphasis added).
73

cf. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness ... Hazel
Washington Square, 1956), p. 784.

Keenan,

p. 193.
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E.

Barnes

trans.

(New

York:

.

Keenan, p. 1
While the Kantian subject

is

able to “under<?tnnH” lUo

that are analogous to the
laws

undermined
knowledge”

prescribes to nhrn
^
as soon as these laws aro
h

freedom

in

it

that could provide the
subiert^

mature, the analogy
established body of “rules

terms

is

and

itselO with a foundation that
is empirically
vcrinabht*”Forrr“'
“practical” dcduct.on of human

freedorsuspeShe

theoretical determination of
human freedom see

pigedom: Essays on Kant ’s Theoretical
and

Cambndge

University Press, 1996),
p. 141

s.

Henrv E AHk"'
(t^‘imbndge.

.

for Sartrcan existentialism

Alexandre Koj6ve^s1nTro^^^^^^^
iMuminate an i^ortaliriii^ninh^^

Kojeve's “Hegehan”

.

11^.

as the Kant, an

^PP^^eipriating
.

.

is

''^Sd

stibject establishes a relation
to the

pnncple of autonomy

'"Vf

world tha^is inim icil

to

ut

and instrumental or “responsive”'? Rut

ind.cates, there

no one

pld3phicar
post ton that perfectly corresponds
with either side of this dualism,
fhfs is why the
Kan tan subject appears today to offer both
a entique and a foundation
for whm
Heidegger mteiprets as the “will to will.”
Its critical capacities arc
evinced when
Desire

is

what transforms Being... into an

m the object and
man

is

formed and

opposed’ to

tt.

It

is in

is

ethical

•object’ revealed to a ‘subject’

and

diffLnt

by—or better still, as— ‘his’

Desire that

revealed— to himself and to others— as an
I, as the I that is
essentially difftrent from, and radically
opposed to, the non-I. The (human) I is the I
of
a Desire or of Desire... In contrast to
the knowledge that keeps man in a
passive
quietude. Desire disquiets him and moves
him to action. Bom of Desire, action tends to
satisfy It, and can do so only by the
‘negation’, the destruction, or at least
is

the

transformation, of the desired object: to satisfy
hunger, for example, the food must be
destroyed or in any case, transformed. Thus,
all action is ‘negating’.”
(Kojeve, James
H. Nichols, Jr. trans. [Ithaca: Cornell,
1969], pp. 3-4.
77

CPR, p.
some way
78

79

80

And cf: “neither concepts without an intuition corresponding
to them
or another nor intuition without concepts can
yield cognition.” (106).
107.

CJ,

p. 16.

CJ,

p. 17.

CPrR,

p. 95//124.
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in

81

mT

Trials
m RRT.
RRT (The fonner text henceforth will in Theodicy”, Giorge di Giovanni

trans
.s.
.?"in
82

83

84

be refen-ed to

i •‘Tteodlcyi

CJ, p. 114. Cf.CPrR, p.71.

CJ,p. 17.
Cf. Keenan, p. 3.

85

ibid.
86

CPrR,

p. 62/80.

87

Theodor W^Adomo, Negative Dialectics.
E.B. Ashton
Continuum, 1973) , p. 289. (Hereafter

trans.

(New York'

referred to as “Negative
Dialectics”).

88

89

CPrR,

p. 28.

GW, p.

32.

Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousnes.s
Rodney Livingston trans.
( am ndge:M T, 1968), p. 124. For a more
recent discussion of the question
of
Ktmtian formalism see J.B. Schneewind,
“The Use of Autonomy in Ethical Theory”
Individualism: Autonomy. I n dividuality,
and the Self in Western
Jjioi^, ed. Thomas C Heller, Morton Sosna and David
E. Wellbery (Stanford.

.

'

Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 75.
Arguing against the “consequentialist”
assumption that the autonomist. .cannot give
a satisfactory account ofthe deepest
roots of action and of personal character,
because the theory requires us to view all of
our projects and our ties to people and to groups
as only contingently part of the self’
Schneewind draws attention to what such a critique implies:
i.e., “that some socially
.

’

determined constitutive aspect of our identity is to
be accepted as carrying moral weight
and as not open to moral question. [And].. .[h]ow
such a view could be plausible in
societies as morally erratic as ours I cannot
see.”
91

Ibid.
92

Ibid.
93

For Kant’s discussion of the how the principle of morality addresses the
question of
war see, for the section from The Conflict of the Faculties entitled “An Old Question
Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” Mary J. Gregor and
Robert

Anchor trans. in “RRT”
Old Question”).

p.

302. (The former essay hereafter will be referred to as
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“An

GW,p.

49//18.

Ibid. p. 57/728.

action the

aw prescnbes.

murt take
must
laketn
on

This

is

why

the logic of nature

is

used, in

understand

feateence of

how

ethical action

form
foiTof
of universality and necessity and how
it must “contain
a
deteimining ^ound of that causality
in accordance with laws of
nature which is itself
free from all laws of nature.”
(CPrR, p. 96) The analogical use of
“natm ” i^th s
context gives nse to what Kant describes
as the “type of pure practical
judgi/enf^a
type of jud^ent in which the imagination
is thoroughly subordinate
to the^
understanding: “the mle ofjudgment
under laws of pure practical reason is
this: ask
yourself whether, if the action you propose
were to take place by a law of the nature of
which you were yourself a part, you could indeed
regard it as possible through your
wt I... If the maxim of the action is not so
constituted that it can stand the test
as to the
form of a law of nature in general, then it is
morally impossible. .In cases where
causality frorn freedom is to be appraised
it makes that law of nature
merely the type of
a law of freedom, because without having
at hand something which it could
make an
example in a case of expenence, it could not provide
use in application for the law of a
pure practical reason.” (CPrR, p. 60).
’th“
the

.

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Daniel Heller-Roazen
University Press, 1998), p. 49.

trans. (Stanford- Stanford

98

Immanuel Kant, “Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”
George di Giovanni trans. (The former text will hereafter be referred

in

“RRT”,
“RBR”).

to as

J.H. Miller,

The Ethics of Reading (New York; Columbia,

1987). [Hereafter referred

to as “Miller”]. Apart

from Miller’s work, cf.: Slavoj Zizek, “Identity and Its
Vicissitudes. Hegel s Logic of Essence as a Theory of Ideology”
in Ernest Laclau,
The Making of Political Identities (London; Verso, 1994), pp. 61-4. Jean Francois
Lyotard, “The Sign of History” in Poststructuralism and the Question of History
ed.

ed.

Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington and Robert Young (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 162-180, Peter Fenves, A Peculiar Fate, (Ithaca; Cornell,
1991).
Miller, p. 25.

GW, p.

For a neo-Kantian

of how the “as if
structures permeating Kant’s texts provide the foundation for an ontological reading of
the human subject cf Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of As If, C.K. Ogden trans.
(London; Routledge & Kegan, 1 949).
30.

213

interpretation

‘

101

1

02

time will that it should
becZea^'u^vtsfl^
any of our actions. Some
actions

estimating

are so constituted that t^
contradiction even be thought
as a universal
r
°
should become one.” To
illustrate the latter

*‘"’ 0 “t

iT

willed as what

'

*e example of

The maxim govem^^^^^^^

suicide.

’
^
following: “from self love I make as
duration threatens more evil
than it Dr'om!r"'^''tquestion as to
wheth:;;irZci;L7fTefrdot:I^^^^^^^^^^^

One

sees at once a contradiction in

c

be the

*ben

continued

^ universal law of nature.

c

t

its

Miller, p. 32.
104

105

GW, p.
CPrR,

57//34.

p.28.

On

the phenomenological concept
of the “pre-thetic” form of
consciousness that
serves as an ontological foundation
for an experience of subjectivity
that is thereby
rescued from arbitranness, cf
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher
and his
a ow
Signs Richard C. McCleary trans.
(Evanston; Northwestern,
1964), p. 172

m

1T)7

Cf. CJ, pp.
108

CPrR,
Kant

1

4-5/7244.

p. 107.

offers a concise encapsulation of
how the higher

^

power of desire acts a selflaw of natural causality

to bring closure to the

(that otherwise represents the
phenomenal world
causes and effects) in paragraph 54 of the

in terms of a never-ending
Prolegomena “the power of

starting... events... spontaneously,

o

cgm and hence needing no

i.e.,

without the causality of the cause

other ground to determine

under time-determinations... [for] only

its

effects

CPR,

series

of

:

its

itself needing

beginning... must not stand

would be appearances.” PTM, pp. 84-

p. 283. “What connects [zusammenhangen] with the
material conditions of
experience (with sensation) is actual .. .That whose connection
with the actual is
determined according to universal conditions of experience is
necessary." For an
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.

.

Necessary than the Future?
More Necessary than it Was?” trans Howard

Become

v ’i7

Actual,

Princeton University Press,
1985), p. 72
III

CPR,

p.

Become

(Princeton:

284.

112

has a peculiar fate in onr* Unri

surpass
113

human

“An Old

answer, because they

5)^
reason’s every ability.” (CPR,
p.

Question”,

p.

300.

114

Transforming iratural history into an
ethical history is not an act
or process
be simply imposed upon the world,
especially when the “content” of thT!,t
js derived from a theologically
inspire^d

that can
,

t

.

pnn^le

Kar^t s ethic

of history

is

that justice

(which

would mean that virtue and Lppiness
exilt
m direct proportion to one another) is something
that cannot
be expected

oJ^Licipated
from either the natural world or from
the subject's attempt to alter
that world- IheLter
always remained bound in part to natural
laws and therefore a reconciliation
with hf
eal does not mark the telos of
Kant’s historical ethic. But it does
serve as a rtullhve
understood in

relation to reason or
“whh
nThT''^
Within
the bounds of mere reason.”
To anticipate how the emergence of this particular
“need” is a “logical” outcome of

Kant s presentations of the formal character
of the will vis-a-vis the natural and the
moral respectively cf the following passage from
the first Critique (“On the Ideal of
the
Highest Good As a Determining Basis of the
Ultimate Purpose of Pure Reason”) that
ftirther amplifies

IS

how

it

is that

the will remains mired in a natural
history in a way that
its obligation to change that
world “how the

accentuated rather than lessened by

:

consequences of .[moral] actions will relate to
happiness
nature of the things of the world, nor by the
causality
.

causality],

hope

and

is determined neither by the
of the actions themselves [i.e. free

their relation to morality.

And thus the. .necessary connection of one’s
for happiness with the unceasing endeavor to
make oneself worthy of happiness
.

cannot be cognized through reason if mere nature is laid
This is a situation that illuminates the sense of the
subject s experience of time.

And

because the

latter

at the basis.”

(CPR, p. 739)
“misfortune” that befalls the
does not correspond with a specific

representation in the Kantian system, theology comes to the
fore at precisely this
juncture in order furnish a sense of hope and memory.

The

theological supplement to morality

grounds.

Cf

is

justified

by Kant

first

of all on logical

CJ, p. 364: “Since. .those ideas [of reason] whose object lies beyond
nature can be thought without contradiction, it [i.e., speculative reason]
will in a moral
.

215

1

respect,

i.e.,

for

its

own

practical

acknowledge those ideas

law and the

as real, so as not to

iu;.
fall

into

Gregor (The Hague:
Mart°nTs'hfilFT^|r^^ ^
knowledge of man (anthropology)
can’ adont efth^r
of view. Physiological

knowle|e

pragmatic, what

man

tigates

as a free apent

(Hereafter’referred to as

‘.Anft^oMog;

•

^

of Viev

^

trans.

treatise

Maty

J.

comprising our

or. pragn,a,c point
what nature makes of him:
”

f

Ibid, p. 61.

**^*^'^ Fcnves.
(Johns
Hopkins, Baltimoremore, 1993)
i yyj), n
p. 1loStThel
08 (The latter will hereader be
referred to as VtTP”).

^^

iherf.

«a
“Anthropology”,
1

"kotte in

-P--n-ble

Philosophy” in“RTTP” n SI “tf
(from a theoretical point of
view’h'his alone

p. 61.

2

101 7
301-2

of ‘he “historical sign” in “An
Old Question” nn
Appropnately enough, the sign in
question is not associated
with

specmtors
pectators
1

<>f “--hful participation”
that

,

“nm
not

actually engaged in the

game

[i.e.,

aCLntous
aZng

arose
the French Revolution] themselves.”

22

14
123

l“^R” p.

57. //Immanuel Kants

Werke: Band VI

For unlike the positing of pragmatic
or technical

“P°"
must take on!
Tusure
f
on a form
of non-natural necessity. The

(Berlin:

acts, the

Bruno

Cassirer, 1914), pp.

purportedly moral action

is

espedally^r because-h

actualization of freedom takes place
suffused with the non-moral acts of
other wills over whfrh the
autonomous subject has no control; ultimately
the subject’s very fmitude poses a
seemingly ineradicable threat to the subject’s
ability to act as final purpose and
^ to
lu mvesi
invest
the world With an “absolute value.”
in

124

125

126

a natural history that

is

Theodicy”, pp. 24-37.
Theodicy”,

CPrR,

p. 24.

p. 121,
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'''

CJ, p. 350.
Ibid, p. 92.

I

?Q

CJ, p. 342/7533.
Ibid.

RBR, p.
RBR,
'''

134

57.

p. 57.

Ibid, p. 93.

CPrR,

p. 107//139.

T

*'*i" i'- Past injustice has occurred and
"
comple e/ ThTs
completed.
The slam are really slam. .If one takes
the lack of closure entirely
nously, one must believe m the
Last Judgment.. .’...The corrective
to this line of
inking may be found m the
consideration that history is not simply
a science but also
has -deten^iLd’, remembLn"
an mod
^
^ can make the incomplete
(happiness) into something
comnlei and the complete (suffering)
complete,
into something

w

is
i^s

m

.

LT

incomplete.”

fu en

^

ethical subject can “expect that nature
will now and
zufalligen Beitritt] to the purpose he feels

u
by chance
accede [hm und wieder einen

so obligated and impelled to achieve,
he can never expect nature to harmonize with
it in
way governed by laws and permanent rules (such as
his inner maxims are and must
be). Deceit, violence, and envy will
always be rife around him, even though he himself
IS honest, peaceable, and
benevolent.”
a

CJ, p. 349.

’^^CJ,p. 114.

“On

a

Newly Arisen

Superior Tone in Philosophy”, in

RTTP,

p. 67.

CJ, p. 364/7553.
141 T

in

two respects, however, Kant converts this lack of a tradition into a virtue.
For the
becomes ethical only if it recognizes that attaining such a condition is a never to

subject
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with an external.

an ethical substance that
merely needs to be
morality itself is something

ftaUmerges

that will

never transpire

nre’’^”'’

L ^a ^

endowed with

a

’’"""P'"
°f self-cogmtion

"V

if it is searched for in th
character of the ethical reaui
es some

.i T

«'« precarious
“> •>«

something that has objective
existence- the^cn T'T'
imaginatiL that formnaXira,™^^^^^^^^

mistaken for

T'

subject has no choice tat

m th^

(which the

^

Cf CPR, “The Antinomy of Pure
Rlason^vsterTtar

nature.

the first place

we must recoaiize that o,,m

T

a?

Cosmological Ideas”: “In

142

CJ, p. 349/7539.
Cf. Joan Copjec, “Evil in the
Time of the Finite World”, in Radical Evil
Joan
pjec, ed. (London: Verso,
1996), p. xv: “guilt, our sure sense that we
have

phenomenal form in which the law makes
itself known
The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso,
1997) p 230
ethically which guarantees that I
”
remain an ethical

Ak!?s*^ir’
to u.s^
us. Also
see Slavoj .Zizek,
^

my

•

.

fai

ure to act

the°"
In the
second Critique

subject

Kant cites Juvenal after disclosing the fact of
reason: “Be a good
soldier, a good guardian, and an
incorruptible judge; if summoned to bear
witness in
some dubious and uncertain cause, though Phalaris
himself should dictate that you
peijure yourself .count it the greatest of
all iniquities to prefer life to honor
and to lose
lor the sake of living, all tat makes
life worth living.” CPrR,
p. 131.
.

Wile

the arbitrary decree of a sovereign seems
to bear a formal similarity to such a
is, he commands that something
be done because he says so. irrespective

sacnftce (that

of any purpose),

it

is in fact antithetical

to Kantian ethics because

it

utilizes a

“formal”

principle in order to further the law-making and
law-preserving functions of the state. It
IS
this context that Zizek attempts to separate
Kantian ethics from the invocation of
Kant that emerged during the trial of Eichmann (where the
accused defended himself on
the Kantian principle that he was simply following
orders for the sake of duty as
such; the problem here, as Zizek presents it, is that duty
as such had been enlisted for
the purpose of achieving a particular end. For National
Socialism “relied on a precise

m
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were instrumentafcej’a^d
145

RBR,

«hical injunctions

p. 59.

146

CJ, p. 345.
147

.he

hl^cTeed for

‘^at

ideal not of reason but
of ir^aaSn
merely randomly incites it The asnect

action

not ”s so ca^^td

is

whose

desires

L™

is

H

bZ^

satisfaction constitutes

underscores
f
“Happiness
an
f^‘®™atically guide the but
will,

f

of happiness which incites
us to
unforeseeable

itr‘matt™™slf'^'* m”ih

Rea^ (Toronto: University ofT“prsM98ol
1

48

RHR.

P-

58//Inunanuel Kants Werke: Schriften
Ifm en

Bruno Cassirer, 1914),

p. 142.

’

^ 77

lipr; n
Von
von 1700
/VU-1796.
Band: ti
VI
...

I

Smsit

m

i

.

i-

(Berlin:

ooproblematically

Perfectly consistent with the
“fact”
that
tVip moral11
that the
law only exists in the subject’s
relation to it. And yet whether
or
nouhe
proper relation is being maintained
is something that
cannot be gauged from the results
of particular actions For there is
no external objective measure by
1

2
r

“

K

•

*e

a

“

whichThfsuS

limits

imposed upon subjectivity

^

'a‘

rsublation

But

if this

ul Jately'a'2ed

"’0 second Critique encapsulates
the process of
of a theological supplement to morality

that culminates in the presentation

and thus to human tooiy: “when morals
(which merely imposesities
provide rules for selfish wishes) has been
set forth completely,

J d“

then— after

the moral

wish, based on a law, to promote the
highest good. .has been awakened, which
could
not previously have arisen in any selfish
soul, and for the sake of this wish the
step to
religion has been taken— then for the
first time can this ethical doctrine
[Christianity]
also be called a doctrine of happiness,
because it is only with religion that the hope of
happiness first arises.” (CPrR, pp. 108-9//141
.).
.

151

RBR,
CPrR,

p. 58//142.

p. 12

(Emphasis added).

CJ, p. 342.
CJ, p. 369.
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155

CPrR,

p. 106.

RBR,p. 58//143.
Theoretical reason’s indomitable
desire for ‘jpninr.rr
of totality is reenacted in the
snhere of nnrf
u^
a de.em,i„a,ion ,ha, co.dd

m

j-

t

•

unconditioned and the concept

reives

no em

necessity of the fact

of^eSnlfrLdom>^“^^^^
unconditioned for the pmcfellv
cond^

Part for being able to

ft

comprehend the

’

k

needs), not indeed as the
determining ground
the moral law), it seeks
the

under the

name of the

if dlfwdrbut"
unconditfoLd totalhi^f the’ohTerr?

highest good.”

(CPrR pp 90

^

157

Ibid.

1

58

be independent of nature,

Z V’

eets all the

self-sufficient,

and a

final

purpose.”

of Fantasies, p. 235. "the problem
with diabolical
cntena of the transcendental definition
of a morally good act

evil is that

it

Kant’s

rejection of ‘diabolical Evil’ is a
theoretically incoherent disavoXf
the nccltri
consequence of his own thought: the inherent
logic of his thought effectively
comiilled
him to posit [It]... as the paradox of an
evil prompted by no pathological
mofivations.”

Such a confiahon explains for Kant the
phenomenon of “radical evil”, whereby the
subject imports the incentives of his
sensuous nature into his maxims “as of
themselves
sufficien for he determination of his
power of choice. .[genuine evil [thus] consists
.

inclinations

when

they invite transgression.” RBR,
pp.
s"t°i'rn'^'xi,"°* *?i
a
surrender
to the principle of heteronomy, to
’
1
fh dernands
A
the
of the lower power of desire which— in an
act of self-deception— are
elevated to the status of moral principles.
161

1

62

RBR,

p. 82.

Cf Maurice

Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow”
McCleary trans. (Evanston: Northwestern, 1964),
p. 172.
,

C.
res

RBR,

p. 82.

164

Ibid.
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in

Signs Richard

1

'“ibid, p. 57//141.

'“CJ,

p.

RBR,

341.

p. 58.

168

Ibid, p. 60// 145.
169

Cf., e.g.,

..... b.

RBR,

p. 70.

....

subject a non-pathological
expenence. For a recent overview
of contemnoraw
interpretations of the Kantian
sublime cf. Peter
’

1

Fenves “Taking Stock o^f
glgbteen th-Century Studies vol.
28, no. 1 (1994), pp. 65-82.

^f

,

7

on
t
contained

sublime, in the proper meaning

of the term, cannot be
m any sensible foim but concerns only ideas of reason,

which, though they
exhibited adequately, are aroused and
called to mind by this very mauequacy.
inLequacv
which can he exhibited in sensibility.”

camot be

172

^

CJ,p. 123.

173

Ibid, pp.

119-120.

174

Ibid, p. 121.

Kant

IS careful to emphasize how the
sublimity of nature does not translate into some
of hitherto undiscovered law of nature; as
usual, the subject can know only that
which It posits, and in this case what it knows is how
it can judge nature in accordance
with Its own rational ideas; nature as appearance
then provides a point of orientation
that directs the subject beyond phenomenal
nature and toward its supersensible
vocahon: the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect
for our own vocation. But by a

sort

certain subreption (in

which respect for the object is substituted for respect for the idea
of humanity within ourselves as subject) t his respect is accorded
an object of nature
that, as it were, makes intuitable for us the
superiority of the rational vocation of our
cognitive powers over the greatest power of sensibility.”
CJ, p. 114.

221

176

Ibid, p. 119.

cf.

by

us,

the

having been prepared through

a judgment about the sublime
in nature

was initially produced by culture
and
mere convention. Rather it has its

foundation

1

78

Paul de

Man, “Phenomenality and

Materiality in Kant”

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996),

p.

87

Ibid.

attributes to

Cf

e.g.

de Man,

Democritus and Epicurus

RBR,

—

cf.

CJ, pp. 212,21A

p. 78.

p. 87.

CJ,p. 134; de Man,

p. 87.

Cf. CJ, p. 128. Judging an object sublime
“strains the imagination
whether of expansion (mathematically) or of its
might over

to its limit

mind (dynamically).
based on a feeling that the mind has
the

e judging strains the imagination because

it

is

vocation that wholly transcends the domain of
nature (namely, moral feeling).”

RBR,

p. 72.

'^^RBR,p. 103//200.
187

•

Giorgio Agamben, The
Stanford University Press,

Man
1

Without Content Georgia Albert
,

trans. (Stanford:

999).

CJ, p. 120.

RBR,

p.

94 (Kant’s emphasis).

RBR, p. 120//224. For an elaboration of how such an aesthetic manifestation of
heroism (the “stirring and shining example’) has the principal effect of dulling the

222

a

'

moral disposition,
lies in

the

cf., e.g.

common moral

RBR

n

more than to do what
“f^onder.^Thus]

^

order and

is

admiration [serves as].,.a
dulferof o

were something extramdinaty

not
"

tVi^

8*™ obedience

anii

traditionally interpreted
as giving rise to certain a
appears here as inimical to

to

act that has

been

L pferarnTa ^^peTeS'rr

Cf.
1

GW,p. 81;CJ,

it

th

p. 121//333.

92

Kant (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press.
193

CJ, pp. 124,128.

194

CJ, p. 182.

because

L“fnguisTes‘ frot
demarcating the borderland separating
thelic'al
something can be “sublime aesthetirallv” m,c a

it

is

a feeling

“e“hcTw^^^^
hor while
aesthetic,

.

t'rrr "S"” r f
mta
harmonize, unintentionallv” tCT

ineir
theTr'^xhibh
exhibition

with

t.

etlncal potential, although in
the

autonomy^

i-rrSv
[affect]
IS

happens when ideas in

n

I't't'i

nr>ixr

4.-

>>

vtySfcL^htve"^^^

otrcumscribed by the need to preserve
morality’s law of

^ocompanied by affect [as its effect],
seems to be sublime, so much so

n'^;
called
enthusiasm. This mental state
commonly alleged that nothing great can be

this

that

it

accomplished without it. But an affect
IS an agitation of the mind that
makes it unable to engage in free deliberation
about
principles with the aim of deteraiining
itself according to them. Hence
there is no way it
can deserve to be hked by reason. Yet
enthusiasm is sublime aesthetically, because
it is
a s ammg of our forces by ideas that
impart to the mind a momentum whose
effects are
mightier md more permanent than are those
of an impulse produced by representations
of sense. But. strange though it seems, even [the
state of] being without affects. .in a
mind that vigorously pursues its immutable principles
is sublime, and. ..in a far superior
way, because it also has pure reason’s liking on its
side.”
.
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"

What this passage indicates is
synonymous with moral feeling

that the feelino

of

despite the facUhat
as formally “similar”
[verwandtl For an act dnn«^ f
aesthetically sublime in terms
aesthetic

moment

ui-

o

the^^

^^ses be viewed

presented as

of its cause and effer[T

as such, as

not necessarily

soLSoTe

'"duces can also devolve tnto
an enjoyment of the
“agreeable”
197

On

the ethics

of the Stoa cf CPrR,

-'f
cl

s the

CJ, p.

p. 106.

198

CJ, p. 119.
199

..buL'-it

"T

subhmity of our mtelleetual ability
might also not be genutne.
Forhefe fte liic na
concerns only our ability’s vocation,
revealed in such cases, insofar
as *e
predisposition to this ability is part
of our nature whereas it remains
up to us as our
obligation, to develop and exercise
this ability.”
’

200

On Kant

s

use of “xexvri”

viz. nature

and human

art cf.

CJ, pp. 99, 237.

201

CJ, pp. 272,272.
202

CJ, p. 331.
203

204

Cf

CJ,p. 127.

CJ, pp. 52,260.

205

RBR, p.
And cf CPrR, p. 107: “the moral law of itself still does
95^
not promise any
happiness... The Chnstian doctrine of morals
now supplements
this lack... by

representing the world in which rational
beings devote themselves with their whole soul
to the moral law as a kingdom of god,
in which nature and morals come into
a harmony ’
foreign to each of them of itself, through a
holy author who makes the derived highest
^
good possible.”
206

Cf

“Among the three pure ideas of reason, God, freedom, and
immortality, that of freedom is the only concept of
the supersensible which (by
of the causality that we think in it) proves in nature that
it has objective reality,
effects
207

CJ, p. 368.

it

can produce in

it.”

CJ, p. 365//5S4

224

means
by the

1

CJ, p. 365.

'"'RBR,p. 177.
CJ, p. 3667/554.

symbolic, rather

“d
as

way of conceiving

tte supreme^6^^/ a d

^.”°"° f

” “'hf°Pomorphic

1

theurgy (a fanatical
delurnTha'retn^^^^^^^^^^^^^
other superpible beings)
or idolatry (superstitious
dl®
we
^selves pleasing to the
supreme being by means other than
a moral attitude ” CJ,
p.

ioX can“"^’

212

CPR,

p. 7.

CJ, p. 340.

^’'CJ,p. 341.

^'^CJ,p.

7.

''^CJ, p. 351.

^'^CJ, p. 342/7533.

^’^RBR,

p. 92.

^’^CJ,

340//531.

p.

CJ, 340.

CJ, p. 342/7533.
22

CJ, p. 337. “Our relation to a purpose, and with
it to the law that governs it, can
be
determined a priori within ourselves, and hence can
be cognized as necessary; hence for
this [relation to a purpose] moral teleology
does not require an intelligent cause outside
us [to account] for that inner lawfubess, just as
the puiposiveness we find in the
geometric properties of figures. .does not entitle us to look

beyond them

.

understanding that imparts

it

to

them.”

225

to a

supreme

CJ, p. 337.
CJ, p. 340.
CJ, p. 342.
225

in the context

analogy with

°f demOTstrahng
art

or

human

nrapHoci

®^r*3tural purposiveness

•

causal based upo^apldnterf'Crr^^^^
amount

for

Kant to a form of non-human

If

Sr:=““~

Spinozism be granted [the claiml

"’I® '?

deduction

h

™ '"‘dissociable relationship

the central

ts

that the

problem addressed

Sh T

he highest good as the corollary,
as

‘

of nature

accidents].

^ r u

this

on

»f
would

But even

if

seems to lack any sort of rigorous
Yovel’s Kant and tL Philosonhv of

that

in

for
it

were, to the categorical imperative

It is

at this

'"sk of
Kan ia7erhl?th^
Kantian
ethics that Kant has recourse
to “ohscure images and
metaphors” and
exteaneous moralistic considerations
are brought in... [like] a vague
feeling of
justice... not rooted in Kant’s
basic ethics.” (pp. 61-3)

The

entire third Critique,

pnnciple

o^udgment

^d understanding:

however,

is based upon the concept
of analogy (the
thought of as a cognitive power on analogy
with reason
160) and the recognition that reason has no choice
but to

itself is

(CJ, p.

ep oy images and metaphors” if it is to
cross the immense chasm separating
practical
eedom from mechanical nature given the absence
of a determinate concept
corresponding to either realm (considered as
noumenon). As for the
“extraneous

moralistic considerations” that

been argued

Kant brings

to his presentation

that theological concepts lie at the
origin

entire ^chitectonic

of a historical ethic: it has
of the Kantian system and the

of reason

way of justifying

that is constructed in the three Critiques
can be seen as a
these principles in a redefined and “purified”
way; Kant announces in

the preface to the

first

Critique, after all, that he is delimiting the proper
boundaries of
reason to open a space for faith albeit an unprecedented
form of religious faith.
In the concluding sections of the third Critique,
Kant presents the

—

relationship

between the theological and the moral

as

something that necessarily

arises out

of the

immense chasm that underlies, as it were, the text that completes his
system. The
subject whose finite nature directs it toward an indeterminate
idea of happiness is also
bound by law as such; since the former enjoins the will to struggle against
but not

226

so, the will
first

would be a

place which

Wy wm7hllt^^

had done

‘

is

^li ur.^

'=>«

felt as a violafio
*"
of
brought into a harmonious
he
relation with one anoth^thi^^'^m
necessary imperative
™P°asible
but
prescribed to the subiecf “one ? !
purpose as pure reason
‘
prescribes it to the being
the ori?"^ purpose
irresistible and is put
^
that is
^
into these beinar: Kv tia
I
beings [i.e. the insatiable,
‘‘lower” desire for
-

happiness]. .[butl
.

is that
its

[our achieving]

[attainment] be

be subiect

it

made

all

thauLT
mn

to the

^^^ists
its

univer^^^^^^^^^^^

makes

the final purpose is the
furtherance of
p. 341).
227

upon concerning

this

purpose

1

appmess

in

inviolable condition, or

J
harmony

to

reason
with morality.” (CJ,

CJ, p. 342.

CPrR,p. 107.
790

CJ, p. 342/7533.

"'"CPrR,p. 106.
231

Ibid.
232

CJ, p. 128.

233

theoretical

and practical

And yet the lerrUo^ on
^

emphasis]

its

T ofthe
f
objects ofall possible experience.”

tot
total
234

235

CJ,p. 120. CPrR,p. 134//103.

CPrR,p.

whichits domainfs set r»!it,
always connneu
confined to me
the sum

legislation is still

107.

CJ, p. 342.
237

CJ, p. 116 (Kant’s emphasis).
CJ, p.341.
CJ, p. 320//512.

227

“0
241

Ibid.

CJ, p. 317//509.

volabon'o'be ;L
have the understanding and
the

i<

winm
^“^70
^

etve'^h th'

punrose than can be
3 .0
purpose however, we must not
seek withta

is

man’s

subject to a condition: he
must
reference to a

^,^
ntmTlT’jwtmnt

7r7:“aT;:Ze7”^
243

244

CJ, p. 25.

CJ, pp. 22-3.

CJ,p. 100.
Ibid.

CJ, p. 113.
CJ, p. 120.
249

CJ, pp. 38/7266. The three mental
powers are the cognitive power
[Erkenntnisvermdgen], the feeling of

pleasure and displeasure, and the

Ih crou7h
which
ought

“"

lo
to take place

process whereby

expanding
It

power of desire

mental powers

rr'r m a judgment ofthe sublime, a relation which
manifests itself
••’e

reason exerts a violence over sensibility
only for the sake of
practical one) and letting
an abyss”, (p. 124) And for
represented as but the negative manifestation
of its own

commensurately with reason’s own domain (the
look outward toward the infinite, which
for sensibility is

reason, the

It

abyss”

is

supersensible vocation. But in the idea of
the reversal that is here being introduced
the
latter would itself appear abyssal
to reason-the very moment which the three
Critiques
are designed to preempt.
250

CPrR,

p. 27.

RBR,

p. 103.

CJ, p. 3427/533.
253

“On

a

Newly Arisen Superior Tone

in Philosophy”,

228

RTTP,

p. 51.

254

CPrR,

p. 108.

255

.he^^Lron
soldier, a

good guardian, and an

some dubious and

incZ^

uncertain cause thmioh Ph
perjure yourself and bring
his bull’tl
prefer life to honor and
^

1

CPrR,
256

257

Of ..on. To augment
-Be a good
^ aa^^ooned to bear
witness in
fact

to lose ’ for the «?alT

p, 131.

‘

i„d
'^i

P’

should dictate

n’''''’"g“f

all »

that

you

greatest of al iniquities
to
hat makes life worth

living.”

CJ. p. 342.
CJ,

p.

341.

258

must not

lie’in 'he

^ avU,

difftrencfSwTeL^^^^^^

m the material of the maxim) but in their r A ^ ^ ‘"eorporates into his maxim
suWmarmn (m the form of the maxim):
which of, he rtvrt
(not

-

he

mrtfesT'wl

T
LorporaSih::';!:^^'’^^^^^^^^
(even the best) TeviT nntv

259

CPrR,

causa

ity,

*at the human being

tl

>’ia

p. 106.

and hence the unconditioned
basis

for

what

teleological order. .In the second
question (which
course presupposing that this cause
is capable of

—

.

“'S: ,r

CJ,p.

RBR,

1

is

conditioned [(as

we

are

is the one we must ask)l
we are of
forming a representation of pum^es

Si" iJlgSfSS.
262

incentives in

357/347.

p. 177.

^^"^CPrR, p. 107.

229

^

1

265

terms: “time

5f

on

S3=r—
g ns he

in

Kafka

s _[he

Tnal:

an acquittal can only be hoped for
which makes un
"» ''"'g^r t»t a give moment, but from
the
vtewpomt
v^ewoViXf^^
of a progress that cont.nues to
inf.nity in its ever increasing
conformity with
consciousness of perseverance in moral
progress) This
nath
V
° u'*®
immortality, follows
rh^ct^!’
straight line of time, inexorable,
and incessant, upon which we remain
in constant
contact wi* the law. But this indefinite
prolongation, rather than leading us to
a
paradise above, already installs us
a hell here below.” [Giles Deleuze,
Essays
gnlical and Clinical Daniel W. Smith and

m

Michael A. Greco

trans.

University of Minnesota Press,
1997), pp. 28, 33].

(Minnii^s-

266

CJ, p. 342//S34.
267

Ibid.

Ibid (emphasis added).

CPR,
270

p.

246//143.

The “Stimme” of einstimmen evokes

implies both agreement and consent.

the voice in the sense

And

of a vote

that further

the word’s derivation from

“Stimmung”(mning, mood, disposition) connotes a state of attunement.
Furthermore,
on analogy with musical instruments, aufeinander einstimmen
signifies two persons
who become attuned to one another. As has become evident, for Kant, the
cognitive
powers themselves (understanding, judgment, reason) take on the quality
of persons.

27

Nature

may

emergence of freedom in the sense that it prepares the
independence from nature. The rupture is conditioned, as it were, or
It seems so only because when Kant “talks
about nature putting obstacles in the way of
the causality governed by laws of freedom. .or about nature furthering it”
he is
subject to exert

“facilitate” the
its

.

referring to

freedom

how

[in

appearances

a “resistance or furtherance” takes place “not between nature and
themselves] but between nature as appearance and the effects of freedom as
in the

world of sense.

.

.It is

[the special] causality’s determination

230

whose

when we
272

think

explicable,

freedomTfcXp°?6^^

m the intelligible that is though of

CJ, pp. 367-8.

273

For a synoptic presentation
of how a moral
system in a way that compels

faith

the latter to extend

^ecessanly anses out of the
Kantian

boundaries of human

Ihe

knowledge cf CJ- “the h^oh ^f r
achieve, that which alone
can make us
ofhH
creation, is an idea that has
objective
realitv

cannot provide this concent w
th reaH^fr
purpose is a mere
; faith

^70“

immortality, which

fo

^^hfcondh

^ ^^

L

in a

,u

m.^T

on f

P“rpose of

^

T

T".; 7'

=‘'”"8

God and

'*

human reason, we 0 00
»f our
° Achieving] the effect
[the final
purpose] of the lawful use of our ffeedn
fro:^ a pie Practil?
assent
of v
'^'“''7
theoretical pure rational
cognition7[N;velebss h

W7

»

.rhleH

ilsliiiPiis
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Adorno, Negative Dialectics

,

p.

248.

275

Ibid.

formative of the firnction of the

"’.'."'O’'

“PO"oooe

Colpll
277

Adomo,

p.

as

revealed in
m Ecnts, Alan Sheridan trans. (New York: W. W.
Norton &
I

248.

278

CJ, p. 20 (emphasis added).
279

CJ, p. 52/7278. “The agreeable, the beautiful
and the good designate three different
relations that representations have to
the feeling of pleasure

and displeasure, the

feeling
by reference to which we distinguish between
objects or between ways of representing
them. .We call agreeable what gratifies us,
beautiful what we
.

just like,

esteem.
280

Cf

CJ, pp. 33-4, 260.

moments

The concept of purposiveness

in the third Critique. First,

it

indicates nothing

231

good what

contains four ascending

more than an

internal

we

phenomenal form

to nature.

^ ^
that is neither treated

That

(33-4).

is,

L„,=
nifests itee
rtself
?!n
tn

powers

subject, is apprehension

of a

confronted with the ‘Mnmiense
diversity’’ of empirical

P7“""”

maS

“ahrihirte

°

r

forms

that

[Natumveck], The purposiveness of
nature now
can only be understood by reason
as though they were

,°“®

’mT^r “

P^nature wi't^f^
itilf
1^

The
of “

a concern, as

it

subfect can then

were, for our cognitive

*'>' ®'>o«<=d '"e subject to

7?
^

discover a source of harmony within
1
^ transition point for the recognition
of the natural pui^ose which
hen lead
eads reason inexorably to the fourth
moment: in keeping with its demand for
unity, a natural purpose is unthinkable
outside of what then appears to be its
proper
context That is, with one natural purpose
there must be more; in fact they must
all be
joined together into a ‘ system of purposes.”
But such a unified system of purposes
would be incomplete unless it contained a foundation
that must be represented as the
purpose of the purposes, as the unconditional
or final purpose. And this can only be the
human subject. But for the subject to consistently represent
itself in this way it must,
since It IS a being of sense, understand such
a final purpose in terms that harmonize the
causes and effecfr of that special causality called
freedom. And as was discussed above,
such harmonization occurs only with the legitimation
and justification of the noncontradictory character of the rational concept of
freedom, which in turn requires that it
be conjoined with the rational concepts of God and
immortality. Only in this way can
the historicization of the law, the reconciliation
of virtue and happiness, occur.
281

282

CJ, p. 168//375.
CJ, pp. 29-30:

When pleasure

is connected with mere apprehension of the form
of
an object of intuifion...[it] cannot express anything other than the
object’s being
commensurate with the cognitive powers that are... brought into play when we judge

reflectively,

and hence [expresses] merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the

object.”

232

'

'''

CJ,

p. 167.

CJ, p. 365,168.
'''

CJ, p. 168.

-

wL"’
Wha,

then remains of

thiLpp“atoS

be thought of as precarious
only if reason
certain historical cognition
of the a hi ct

•

P'"P°-

V

fails to

trand^?

'he problems a,

^ foundation that

^^s

”

is to

self-cognition into a

i

by .he

Copenncan Revolu.C The
special emphasis

by Kant- “reason cannot h
u
me,aphys.cal] hope" and to re^ri,
oTd ttaoL:^^
based upon a correctible ca^e of n^ictou
made endurable by the principle of
moral fehh'""’

interpretation

is

given

\

'“PT

^ince the latter

was
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#^==“=S=='=-

greeable, the beautiful, and the
good” as designations
at representations have to
the feeling of pleasure and
occasmn for the gratification of inclination,
the second
ird for a renunciation of
mere pleasure in the attitude

^

of the “three

displeasure ”

different relations

The

first is

an

for a disinterested liking and
the

of respect which is
simply rearranging the
valorization of “natural feeling” and

(52ff). Schiller is not

H

^ conceptual grid in his

h eauhful
i f,
virtuj the concept of freedom
and the “representability” of lawfiilness
themselves undergo a fundamental
reevaluation.
1
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Duke nf

P"™®

F"^‘bich Christian,
“'"'be composition and

^
Letters

w

f
A Willoughby
n°"
UA.

o n Aesthetic Education see Elizabeth
M. Wilkinson and
,

s extensive introduction to their
translation (Oxford: Clarendon 1967).

.™*bout the introduction and footnotes in
Friedrich Schiller:
Walter Hmderer and Daniel O. Dahlstrom ed.
(Continuum: New York 1993)
The fotte^edition will be cited below along with
Friedrich Schiller, Samtliche Werke:
V; Philosophische Schriften (Miinchen
:Winkler-Verlag, 1968) as “Essays” and

^nd

,

Werke

289

290

LAE,
CPrR,

respectively. (Hereafter references to this
text will be cited as: “LAE”).
p. 87//310.

p. 80.

233

291

form of an object of
inmkior^*e'i!teure
object’s being commensurate
with the comitive
Spiel] when we judge
reflectively’’

pp 29

“PPrehension of the
anything other than the

3^^

Edu';C^;rre“wstolfm?ota^ ^

freedom as two

psychological drives: the sense-drive pnH tv, c
system in the individual psyche ”
[Juliet Svrh

shown above that in the iudfmipnt r.f tUo
it can become
an “instrument” of reason

o

ur

^

which^
^^

inS^^^^

different

After

P‘

J

.

mxoptay [im

^^us relocates Kant’s

1^

nature to freedom in the thijd
Cnt ^.eTn
beauty, in order for the
subject to recomi'
nature Furthermorf as

•'’''ought

own

nsu«

Critique in motion by ts“
^^^^^^
acting as a form of preThefic or!I!.rn
f
agency. Paul de Man acknowledges

»uagination

is

all, it

was

“sacrificed” so that

'n ««= movement from
approached, with a feeling for
sublimity and independence
from
power of desire-sets the first

nnconditioned, thus

thr^miMt/bl^el”^^^^^^^

^

Wi,h . artcii,

hermore the idealism of Schiller
contrasts with the
guage of Kant In short, “Schiller
appears as

transcendental-critical
the ideology of Kant’s critical

philosophy. Paul de Man, “Kant
and Schiller” in Aesthetifideoloev. (Minneapnliaimneapoiis.
^
University of Minnesota Press, 1996
pp. 143,147.

^

),

philosophical and the
psychological converge upon one another
in the very articulation of the
historical ethic
attempted by both Kant and Schiller.
Kant recognizes that this will require a
modification of the system (i.e. the subject—
as an irreducibly pathological being-

however,

is itself

perseveres

dictated

by the terms of the system. The agency of

reason thus
m the third Critique when its demands necessitate the theological

supplement

The “psychologism” of Schiller noted by Sychrava
and de Man
one aspect of his “further development Kantian
ideas” that attempts to re-work, and
not abandon, the relationship between the
transcendental and the empirical throu^ the
introduction of what at first appears to be the
non-mechanical,
to morality.

IS

the

play dnve’’.

non-theological time of

on temporality that serves as the primary impetus
behind Schiller’s personification of the Kantian incentives
which are explicitly
presented in the language of Kant’s transcendental
aesthetic; the interaction of the formdnve and sense-drive creates the conditions of possibility for
It is

this accent

an ethic of history out of

234

implications”.
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294

295

LAE,p.
CJ,

attributed to the “individual

^

psyche’’?hTth^^^^^

with “epistemological

127//353.

p. 92.

CJ, p. 20.

296

“On the miscarriage ofall philosophical
trials in theodicy” in RRT n os -n,
^
p. 25. The
ambiguities surrounding the
interrelationctiin
”®''**^
aesthetic, the
secularly moral and the natural
then recur jusUterX dted^
proves itself adequate to ideas the
possibimv of
reason (e.g. when means and
ends reciprocally produce
o^'^aTOthTr^Y
odies) [we can think of such
purposes as the product of) .a
divine’art.”"
. .

297

pleasure.

The capacity

be understood neither

for producing artworks
deserving the

in a

“judgment” of genius is to
morally autonomous nor merely
hetironCous Lnse Or the

what seems to emerge as a result of a
self-positing act in the work of
genius can he
understood in an “extra-moral” and not
merely pathological way; “genius”Zs
signifies the ability to apprehend
the imagination’s rapidly passing
play and to unite it
n a concept that can be communicated
without the constraint of rules (a
concept that on
that

'nftrred from any earlier pnnciples
or examples.” (186). And cf
pp. 181-2:
“c pm^ [GeistJ in
an aesthetic sense is the animating
principle in the mind. But what
is pnnciple uses to animate
the soul, the material it employs for
this, is what imparts
“ purposive momentum, i.e., imparts to them a
play which is such
that It sustains itself on its own and
even strengthens the powers for such play.
This
pnnciple is nothing but the ability to present
aesthetic ideas: and by an aesthetic idea
I
mean a representation of the imagination which prompts
much thought, but to which no
determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate]
concept, can be adequate, so that
no l^guage can express it completely and allow us
to grasp it. .In this process we feel
our freedom from the law of association (which
attaches to the empirical use of the
imagination); for although it is under that law that
nature lends us material, yet we can
process that material into something quite different,
namely, into something that
.

surpasses nature.”
298

LAE,

p.

1

447/37 1.

235

299

Ibid, pp. 121-2//348.

CPR,p.

LAE,

6.

p. 106//331.

Ibid, p. 131.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 121//347.
305

Ibid,p. 126//353. CJ,
p. 135.
Ibid.

CJ,p. 182.

CPR,

pp. 43-4.

Ibid.

p. 165.

CJ, p. 182.
312

without a purpose underlying
a judgment of natural
h. Jf prepares the
beauty
subject for its self-recognition
as an
ofTs
cognitive powers prompted by its
exposure to nature draws it toward
the^laLr
which
en appears to take on a non-mechanical

EndLekTe Iv

quality that provides a “hint”
as to how the
subject’s capacity for freedom can
be corroborated (and thought to be
no^wiftout
practical purpose) by “something”

[which becomes coherentTor
reasonlChis
symbolically as a non-human understanding]
that seems to be connected

Tamral heaT,^

7m
,7

(‘>“«sted to by
"“'“m”) seconrf (or jMpmensiWe) narure.’
“and
possibility [of judging natural beauty]
within him while

heraiisptb
"^iv"
because the subject
has this
outside [hm] there is also the possibility
that nature will harmonize with it,
judgment
nds Itself referred to something that is
both in the subject himself and outside him
something that is neither nature nor freedom
and yet is linked with the basis of freedom
the supersensible, in which the
theoretical and the practical power are in
an unknown
manner combined and joined into a unity. ” ("CJ,
p. 229).
313

LAE,p.

106//331.
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1

^‘"LAE,

p. 121.

^’^LAE,

p. 128.

^’^LAE,p.

1

^‘^LAE,p.

114//340.

27/7334.

territory

319

LAE

115

p.

The need

for such a deduction

is

further

Lr/ virtues '/o 14)”"
LAE,

p.

LAE,

p. 132.

determined bv the

“P°"

“d fall of

65/7394.

1

LAE,p.

107//351.

LAE,

1

p.

and

65/7394.

Ibid. p. 174//404.
325

On the Aesthetic Education of Man

trans. (Oxford:

,

Clarendon Press, 1982),

Elizabeth

M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby

p. 211.

^^^Ibid. p. 90//314.

CPR,

P562-3//514.

LAE,

p.

Ibid, p.

33

1

1

46/7374.

46/7374.

CPR,

p. 30.

CJ,

363.

view,

p.

i.e., it is

Assent in matters of faith is an assent from a pure practical point of
a moral faith that proves nothing for theoretical pure rational cognition,

but only for pure practical cognition that aims
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at

[our]

complying with

[our] duties.”

332

CJ,p. 151.
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® *°«ive

attempt arhistoricization^lSally^^^^^^

Sat

attnbied to the
of opportunity finds a
is

Revolution as a

LAE,

336

337

p.

1

gentat n

historical sign

whose simiflranrp r

327/359.

LAE,p.

128/7355.

CPR,

562/7396.

p.

the

CJ,p. 135.
CJ, pp. 215, 182.

339

CJ, p. 114 and “Inaugural Dissertation”,
in Theoretical Philosop hy:
1755-1770 ed
trans. David Walford, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University PreL,^l
992), pp. 407-8.

and

LAE,

p.

u
Erhabene
T7

1

67/7396.

Sublime”, Daniel O. Dahlstrom trans in
Essays,

m Werke, p. 229.

(Hereafter referred to as “CIS”).

Ibid.

ibid, p. 85//230.

LAE,

p. 178//408.

Ibid, I28//355.

LAE,

p. 93//318.

LAE,

p.

LAE,

p. 126.

1

32/7359.
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p.

84.//“Uber das

p. 92//317.

Ibid, 93//318.
351

Ibid.

Ibid,p. 131.
353

(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell,

1990rp^pTo8-?‘"‘“"’

^^"LAE,p. 177//407.

Cf. p. 170.

ICC

"’LAE,p. 176//406.

CTS,p.

71//216.

357

Lukacs, History and Class Conscimisnpgg
Rodnev T.ivinaQtnn^
(Cambridge: MIT,T97lx^^:i39^^
as

LAE,

p. 92//317.

HCC,

pp., 1 40,

1

43 “History
:

is

an insuperable barrier

HCC).

to a rationalist theory

knowledge .[Once discovered] it succeeded in
identifying
appeanng for the first time, in which philosophically
connections between things were to be

tror.o

the substance,

of

now

the underlying order and the
found, namely history.”

CJ, pp. 36-7.

LAE,p.
362

1

68/7397-8.

CJ,p

182. Cf.LAE,p. 171. The defining fault of
the present age is that is has not
attained to the level of pure semblance. .[it has
not] sufficiently distinguished
existence from appearance, and thereby made the
fi-ontiers of each secure forever. We
.

shall deserve this reproach as long as we... still
refuse imagination
legislative rights of her own.”

365

LAE,

p. 171.

LAE,

p. 92//317.

LAE,

pp.

1

62-3/739 1-2.
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any absolute

Ibid,p. 163// 192.
Ibid, p. 146.

CJ, p. 100.

LAE,

p. 170//400.

LAE,

p. 92//317.

371

Ibid, cf. p. 127//354.

373

CTS,

p. 7I//215.

LAE,

pp. I69-70//399.

Ibid.

LAE,p.
CTS,

128.

p. 8/Z226.

Ibid, p. 70//215.

^^^Ibid, p. 81//226.

Ibid. p. 71//215.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 163//192.
382

CTS, pp. 83-4/229. “. .weil es einmal unsre Bestimmung
ist, auch bei alien
sinnlichen Schranken uns nach dem Gesetzbuch
reiner Geister zu richten. .” Cf.
p. 128.
.

.

LAE,

383

Ibid, pp. 71-2/216. “...eine

Gewalt, die er der Tat nach erleiden mup,

nach zu vemichten, heipt aber nichts anderes,

dem

Begriff

als sich derselben freiwillig

unterwerfen.”
Ibid, p. 83/Z228.

History erects ample pictures [Gemalde] of humanity wrestling
art brings imitations of these images before our
eyes.”

with fate and the tragic
385

•

Ibid, p. 83/Z228. “. .der
.

hochste Schwung der Menschennatur.”
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“aesthetic education”
reading of Schiller put forth
belies the
by Di'eter"^dnri^^
between Kant and Schiller
exclusively” the liuhTof thT* *®f,’’'‘=‘>'-‘»'^s"'etic relation
ideal of morality on
which the
“P “
n ed
^
insoluble conflict with
the Kantian law of reason
The truly moral ch
t
inclination; it does not do
^uty and
its diitfoni
a
^
enjoys that harmony with
itself which^pu"s
on
Perfection of human nature.”
Dieter Heinrich, “Beauty
and Freedom^
c
Kant’s Aesthetics”, in
Essays in Kan t’s Aesthetics
ed Ted rnti
^^yer,
(Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), p. 252.

coSsdf

L''S
’

387

CTS,

p. 83/7228.

389

“Ob^dk^PaSchl?^^^
390

391

CTS,

p. 72//216.

OTP,

p. 53//199.

LAE,

p.

CTS,

p. 85//230.

(hS el°d

"

3Q9
1

65/7394.

OTP,

p. 59//204.

CPrR,

p. 106.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 107.

CTS,

“On

p. 72//217.

the Sublime” in “Essays”, Daniel O.
Dahlstrom trans. p. 32.//
in Werke, p.l76 (Hereafter referred
to as “OTS”).

Erhabenen”

Ibid, p. 34//179.

OTP,

pp. 61,63.
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“Vom
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f
CJ, p. 1135.
">

““cj.pp.

177-8.

CJ, p. 229.

-iS"»

r“ 'r

“

aes he 1C as soon as

it exacts a painftil
sacrifice from those who carry\
out
The
aesthetic judgment contains in these
cases more truth than one usrSly
believes
Vices
that testify to strength of will
clearly proclaim a greater potential
for fruly moral
freedom than do virtues that draw on
inclinations for support. For it
costs the inveterate
villain only a single victoiy over
himself, a single reversal of maxims,
to turn all that

constancy and firmness of will he expends
on

evil into

something good.” (pp. 67-8).

be possible

t

the lawfulness

e purposes that
407

OTP, p

4UO rpv

we

of nature as

are to achieve in nature according
to laws of freedom.”

61//205-6.

•

This inovement

however

to think

being such
m its form will harmonize with at least the possibility of [achievingl

.

is

a progression” insofar as

Schiller’s valonzation

it

leads the subject to

its

moral destiny

’

of the aesthetic makes

more of a delimitation of two
spheres, each of which contains its own particular
value. But this value is assessed on
the basis of whether or not it accentuates the
self-positing power of the will: “in
aesthetic judgments we are interested, not in morality
of itself, but simply in freedom,
and morality can please our imagination only insofar as it
makes that freedom visible!
It IS thus an obvious confounding of
boundaries, for people to demand moral
purposefulness in aesthetic things and to want to drive imagination
from its rightful

domain

as a

means

to

it

expanding reason’s realm.” (OTP,

p. 68).

The Physics Phillip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Comford
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 131-3.
Cf. Anstotle,

^'^PrR,

,

p. 106.

p. 92.
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trans.

^

Schiller,

Resignation” in S^tlicheJWerke:
Erster

Band III), n. 1 15.
dein Lohn ist abgetragen/
deine Weisen fragen/ Was man

D e Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgerich^mH^^^Fi^
Dein Glaube war dein zugewognes GluckADu
konntest
von der Minute ausgeschlagen/Gibt keine

Ewigkeit zuriick.” Weltgericht also signifies
would be “secularized.”

the last judgment

CTS,

a last judgment that in this case

p. 847/229.

'^"‘OTS,p. 32/7176.
appears to arise out of a strange amalgamation
of Christian doctrine
culture. This becomes most evident in
“The Bride of Messina”; in the
essay ongmally published as a theoretical preface
to the text of the drama—“On the use
of the Chorus in Tragedy”(hereafter referred to as
“CT”- Schiller concedes such a
synthesis is hard to jusrify.” But not if it is recognized
that it is the “privilege of poetry
to treat the various religions as a collective
whole for the powers of the imagination,

and Hellenic

which whole everything
feeling, has

its

place.

in

that bears a

unique character or expresses a unique way of

Poetic truth thus utilizes religion in a

manner not unlike Kantian
reason, although the relation between the aesthetic and the
theological is not then
represented by Schiller in explicitly historical terms. Cf Friedrich

von

Bride of Messina Charles E. Passage trans.
,

""^OTP,

p.

(New York: Ungar,

Schiller,

The

1962), pp. 11-2.

45//190;61//208.

Cf Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory Robert-Hullot-Kentor trans.
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 266. “Kant’s doctrine of the
sublime falls short only in that it established the counterpart to this nullity as a positive
,

and situates it in the intelligible subject.” Adorno’s judgment would seem
apply to Schiller’s work as well, even thou^ the status of such “positivity”—the
referent of the “spiritual vocation”
is cast into doubt by Schiller’s particular
infinity

—

valorization of the art of tragedy.

"”^CfLukacs, HCC,

CT,

p. 140.

p. 8/7249.

'‘^^AOT, pp. 9-10//153.

AOT,

pp. 9- 10// 152-3.
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Enlightenment’’ progress:
transfonnation since that

424

Ibid, pp. 717-8.
425

Ibid, pp. 717-8.
426

Ibid, p. 718.
427

Lukacs,

HCC,

p. 139.

428

YorvT' J'
Si’
B^n^, ed. Giorgio

Ihe

Birth of Tragedy . Walter Kaufinann trans.

(New

ihereafter refen-ed to as “BT’’)//Mtische
Studienausgabe:
,
Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter 19SS) n
54. (Hereafter referred to as “KSA”, followed
by volume number and page reference)

CGT,

p. 6.

Sentimental Poetry” in “Essays”, Daniel O. Dahlstrom
r'
trans
The opposite of the naive feeling, namely the reflecting intellect
and the sentimental
mood, is the result of striving, even under the conditions of
reflection, to restore the

naive feeling in terms of the content... It is part of the
essence of sentimental poetry that
nature is set off against art and the ideal against the actual.
If this is not explicitly

done

by the poet and he places before our eyes a portrait of nature
unspoiled or the ideal
folfilled. .that contrast is still in his heart and will
betray itself, even without his willing
it, in every stroke of the pen. Indeed
were this not the case, then the very language he
must use will bring to mind the actual world with its limitations. .For
the language
bears the spirit of the time in itself.” (pp. 233, 212).
.

.

Kritische GesamtausgabeiNietzsche Briefwechsel:

Mazzino Montinari

(Berlin: Walter

de Gruyter, 1975),

Band
p.

III,

ed.

Giorgio Colli and

269.

Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” in Surveys from Exile:
Volume 2 Ben Fowkes trans. (Penguin: New Left Review, 1992), p. 146.
Cf.

LAE,

p. 99ff.
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Ibid, p. 168.

BT,

p. 33/725.

aesthetic state everything—
even the tool that serves—is a
having equal nghts with the noblest;
and the mind, which would force
the
pa lent mass beneath the yoke of its
purposes, must here first obtain its
assent.”
free citizen,

Liability of History for Life” in
The Comp lete
Nietzsche: Unfashionable Observations
Richard T.
!!
(Stanford. Stanford
University Press, 1995), p. 132. (The
former text will hereafter be
referred to as “History”; the latter volume
as “Works”).//KSA (Vol !)•
p. 296. “nur
weim die Histone es ertragt, zum Kunstwerk
umgebildet, also reines Kunstgebilde

W

werden, kann
439

CPR,

sie vielleicht Instincte erhalten

zu

oder sogar wecken.”

p. 27.

What IS of interest to Nietzsche here is primarily the
Schopenhauerian will
underlying the phenomenal world and forever
manifesting itself (imperfectly)

therein as

representation” and Lange’s supposition that the
Kantian thing in itself is but the most

rarefied product of the self-positing subject.
44 ]

S elected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, Christopher
Middleton ed. and
(Indianapolis: Hacked, 1969), p. 18. Frederick Albert
Lange, The History

trans

of

Materialism, Ernest Chester Thomas trans. (New York:
Humanities Press, 1950), p.
342. (Hereafter referred to as “Lange”). On the relationship
between Lange and
Nietzsche cf. above all George J. Stack, Lange and Nietzsche (New
York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1983). For two relatively recent interpretations of the
latter cf. John T.
Wilcox, “The Birth of Nietzsche Out of the Spirit of Lange”(
pp. 81-9) and Daniel
Breazeale, Lange, Nietzsche and Stack” (pp. 91-103) in International
Studies in
Philosophy (Volume 21 11, 1989). The terms of this debate have been set
by Stack’s
decision to direct the question of the possible influence Lange exerted upon
Nietzsche
to the latter’s works of the 1880’s; as a result the early works of
Nietzsche under
consideration here have not been included in what has emerged as yet another subcategory of Nietzsche interpretation.
,

,

:

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Die Teleologie

seit Kant” in Gesammelte Werke:
Musarionausgabe, Erster Band (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1922). (The latter volume
will hereafter be referred to as “Musarion”; the text as “TSK”).

245

TSK,

p. 408.

‘““TSK,p.410.

TSK,

p. 417.

Ibid, p. 425.

LAE,

p. 142.

™ “Die Teleologie
p.

252. (The

Kant,” Claudia Crawford trans.
Appendix to Claudia Crawford
’
of Lancuap e (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1987)
Musanon edition does not include the last
paragraph of Nietzsche’s
Ntetzsche
f
seit

M

prospectus from which
449

8

P

^ Nietzsche On Schopenhauer” Christopher
Janaway

^

M.Ihmgness: Schope^_auer.^>^^

^

s

this citation is taken).

Clarendon Press, 1998),

p.

trans. In

Willing and

Janaway-^

259. (Hereafter referred to as

(Oxford-

“On Schopenhauer”).

Ibid cf p. 262: “Schopenhauer requires
that something which can never be
an
object should nevertheless be thought of
objectively. But on this route we can reach
only an apparent objectivity, given that a totally
obscure, inconceivable
is being
decked out, as if in brightly colored clothes, with
predicates drawn from a world alien to
It, the world of appearance.”

X

“Thus the Schopenhauerian thing in itself would be the
principium
and at the same time ground of necessitation in other words,
just the
ordinary world that is present to hand. Schopenhauer
wanted to find the X in an
equation; his calculation yields the result that = X, which
means that he has not found
Ibid, p. 264.

—

individuationis

it.”

TSK,

p. 417.

Cf “Lange”, p.228: “The conception of duty which calls to us, ‘thou shaft’ cannot
possibly continue clear and strong, if it is not combined with the conception
of the
of carrying out this command. For this reason, therefore, we must, with
regard to the morality of our conduct, transfer ourselves entirely into the intellectual
possibility

world in which alone freedom

TSK,

is

conceivable.”

p. 408.

Lange, pp. 231-2. “Kant would not understand, what Plato before him would not
understand, that the ‘intelligible world’ is a world of poesis, and that precisely upon
fact rests its worth and nobleness. For poesis. .cannot be regarded as a capricious
.
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this

plaything of talent and fancy with
empty imaginations for amusement
but is a
necessary offspring of the soul, arising
from the deepest life-roots of
the race.”
456

459

460

TSK, p.412.
Ibid, p.

422.

Lange,

p.

337.

Arcndt, “The Concept of History”,

Lange,

p. 89.

339-40.

pp.
“In our commerce with this power
we are exclusively dependent
upon expenence and upon reality and no
speculation has ever found the means
of
penetrating by the magic of pure thought
into the world of things.”
461

Ibid.
462

Ibid.

BT,

p. 45.

Lange, pp. 364-5.

What was

cited above as an intimation of “something
else, of a power that now
compels us and now is dominated by us” does not introduce
anything like a qualitative,

histoncal relation.

It rather suggests that a fateful play
of forces is at work in the
structurally unvarying experience of being in the world.
(Lange, pp. 339-340).

See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge A.M. Sheridan
Smith
.

(New York: Pantheon,
archive, since

it

is

1972), p. 130. “It

trans.

not possible for us to describe our own
from within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to
and to itself, the object of our discourse^ its modes of appearance,

what we can say
its forms of existence and coexistence,

is

—

its

system of accumulation,

historicity,

and

disappearance.”

Lange,
Cf.

p.

229.

Hannah Arendt, “The Concept of History”,

mortals directly, the spoken word and

all

p. 44:

“What goes on between

the actions and deeds [associated with

freedom] can never outlast the moment of their realization and would never leave any
trace without the help of remembrance.”
Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism,

66

Guy Oakes

.
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trans.

(Cambridge: MIT, 1986),

p.

Lange,
Lange,

p.

355.

231.

p.

CJ, p. 36.

LAE,

p. \61H2>96-1.

BT,

p. 45.

BT,

p. 45.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Die dionysische
Weltanschauung” in
(Hereafter referred to as “DDW”).

BT,

p. 59.

BT,

p. 52.

BT,

p. 527/48.

“KSA” (Vol

D

BT, pp. 31-2/724; Kritische Gesamtausgabe:Nietzsche Briefwechsel:
Band
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1975), p. 269.

TSK,
482

by

p.

II,

ed.

407.

The

subject’s ability to reenact the experience ascribed to the “genius” is
presented
Nietzsche in “The Dionysian Worldview” as a universal capacity: “real art ability

to

create

images [Erschaffenkdnnen von Bildem] no matter whether

after-creation [Vor-schaffen oder Nach-schaffen].
all

n 554

—

humans

others through his artistic

TDW, p.

On this characteristic

meaning of art. The artist.
means to art.” (TDW, p. 564).

rests the cultural

567.

CJ,p. 181.
History, p. 89.

'*^^Ibid,p. 145.

Ibid,p.l43.
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this is fore-creation

.

.[is]

the one

—

common to
who forces

or

488

CJ, p. 177.
489

History, p. 89/725 1.

Friedrich Nietzsche,

KSA (vol.

1), p.

Ibid, p.

887.

“Uber Wahrheit und Liige im
aussermoralischen Sinne”,

in

883.

History, p. 153.

Ibid, p. 108.

unpublished fragment entitled “Notes
on History
and
HktLr»i <J
md H.stoncal
Science, Nietzsche offers a “Kantian”
critique of the Hegelian and
Histoncist conceptions of history as
an object of science which prepares
the way for an
task of accounting for its own
conditions of
possibility,
TOSS* iiw“'r
the medium through which the historian
sees [phenomena] consists of his
own representations (also those of his age) and
those of his sources. [Ferdinand

^

that the process which is thought
to develop
K ^^!iTbehind
history can be intuited; he does not only
want to tear the two skins of the
r^resentations of the [present] age and of the
sources apart, but also to lacerate the
ick and impenetrable skin that envelopes
the things themselves.” Friedrich Nietzsche
Aufzeichnungen iiber Geschichte und historische
Wissenschaft”, in “Musarion” (vol
^
'

1), p.

281.

Peter Berkowitz has recently interpreted Nietzsche’s
concept of monumental history
as an unsuccessful revival of classicism that
falters on account of an “unresolved
^^tagomsm” between the imposition of value on a senseless
world and a
superhistorical ethical order.” What Berkowitz does
not discuss is how

Nietzsche

overcome

atternpts to
illusion

antinomy be introducing the distinction between illusion as
and illusion as symbol. Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics
of an
this

Immoralist (Harvard: Harvard University Press,
1995), pp. 26,28.
,

History, p. 107; 130//294. “Der Spruch der Vergangenheit
ist immer ein
Orakelsupruch, nur also Baumeister der Zukunft, als Wissende der
Gegenwart werdet
ihr ihn verstehen.”

BT,p. 113//119.
History, p. 107.
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Ibid, 166.

History, p. 127.

Ibid, p. 110.

Ibid, p.130.

Ibid, p. 99.

Schiller’s essay
cf.

on “Universal History”

in this context:

p

'S meant to valne matter only
PP- * ^0' *
to the extent that
capable of taking on form and extending the
realm of ideas.”
•

it

is

History, pp.125-6, 116.

For an accounts of the Nietzsche-Wilamowitz relation
cf M.S. Silk and
Nietzsche on Tragedy, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,

J.P.

Stem,

1981), pp. 95-109.

CJ, p. 125.

^^^bid, 198.

^'°CJ,pp. 199-200.
CJ, p. 200.
512

•

Ibid, 196.

Ibid, p.

On why the cultural

and the moral are not

200.

^'^BT,p. 35.

^'^TDW,p. 571.
CJ, p. 200.

^'^CJ, 135//347.

CJ, pp. 226-7.
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identical, see pp. 319-20.

[is reached when]...all
that is
unity nature of the will manifests
height.” Among the many recent
texts
devoted to discrediting Walter Kaufmann’s
contention that Nietzsche remains
uncntically dependent upon Schopenhauer’s
philosophy in The Birth of Trage dy, cf
enry Staten, Nietzsche s Voice, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990) p.
205ff
Wayne Klein,
etzsche and the Pro ise of Philosophy
. (Albany; State University
of
^es^;i997),pp. 133-7;
StLulations:
^^usion
The Birth of Tragedy , in The Journal of Nietzsche
Studies 3 (1999), pp. 50’

dis^ves Itself in appearance, and beyond it
the
Itself The illusion, the delusion
[Wahn] is at its
1

^

m

Wdllf

m

BT,

p. 38//30.

Ibid, p. 34.
522

History, pp. 1 01 “That the great moments in the struggles
of individuals form links
one single chain; that they combine to form a mountain range
of humankind
.

in

through

the millennia, that for

me the highest point of such a long-since past moment is

ahve, bright, and

still

great—this is the fundamental thought in the belief in humanity
expresses itself in the demand for a monumental history.”
(p. 97).

that

CJ, p. 90.

CJ, p. 57.

cf CJ,

p. 47.
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BT, pp. 139-40. While the “sensus communis” was associated with the beautiful and
the experience of tragedy is allied with the sublime (insofar as the imagination is no
longer able to comprehend the significance of the image), Nietzsche asserts in “The
Dionysian Worldview” that the latter is something “common to all humans.” And while
Kant reserved the principle of “common sense” for the judgment of the beautiful, the
capacity for experiencing the sublime has

roots in

“human

nature.” It just does not
have the same degree of immediate accessibility as the contemplation of the beautiful,
which is why the latter was singled out in order to isolate the foundation for teleological

judgment

(as required

without a purpose.”
certain degree

its

by the vocation of reason)

of culture, but

it is

not produced by culture, (cf CJ, p. 125.).

BT, pp. 33,141.

HCC,

in the experience of “purposiveness

A judgment of the sublime presupposes the development of a

p. 140.

Ibid, p. 143.
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BT,

p. 60.
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Ibid, p. 137.
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BT, p 95. The Kantian philosophy was
unable to

arrest this secularizing

tendency

P”'"'
of so-called world
hisiow (96). In fact, Kant s system
histoiy
plays a pivotal role in this narrative,
for its task of
amulhng knowledge is read as a sign that a birth
of tragedy in modernity has to a
certain extent been prepared for by
“German”philosophy. For one of the rare works
in
English that focuses upon the “Pmssian
School” of historiography, ct Georg
G
Iggers
Jh^German Conception of History , (Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press 1968)

p
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History, p. 91 “We will therefore have to
consider the capacity to live to a certain
degree ahistoncally to be more significant and
more originary, insofar as it lays the
oundation upon which something just, healthy and
great, something that is truly
.

human
alone

IS

grow

able to

at all.

engendered, and
atmosphere.”
life is

History, p. 126.

Joan Stambaugh

The
it

ahistorical is like

an enveloping atmosphere

who

in Nietzsche’s early works is not acknowledged
by
reads “Historic” as an epistemological advance vis-a-vis
The

:

in

[in

“History’^”

Stambaugh, The Problem
Nietzsche (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press,
1987), p. 41.
,

^^^Ibid, p. 139.

BT,p. 141.
Ibid, p. 4.

Ibid, p. 59.

CTS,p.

CGT,

which

Such continuity

Birth of Tragedy “Nietzsche abandons the ground of the
mythical
an^..his inquiry shifts into the realm of the historical.” Joan

of Time

in

disappears again with the destruction of this

71.

p.6.

History, p. 89.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Richard

Wagner

in

Bayreuth” in

History, p. 126.
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CW (vol.

1), p.

270.

History, p. 126//290.

Ibid, p.95.

CPR, p.731.
Ibid, p. 106.

History, p. 88.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator”
in

The
ethical

historical process

demand

for a

takes on a

more

CW, p.

positive character

“new and improved physis”

218.

when the

aesthetic-

confronted with a heritage that
includes the tradition of classical philology and the
Kantian philosophy. When the
latter’s cntique of positivism and empiricism is
brought to bear on the methodology of
the former, then a “space” opens within which Hellenic
culture can be approached in a
way that produces an “alienating effect. .For ultimately, what we have
before us is
nothing but printed pages, not the reality of that tragedy. We
must supply the Greek
is

.

character to [the latter]. .But if we are able to do that, to recreate
the Greek in our
thoughts, then we have also almost created ancient tragedy anew
out of
ourselves. .Only analogous phenomena of our world, phenomena
that almost deserve to
be called Greek, can be of assistance to us now.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished
.

.

Writings from the period of Unfashionable Observations Richard T. Gray
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 139.
,

trans.

History, p. 90//250.
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While Mark Warren attempts

to undermine the assumption that “there is... [an]
ontological ‘chronophobia’ for Nietzsche”, he maintains that a mechanical
representation of time is counterpoised in “History” only by the valorization of the selfpositing subject’s ability to appropriate its own history; for Warren “chronophobia” thus

arises only

“from an

inability to act in such a

transformed into the future.

What

way that

the possibilities of the past are

causes ‘chronophobia’

is

a lack of power organized

Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge; MIT,
1988), pp. 81-2. For a statement of the “ontological” position Warren is opposing cf

as subjectivity.”

,

A Study of Nietzsche’s Moral and
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 14-5; Paul de
Man, “Literary History and Literary Modernity” in Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota, 1983), p. 150.
Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau:

Political

,

,

Ibid, p. 107//270. Phillipe

Lacoue-Labarthe has argued that “beneath the ethical

pathos [of Nietzsche’s “History”],

it

is

really an aesthetic thematic that

253

comes

to light.

and we recognize in the categories that
Nietzsche manipulates the
the theory or philosophy of art.”
This “lexicon” alludes

traditional lexicon

to a tradition

of

of German

with the impossible desire “to imitate
the Greeks without imitating
Laeoue-Labarthe does not consider in this
diagnosis of aestheticism is
the ethical pathos in question
can be illuminated by an interpretation
of the
relationship between Kant and Nietzsche.
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, “History
and
Mimesis m Looking After Nietzsche, ed. Laurence
A. Rickets, (Albany State
University of New York Press, 1990),
pp. 217, 224.

^hem ”

BT,

hL

p. 141.

History, p. 167, cf. p. 1 1 1 “the unity of artistic
style that manifest itself throughout
the vital self-expressions of a people.”
:

all

History, p.

1

32/7296.
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Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy (London:
Verson, 1985). Slavoj Zizek, “Beyond Discourse- Analysis,” in
Ernesto Laclau, ed. New
Reflections on The Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso,
1990), p. 249. (Hereaft^
.

.

referred to as
558

“New

Reflections”).

Ernesto Laclau, “The Impossibility of Society” in

“New

Reflections”, p. 92.

Ernesto Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony” in “Deconstruction
and
Pragmatism”, pp. 56-7. (Hereafter referred to as “Laclau, ‘D, P, H’”).
Ibid. p. 58. In this

way

ideological (or the idol)

is,

the relationship between the ethical (or the ideal) and the
Laclau claims, inverted: “the ideological would not consist

of the misrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the opposite: it would consist of
the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of
any ultimate suture.” (Laclau, “The Impossibility of Society”, in New Reflections, p
92).

Laclau, “D, P, H”, p. 55.

The Kantian conception of “finitude” here refers to the representation of the subject
whose inability to actualize its capacity for freedom is measured against the rational
ideal

of a “holy”

will.

Ernesto Laclau, “Introduction” to The Making of Political Identities Ernesto Laclau,
,

ed.

(New York: Verso,

1994), p. 3. (Hereafter referred to as “Laclau, ‘Introduction’”).

Laclau, “Psychoanalysis and Marxism”, in
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New Reflections

,

p. 93).
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LAE,p.

106//331.

Theory of the Novel, Anna Bostock

trans.

(Cambridge: MIT,

“D-ns.ruc.ion

p.;r
Ibid.

Laclau, “D,P, H”, p. 56.
570

Laclau, “In.roduc.ion”, p. 4. Cf. BT,
p. 45. Although the Ur-Eine symbolizes
a truth
be mimetically reproduced, “it also needs the
rapturous vision, the
pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption.”
that cannot

Laclau, “D,P.H”, p. 58.
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